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Atypical work, i.e. part-time and fixed term employment, has become the 
new norm in many industrialised countries. Welfare states, however, were 
traditionally designed to accommodate the needs of standard workers in 
manufacturing.
     This study examines to what extent welfare states have adapted to 
the proliferation of atypical work in the period of 1990 to 2008. Since the 
rise of atypical work is closely related to deindustrialisation and an in-
creasing role of services in developed economies, the study also deals with 
the question how the specific design of welfare schemes has incentivised 
growth or stagnation of various service sectors.
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For more than thirty years, labour markets in all devel-
oped economies have been subject to a trend of pro-
found change, which so far shows no sign of abating or 
slowing: namely, industry employment is in a process 
of steady decline. Averaged over 18 industrialised coun-
tries, manufacturing accounted for 28% of all jobs in 
1971; by the year 2005, the share had dropped to 16%. 
Services, by contrast, were undergoing the exact oppo-
site trend: growing from 52% to 72% of total jobs in 
the same period (for more details see chapter 3). Yet this 
shift has not been unfolding in a uniform way in each 
affected country. Services are a rather heterogeneous 
category, comprising a whole range of various activities 
with very diverse skill requirements. While some are 
solely market-based, others are to a large extent pro-
vided by public actors. Contingent on the institutional 
environment and the role of the state, the composition 
of the service sector differs widely across countries. In 
2008, for instance, it was ‹food and fun services›–Esp-
ing-Andersen’s (1990) terminology for restaurants, ho-
tels, trade, and other personal services–that accounted 
for more than 30% of total service employment in Aus-
tralia, New Zealand, Britain, Japan, and Spain, whereas 
in Norway, Finland, Belgium, and Denmark the corre-
spondent share was about ten percentage points low-
er. If, however, welfare services are observed, a mirror 
pattern emerges, in that those countries with a smaller 
proportion of ‹food and fun services› exhibit a rough-
ly ten percentage points higher fraction of welfare ser-
vices. Likewise, the pace by which the rise of services 
has been proceeding is not always the same. In Britain, 
Australia, the Netherlands, and Norway merely 10% of 
all jobs were in manufacturing in 2008, compared to 
still almost 20% in Germany and Italy. From this we 
can see that, despite a general trend towards an increas-
ingly service-based economy common to all industri-
alised countries, there is significant variation in detail 
and scale of how this change impacts labour markets, 
stirring particular interest in the underlying reasons for 
differing trajectories.
The current shift towards more service employ-
ment is not the only upheaval on the labour market, as 
it concurs with a steep rise in the number of part-time 
and temporary contracts, often referred to as ‹atypical 
employment› or ‹non-standard employment›.1 Between 
1996 and 2007, the share of part-time jobs rose from 
16% to 21% in the EU15, the share of temporary jobs 
from 10% to 12%. In the Netherlands, the country 
with most part-time jobs, no less than 47% of all em-
ployees worked shorter hours in 2008, up from 21% 
in 1983. Even those countries with the least part-time 
employment, Spain and Portugal, witnessed an increase 
from 6% to 12% over the same period. Temporary em-
ployment is less widespread, but marked by significant 
growth, too. In Spain, its fraction of total jobs rose 
from 10% to 24% between 1987 and 2008, in Portugal 
from 11% to 17%. The simultaneous increase in atyp-
ical work and the growing importance of services is no 
mere coincidence; as a matter of fact, the service sector 
relies much more on such flexible work arrangements 
than all other sectors, manufacturing in particular. This 
is clearly reflected in employment structures: in manu-
facturing, only 10% of employees were non-standard in 
the EU15 in 2007, whereas part-timers accounted for 
25% and fixed term workers for 13% of all employees 
in services. 
There are specific reasons for the higher dependen-
cy of service providers on atypical work. Because major 
parts of the tertiary sector are still fundamentally based 
on face to face interaction, firms have to configure their 
1 Both terms are used synonymously.
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staffing policies in a way that most closely matches con-
sumer demand. Atypical workers play a key role in this 
strategy by functioning as necessary buffers, providing 
flexibility to cope with temporary demand peaks. But 
not just for employers, also for employees non-standard 
work arrangements may turn out to be beneficial since 
they may facilitate to combine employment with fam-
ily obligations or act as stepping stones into work for 
groups with little attachment to the labour market such 
as the low-skilled, the young or immigrants (see chap-
ter 2). 
Irrespective of these potential advantages, atypical 
work also undoubtedly involves a whole range of specif-
ic risks to employees, grave enough to dominate major 
parts of the debate on non-standard employment. It is 
widely accepted that part-time and fixed term workers 
on average earn less, face shorter tenures and receive 
lower benefits (see chapter 3). It thus comes as no sur-
prise that atypical employees are frequently described 
as a generally troubled and disadvantaged group, while 
standard workers enjoy extensive privileges in that they 
are paid more generously, have open-ended contracts, 
easy access to fringe benefits and social security cover-
age. One of the most famous and earliest works taking 
this perspective stems from Doeringer and Piore (1971), 
who, as part of segmentation theory, conceived of atyp-
ical workers as forming an underprivileged second tier 
of the labour market. Recently, this line of thought has 
re-emerged under the label of dualism. At the heart of 
this concept is the very general notion that one specific 
group (the insiders) enjoys significantly higher advan-
tages than another (the outsiders). What these advan-
tages are specifically, and which group is thought to 
be the insiders (and which one the outsiders), depends 
on the objective a researcher pursues and can be de-
fined in numerous ways. When discussing dualism, it 
is thus not necessarily non-standard workers that must 
be thought of as outsiders. Other operationalisations 
would be possible, as applied, for example, by Iversen 
and Soskice (2009), who draw the line between skilled 
and semi-skilled workers rather than between standard 
and non-standard. It nonetheless seems more common 
to explicitly identify atypical employees as labour mar-
ket outsiders as is done, for instance, by Häusermann / 
Schwander (2013) and King / Rueda (2008), the latter 
of whom even go so far to equate atypical employment 
with ‹cheap labour›. Both studies share the assumption 
that dualism on the labour market is–among other 
things–a cleavage between standard and atypical work-
ers. 
Even if one accepts the idea that dualism is the 
unequal treatment of standard and atypical employ-
ees to the detriment of the latter, it remains unclear 
in which way this discrimination will manifest itself. 
Emmenegger et al. (2012) rightly note that dualism 
is a multi-faceted phenomenon which affects a wide 
range of different societal, economic and political di-
mensions. Therefore, if dualism is to be used as a scien-
tific concept, its meaning and scope must be carefully 
delineated. For their own research, Emmenegger et al. 
distinguish three dimensions of dualism: labour market 
dualism means that outsiders face disadvantages regard-
ing wages, employment stability and mobility, as well 
as opportunities for further training. Social protection 
dualism refers to patchy coverage of social security sys-
tems and unequal benefits. Political integration dualism 
refers to the under-representation of outsider interests 
in the democratic system as outsiders increasingly re-
frain from active participation in established ways. It is 
the former two dimensions which are at the heart of 
this thesis, while the latter one is not further discussed 
here. Most research interest so far has been attracted by 
labour market dualism, which is apparent in the huge 
number of studies examining the downside of atypical 
employment in terms of job tenure and remuneration 
(see chapter 3). Social protection dualism, in compari-
son, has commanded relatively less attention, although 
it seems most likely that atypical employees more often 
fail to meet qualification criteria and receive less gener-
ous benefits.
As to the underlying causes that have brought 
about labour market and welfare dualism, i.e. why ex-
actly some groups receive a better treatment than oth-
ers, there is a lively debate. Emmenegger et al. (2012) 
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emphasise that dualism is no necessary outcome of the 
employment shift towards the tertiary sector and the 
rise in atypical employment associated with it, but rath-
er a result of institutions failing to protect the rights 
of outsiders. Dualism is thus a consequence of politi-
cal decisions on the design of rules that govern labour 
markets and welfare schemes. One critical concept in 
this context is flexibilisation at the margin, referring to 
a reform strategy that leaves the rights of standard work-
ers largely intact while cutting back on the rights of 
atypical employees (Barbieri / Scherer 2009, Eichhorst 
/ Marx 2011, Eichhorst / Tobsch 2015). This strategy 
has been applied with particular success in the realm 
of employment protection legislation where temporary 
work contracts have seen significant liberalisation, when 
at the same time the protection of standard workers has 
remained virtually unchanged. This way, policy makers 
have hoped to allow for more labour market flexibili-
ty without incurring disaffection of voters on standard 
jobs with entrenched interests (Palier / Martin 2007, 
Palier / Thelen 2010, Saint-Paul 2002). Yet the applica-
tion of flexibilisation at the margin as a reform strategy 
is not restricted to the field of employment protection; 
it stretches further to areas such as wage determination 
and social policy. The coverage of wage agreements, for 
example, has become more fragmented, especially in 
Continental European countries, which leaves outsiders 
with lower earnings than insiders who remain fully cov-
ered. The same logic holds for insurance based welfare 
schemes which become more and more focused on em-
ployees with a sufficient contribution record, effectively 
barring those with a fractured employment history–of-
ten atypical workers–or offering less generous benefits 
to this group (Hassel 2011, Kvist / Greve 2011, Palier / 
Thelen 2010, Rueda 2005, Seelaib-Kaiser / Saunders / 
Naczyk 2011). 
Flexibilisation at the margin helps to explain the 
emergence of dualism from a politics point of view; 
the reason why a strategy of partly de-regulation often 
seems to be more successful than efforts for wholesale 
liberalisation lie in actors’ specific preferences. First of 
all, employers, who are keen to contain staffing expens-
es, wish to target any benefits and entitlements of those 
employees whose skills are indispensable for the firm’s 
success in order to retain them as long as possible. Flex-
ible, i.e. usually atypical, workers who may be nonethe-
less crucial for a firm’s success, especially in services, but 
who are also fairly easy to replace should thus receive 
a less generous treatment (Seelaib-Kaiser / Saunders / 
Naczyk 2011). Unions, too, may under certain circum-
stances view dualism as the lesser evil. If unions are in a 
weakened position, e.g. due to high unemployment or 
declining membership, they may not be able to strike 
deals on national or industry level, but have to resort to 
firm level bargaining which is likely to result in better 
settlements for a limited group of privileged workers, 
most of them in manufacturing. Unions may also have 
better incentives to protect social benefits of standard 
industrial workers because these form their core con-
stituency and can exert greater political influence than 
less organised atypical workers (Palier / Thelen 2010). 
Another suspect to foster dualism is social democratic 
parties. Since their main electorate is skilled workers, 
i.e. labour market insiders holding standard jobs, these 
parties face incentives to meet calls for flexibilisation 
and cost containment by concentrating the costs of 
such reforms on outsiders, barely touching upon the 
rights of insiders (Rueda 2005). The same logic is ar-
gued to apply to Christian democratic parties in systems 
of proportional representation. These parties basically 
act as platforms to collect votes across large parts of the 
middle class, including both white-collar, high-income 
earners as well as skilled blue-collar workers with modest 
wages supportive of a certain degree of social protection 
and redistribution. If Christian democratic parties then 
set about forming centre-right coalition governments, 
they must find ways to accommodate contradictory de-
mands of their constituencies, namely to provide social 
security without too much redistribution, which can be 
accomplished by limiting benefits mostly to the latter 
group of skilled workers, barring unskilled low-income 
earners (Iversen / Soskice 2009). 
What remains open to question is whether or not 
dualism is a lasting reform strategy that will permanent-
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ly segment employees in one privileged and one un-
derprivileged tier. While the theories mentioned above 
imply that dualism has the potential to last, others argue 
it might rather be a transitory state, eventually leading 
to erosion of insider privileges, as outsiders increasing-
ly put competitive pressure on them (Eichhorst / Marx 
2011). In this view, dualism is just a gateway to whole-
sale flexibilisation.
While a considerable number of case studies exists 
on welfare dualism, informing us in detail about the de-
sign of rules that cause specific forms of dualism and 
the political processes that have brought them about 
(see e.g. Eichhorst / Marx 2011, Palier / Thelen 2010, 
Seelaib-Kaiser / Saunders / Naczyk 2012), they do not 
provide a comprehensive view across a bigger number of 
countries. As a result, evidence on dualism based on in-
ternationally comparable time-series data is scarce. The 
main reason for this may be the inherent complexity 
of the term dualism: the magnitude of ways to define 
insiders and outsiders may impede on the comparability 
of studies. If a researcher aims for a cross section anal-
ysis of welfare dualism, it is therefore critical to, first of 
all, outline in an internationally applicable and consis-
tent way who the population groups are to be studied. 
Following major parts of the literature, this thesis is re-
stricted to deal only with inequalities between standard 
and atypical employees. The former work on full-time, 
permanent contracts, whereas the latter work either 
part-time, on a fixed term basis or both. This division 
seems appropriate since the studies on welfare dualism 
cited above suggest that it is primarily atypical employ-
ees who are likely to be disadvantaged in social securi-
ty schemes due to their more fragmented employment 
histories and lower earnings. Standard workers, by con-
trast, will in most cases meet all employment require-
ments and receive full benefits. Welfare dualism is con-
sequently defined as the unequal treatment of standard 
and atypical employees in the system of social provision. 
One must not confuse, however, atypical employ-
ment with precarious employment. Originating from 
Italy, Spain, and France, the notion of precarity has 
gained currency in almost all developed economies over 
the past few years. Precarity in its broadest sense does 
not only encompass conditions and terms of work, but 
also a general state of being deprived of opportunities 
in life and of participation in society. With regard to 
employment it hence refers to a kind of work that is 
uncertain, poorly remunerated, and resulting in low 
(or none at all) social protection entitlements (Arnold / 
Bongiovi 2013). All of these characteristics will mostly 
affect non-standard workers; precarity is thus chiefly an 
issue of part-time and fixed term workers. Yet this rela-
tion does not hold in the reversed way: many atypical 
employees may simply be working parents with higher 
education in well paid jobs whose socio-economic state 
is far from being precarious despite reduced working 
time or limited tenure. Atypical employees surely face 
a higher risk of precarity but they need not be pre-
carious. One more problem connected to the term of 
precarity lies in its inherent normativity. Precarity and 
atypical jobs are by definition undesirable states pol-
itics should take measures to contain. This, however, 
is not a claim this thesis wants to make. Atypical em-
ployment may be useful for groups as it helps to recon-
cile work with family life, acts as a stepping stone back 
in employment, or simply because employees wish to 
have more leisure time; it might not be a mere make-
shift for job seekers in order to bridge the time until 
they find standard work. For these reasons it would be 
wrong to mark all atypical work as inferior. Instead, 
this thesis seeks to analyse non-standard employment 
in a non-normative way, deliberately avoiding the term 
precarity.
1.1 RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The aims of this study are twofold. The first is to develop 
quantitative indices by which social protection of stan-
dard and atypical employees in case of unemployment 
and sickness can be gauged in a cross-time, cross-sec-
tion manner, informing us about existence, scale and 
evolution of welfare dualism over various countries and 
years, as such a measure is so far practically non-exis-
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tent.2 Then, the descriptive results are to be interpreted 
and made sense of in the context of Esping-Andersen´s 
famous three worlds typology. Since Esping-Anders-
en is primarily concerned with standard workers and 
social protection for them, in a first step hypotheses 
must be developed as to how atypical workers may be 
treated in his typology and then, in a second step, it is 
scrutinised whether or not reality fits the hypothesised 
patterns. The focus of this study is exclusively on the 
rules governing the entitlements of benefits. It is not an 
attempt to assess how these rules translate into aggre-
gated empirical outcomes such as number of recipients 
or average duration of receipt in each country and year. 
It is thus a comparative study on institutional rules of 
welfare entitlements and their evolution, irrespective of 
country and time-specific labour market conditions. 
The second aim is to apply these quantitative in-
dices in order to analyse in more detail the extent to 
which social welfare entitlements, particularly for atyp-
ical employees, as part of the institutional environment 
in an economy, give incentives that help or hinder var-
ious economic branches to build up employment. As 
the expansion of atypical employment is closely linked 
to the process of tertiarisation, it seems reasonable to 
assume that the integration of atypical employees into 
the systems of social security plays a non-negligible role 
in shaping the sectoral composition of employment. If, 
for example, high unemployment benefits lift up reser-
vations wages, employers in service sectors with a low 
wage floor may struggle to find workers. On the oth-
er hand, in manufacturing there is a high reliance on 
standard workers with firm-specific skills demanding 
generous levels of protection. Welfare retrenchment in 
this case may lead to a shortage of firm-specific skills, 
hurting employment in manufacturing.
There has been plenty of theorising on these rela-
tionships, often intricate and contradictory, yet there is 
no study so far testing these theories in direct compar-
ison with each other. Nor has it so far been possible 
2 Or afflicted by serious measurement and interpretation 
problems, see section 1.2.
to make statements whether welfare dualism affects em-
ployment in different industries in various ways. This 
study wants to shed more light on the employment 
effects of social security schemes by examining which 
kinds of specific welfare arrangements, including dual-
ism, are conducive to employment in specific economic 
sectors.
To reach this aim, it is necessary to define more 
precisely what is meant by the terms social security, so-
cial protection, and welfare which are used interchange-
ably. This study covers only welfare schemes providing 
financial support in case of job loss and illness. There 
are many more situations in which people may be in 
need of support (e.g. maternity and old-age), yet due 
to limitations of space and because they feature promi-
nently in comparative welfare state research, I will deal 
only with unemployment and sickness protection. Both 
are frequently two-tiered: initially, there is a contribu-
tion-based, non-means-tested scheme whose benefits 
are usually limited in time, requiring a contribution 
record in order to become eligible. If such a scheme 
does not exist, or if the claimant fails to meet the qual-
ification requirements, or if the maximum duration of 
receipt has been reached, the second-tier benefit ensues, 
which typically is state-funded and means-tested, but 
open-ended and not based on contributions prior to 
benefit receipt. It serves the purpose of providing a min-
imum income to those who have no other sources of 
income left. 
Within this framework of two-tiered social protec-
tion schemes, dualism can materialise in three distinct 
forms: first, atypical employees are excluded altogether 
from first-tier benefits through high work and contri-
bution requirements, while standard employees meet 
these requirements in almost all cases. Second, atypical 
employees who are eligible to first-tier benefits receive 
payments whose amount and duration is less than what 
standard employees receive. Third, benefits of the sec-
ond tier–the main source of social security for many 
atypical employees–are significantly less generous than 
first-tier benefits. 
In order to estimate the extent by which each of 
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these forms is present in a welfare scheme, four different 
aspects need to be observed and compared: (1) accessi-
bility (i.e. the qualifying conditions for the first tier), 
(2) generosity of first-tier benefits for standard workers, 
(3) generosity of first-tier benefits for atypical workers, 
and (4) generosity of second-tier benefits. The distinct 
ways in which countries combine these four aspects is 
called social protection arrangement3. A country, for ex-
ample, could tie high first-tier benefits for standard and 
non-standard employees to strict qualifying conditions 
while the second-tier benefit remains low. In this case 
it would be possible to state that dualism arises from 
harsh eligibility criteria to first-tier benefits and the low 
level of second-tier support, but within the domain of 
first-tier schemes standard and non-standard employees 
are treated almost equally. The description and analysis 
of such kinds of potential dualising relationships consti-
tutes the first empirical part of this study.
As for the research strategy, in a first step quantita-
tive indices are developed to measure the four aspects 
mentioned above. Since countries are likely to vary in 
the designs of their social protection arrangements, it 
is interesting to see if patterns emerge of countries with 
similar arrangements, and thus similar forms of dualism, 
particularly with respect to Esping-Andersen´s three 
worlds typology. From this, we would be able to learn if 
specific types of dualism are more common than others. 
The method at hand to check for common patterns is 
cluster analysis, of which, as a second step, I perform 
four in this thesis. The first two analyses are concerned 
with unemployment benefits and use as variables the in-
dices measuring the four aspects described above. One 
analysis deals with the year 1991 and the other one with 
the year 2006, to check how benefits evolved over time. 
The same is subsequently repeated for sickness benefits. 
Because clustering is a merely descriptive tool, a third 
step multivariate regression is applied to see whether 
there are general trends in how social protection ar-
rangements are structured. For that purpose, each of 
the indices are regressed on one another, resulting in a 
3 This term is also used by Seelaib-Kaiser et al. (2012).
total of four distinct regressions for each scheme. The 
second empirical part of this study then turns towards 
the consequences of social protection arrangements on a 
country’s employment structure. Once again, a series of 
panel regressions is conducted with employment shares 
of different industries as dependent variable and the in-
dices (together with some controls) as the regressors.
The study proceeds as follows. In the remainder of 
the introduction, I give an overview of previous efforts 
to measure welfare entitlements and why they are not 
suited to capture the situation of non-standard workers. 
Presenting detailed figures, Chapter 2 traces exactly by 
how much part-time and fixed term employment has 
been growing over the past few decades and demon-
strates that this process is primarily concentrated on 
the expanding service sector. It further gives reasons 
why both trends, i.e. growth in services and in atyp-
ical employment, are so closely linked to each other. 
Chapter 3 elaborates on the underlying causes driving 
service growth as identified in economics literature. 
Chapter 4 delves into the economic consequences of 
atypical work on employees by providing an overview 
of literature analysing micro data of non-standard work-
ers’ earnings and tenures. There is consent that atypical 
employees face lower wages and employment stability 
in most countries, effectively lowering their chances 
to acquire the same welfare entitlements as standard 
employees. Chapter 5 explains the purpose, basic prin-
ciples and general institutional designs of social pro-
tection schemes discussed in this study–i.e. unemploy-
ment protection, sickness protection, and second-tier 
minimum income protection–as they are typically in 
place in most developed countries. It also gives a brief 
overview of Esping-Andersen´s three worlds of welfare 
capitalism. Chapter 6 is the beginning of the analyti-
cal part of this study. It first sets out in greater detail, 
based on the discussions in preceding chapters, which 
specific aspects of welfare entitlements are decisive if 
their generosity, especially for atypical employees, is to 
be measured by indices. Then it introduces the method 
by which the indices are constructed, the data used, and 
presents first descriptive results. The next sub-chapter 
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derives hypotheses from Esping-Andersen´s three world 
theory on the social protection of atypical employees in 
each world and the resulting types of dualisation. This 
is followed by cluster analyses and regressions to see to 
what extent the hypotheses hold. Chapter 7 deals with 
the second research question of this study. First, it sums 
up existing theories and derives specific hypotheses to 
be tested. The second part then subjects these hypoth-
eses to close scrutiny by deploying multivariate panel 
regressions. Chapter 8 summarises the main results and 
concludes. 
1.2 LITERATURE OVERVIEW
The debate on welfare state retrenchment and reform 
is characterised by what Pierson (1996, 2001) calls the 
‹dependent variable problem›. It refers to the striking 
ambiguity of the term ‹welfare state› which can be used 
to label a whole range of different policies and institu-
tional arrangements. The provision of social services, for 
instance, can be viewed as one defining characteristic 
of welfare states, just as transfers and redistribution to 
the underprivileged, although both things are essential-
ly not the same. The meaning of ‹welfare state› is thus 
often blurry and so are scholars’ attempts to operation-
alise it. 
If generosity and retrenchment are to be examined, 
two approaches can be distinguished, both of which 
have been widely applied. One is to use aggregate so-
cial spending on various schemes as the dependent vari-
able (e.g. Castles 2004, Gornick / Meyers 2001, Siegel 
2002). This has been criticised because it does not allow 
to draw any conclusions whether a change in spend-
ing is caused by altered regulations or a change in the 
economic environment (an economic downturn, for ex-
ample, is likely to drive up the number of welfare claim-
ants). Proponents of the aggregate measure try to fix 
this problem by using ‹adjusted› spending instead, i.e. 
aggregate spending divided by the number of recipients. 
Even this procedure, however, leaves some issues unre-
solved; most prominently, it remains indistinguishable 
if changes to entitlements or changes to institutional 
governance are accountable for fluctuations in spend-
ing. Moreover, aggregate spending often reacts with a 
time lag, making its real determinants hard to discern 
(Green-Pedersen 2004, Kühner 2007, Scruggs / Allan 
2004).
Another approach was chosen by Esping-Anders-
en (1990). Rather than focusing on aggregate spending 
figures, he suggests  paying more attention to individ-
ual benefit entitlements as these have the advantage 
of being robust against changes in the economic envi-
ronment, do not have a time lag, and reflect more ad-
equately what a welfare state offers its citizens in terms 
of financial support. The drawback in this approach–de-
spite its intuitive logical appeal–is that it is difficult to 
implement in research practice. The challenge is meth-
odologically: while spending data are easy to come by 
and exploit, individual entitlements are contingent on 
a multitude of factors such as eligibility rules, replace-
ment rates, taxation and so on. Esping-Andersen’s solu-
tion to this problem is the construction of a single index 
merging all these factors into one single number that 
can be conveniently processed. He calls this index de-
commodification index, referring to the extent by which 
social security is removed from market dependency, 
applicable to all types of protection schemes that offer 
earnings replacements. The study at hand follows this 
approach since aggregate spending data are essentially 
incapable of informing us as to the disparities in pro-
tection between standard and non-standard workers. 
Understanding welfare dualism thus seems impossible 
unless individual entitlements are made the object of 
investigation.
The basic idea of the decommodification index 
was later taken up by Scruggs (2004) who extended the 
database to encompass several decades starting in the 
1960s, revised the computation method, and renamed 
it generosity index. Recently, the database has been fur-
ther expanded and the methodology refined (Scruggs / 
Jahn / Kuitto 2013). It comprises indices on unemploy-
ment and sickness benefits as well as on pensions; each 
index (except for pensions which are not included in 
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this study) is composed of four variables: replacement 
rates, benefit duration, required weeks in employment 
previous to benefits, and waiting days before the dis-
bursement of the benefit starts. All variables are com-
puted for a worker 40 years old with 20 years of employ-
ment history. The aggregation of the variables is done by 
the addition of the Z-scores of all variables, calculated 
on basis of the log-values of the raw variables across all 
countries and years, with replacement rates given a dou-
ble weight. The resulting score is finally weighted by the 
coverage rate of the respective benefit. 
This seminal approach allows one to compare the 
generosity of individual welfare entitlements across a 
wide variety of countries on a time series basis, there-
with opening up an entirely new perspective in com-
parative welfare state research. Yet with regards to the 
goal of this study, namely to analyse welfare entitle-
ments of atypical workers, the generosity index is not 
well suited because its focus is solely on standard en-
titlements. Replacements rates in the generosity index, 
for instance, are calculated for workers with a full-time 
work week, while corresponding figures for workers 
with lower earnings are not yet available. Furthermore, 
the only variable to measure the strictness of qualifying 
conditions, which is of foremost importance to atyp-
ical workers, is the number of employment weeks re-
quired to become eligible, even though there are other 
factors, such as the number of minimum hours of work 
per week, certainly posing no less an obstacle. Given 
that qualifying conditions are much harder to meet for 
atypical employees, they should likewise carry a higher 
weight in an index designed to gauge entitlements of 
non-standard workers. The generosity index is hence an 
excellent point of departure, but needs refinement to be 
applicable to part-time and fixed term workers.
A more explicit focus on atypical employment is 
placed by Tangian (2011). Originally designed to as-
sess the scale of flexicurity, i.e. the balance between 
employment flexibility and social security, in interna-
tional comparison, Tangian invented a new method by 
which social protection of both standard and atypical 
employees can be measured simultaneously. His ap-
proach deviates from Scruggs’ and Esping-Andersen’s 
in one fundamental point: rather than expressing the 
generosity of entitlements by a numeric value directly 
derived from predefined empirical indicators (e.g. re-
placement rates, duration of receipt etc.), he suggests to 
simply rank international welfare schemes according to 
their generosity. By doing so, he avoids the contentious 
issue of assigning exact numerical values and weights 
to each of the numerous aspects constitutive for benefit 
generosity; instead, it suffices to be able to state that 
one benefit scheme is more generous than another. The 
resulting ranks can be easily transformed into quanti-
tative scores. What is appealing about Tangian’s origi-
nal procedure is that protection of both standard and 
non-standard employees is ranked on the same scale 
and in direct comparison with each other. It is therefore 
possible to calculate the precise difference in generosity 
between standard and atypical employees’ entitlements, 
which could be interpreted as a quantitative measure of 
welfare dualism. Just like the generosity index, Tangian’s 
method is ready to be applied to a variety of provisions 
such as unemployment, sickness, maternity, pensions, 
and paid holidays. 
In spite of all these virtues, there are some severe 
caveats. One is that Tangian does not specify in greater 
detail which criteria were consulted in order to rank the 
schemes. This would not be too serious, if his primary 
goal were to present and demonstrate the basic func-
tioning of his new method. Yet in this case it obscures 
that there is one principal objection against ranking wel-
fare benefits of standard employees relative to those of 
atypical employees on the same scale. The critical point 
is that both cannot be evaluated by the same criteria and 
hence cannot be ranked in direct comparison to each 
other. An easy illustration of this problem is given by 
the role of qualifying conditions which play a profound-
ly different role in atypical and standard workers’ chanc-
es of receiving benefits. For standard employees with 
long contribution records and high income qualifying 
conditions might not matter much; to atypical employ-
ees they most likely do. Likewise, a given replacement 
rate can mean different things to different kinds of em-
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ployees depending on their income level. One group 
with high earnings may view a given percentage rate as 
generous while another one with lower earnings may 
not. In face of these differences between standard and 
non-standard employees in the criteria defining whether 
a benefit is generous or not, it seems as no good idea to 
measure both on the same scale, as this would wrong-
ly imply that benefits for both types of employees can 
be evaluated by the same criteria. The better way thus 
seems to assess both things by separate standards.
There are some other indices that do not deal with 
overall generosity, but focus only on the eligibility part. 
This includes contribution conditions as contained in 
the generosity index, yet extends further to comprise 
also behavioural requirements claimants are required to 
comply with. Making benefit receipt conditional on a 
certain behaviour is an attempt to stifle incentives to 
become long-term dependent on public financial sup-
port. Since the state of joblessness can only be escaped 
by an individual’s own job search efforts, the monitor-
ing of recipients’ behaviour is of special concern for the 
handout of unemployment benefits, which is why the 
support for the unemployed in almost all countries is 
linked to obligations to actively seek work. With regards 
to sick pay, such obligations are usually less rigorous as 
recovery from illness is less contingent on personal ef-
forts. Attempts to measure the strictness of behavioural 
obligations, which are differing largely across countries, 
are thus focused on unemployment benefits.And  to the 
best of my knowledge, no such attempt has so far been 
undertaken for sickness benefits. 
The most comprehensive approach to eligibility 
criteria measurement stems from Venn (2012) which is 
based on earlier studies by Hasselpflug (2005) and the 
Danish Ministry of Finance (1998). In addition to fa-
miliar criteria taking into account contribution history, 
she presents novel indicators of claimants’ obligations 
to be occupationally and geographically mobile, to be 
available during active labour market policy participa-
tion, and to proof serious job search efforts. These are 
further complemented by variables capturing the strict-
ness of sanctions authorities can impose should a claim-
ant fail to meet her obligations. The variables are coded 
on a scale from 1 to 5, weighted and added. Although 
this approach is certainly innovative and contributes a 
new perspective to the discussion of benefit generosi-
ty, it does not bear special importance for the debate 
on dualism, since obligations do not differ for standard 
and non-standard workers. Therefore, I decided not to 
include behavioural obligations in this study.
In short, I have adopted a method in the tradition 
of Esping-Andersen (1990) who assesses generosity of 
welfare states by analysing individual entitlements. This 
approach seems particularly well-suited for the aim of 
this study, which is to examine to what extent one group 
of employees faces conditions of social protection less 
favourable than others and how this impacts the struc-
ture of employment. Since no index so far has defined 
indicators explicitly concerned with the specific situa-
tion of atypical employees in comparison to standard 
ones, I have constructed three new indices: one is to 
gauge the strictness of qualifying conditions, while the 
remaining two measure amount and duration of bene-
fits for standard and atypical employees. Finally, I have 
left aside behavioural obligations because these are un-
likely to cause welfare dualism.

2. THE INCIDENCE OF ATYPICAL EMPLOYMENT
2.1 DEFINITIONS
Notions of atypical and standard employment are so 
closely intertwined that no definition of one can be 
given without a definition of the other. One approach 
frequently adopted by researchers is to delineate the 
concept of atypical employment ex negativo, i.e. as any 
kind of work arrangement that is not standard. The 
term atypical employment then is conceptually a blurry 
one, whose meaning is fully contingent on the defini-
tion of standard employment. In order to arrive at a 
more narrowed definition of atypical employment that 
is not a mere residual category, it is necessary to dwell 
more on the notion of standard as opposed to atypical 
employment.
First, it is important to note that the use of the term 
standard employment varies significantly among schol-
ars depending on the research topic. There are none-
theless several core elements central to most, if not all, 
definitions which can thus be considered to constitute 
the essence of the term. These are (i) the full time char-
acter of a job, (ii) its persistence (i.e. the work contract 
is not temporally limited), and (iii) the dependency on 
an employer. Among other crucial features frequently 
listed by researchers are a pre-defined career path within 
a company, the concentration on only one employer, 
work being done outside the home, as well as access to 
social insurance schemes, which is most important in 
Continental Europe. The latter features, however, are 
not essentially defining the concept because they are 
drawn on very selectively only when a given research 
project calls for it; if not, they are disregarded altogether 
(for an overview see Kress 1998). To keep the definition 
as parsimonious as possible and to avoid confusion, I 
restrict the meaning of standard employment to com-
prise only the core parts described above: standard em-
ployment is hence a work arrangement that is full time, 
continuous (i.e. without a fixed termination date), and 
dependent on one employer. I will turn to empirical op-
erationalisations later.
Atypical employment then can be defined as any 
deviation from the aforementioned standard. What 
militates against such a definition ex negativo is that it 
lumps together a whole range of various work arrange-
ment, such as part-time work, temporary work, agen-
cy work, casual work, and self-employment, some of 
which differ widely in their basic traits. This becomes 
most striking with self-employment, implying by defi-
nition that a person does not have an employer and 
thus, under certain circumstances, could be considered 
an entrepreneur rather than an employee. Furthermore, 
and most crucial to this work which is about the social 
protection of atypical employees, self-employed persons 
are prohibited from entering social insurance schemes 
in many countries so that social safety for the self-em-
ployed is organised in a profoundly different way than 
for employees, rendering a direct comparison difficult. 
The inclusion of agency work proves a problem too, 
as there is a huge variety of collective agreements and 
governmental rulings specific to this kind of work and 
often diverging from the general rules for employees. 
This complexity is further exacerbated by the relative-
ly low number of agency workers making it harder to 
determine the exact norms governing agency workers’ 
benefit entitlements in each country. Therefore, to keep 
the definition as simple as possible and to avoid bun-
dling overly heterogeneous types of employment rela-
tionships into one single category, I restrict the term 
atypical employment only to cover part-time and fixed 
term work. This restriction bears two more advantages: 
besides the fact that these sorts of employment are the 
most frequent forms of non-standard employment, thus 
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likely having the largest empirical impact, they also have 
in common their dependence on an employer, which 
facilitates the comparison. 
Initially, when the concept was developed parallel 
to the expansion of the welfare state in the years follow-
ing the second world war, the notion of the standard 
employment relationship involved an explicitly norma-
tive slant. Perceived as a means to protect employees 
from the contingencies of the labour market, it was 
supposed to ensure the stability of the job, to guarantee 
a fixed and reliable compensation on a regular base, 
and to stipulate the rights and obligations of employers 
and employees (Countouris 2007: 15–55, Mücken-
berger 1985b, Schömann et al. 1998: 10). Against this 
backdrop, work arrangements differing from the stan-
dard were easily suspected to constitute a less desirable 
lower tier of the labour market, withholding most of 
the privileges standard employees enjoy (e.g. Osterland 
1989). However, this normativity did not go without 
serious criticism; for example, critique was placed on 
the implicit assumption of a male breadwinner model 
inherent to the standard employment relationship. In 
absence of sufficient child care facilities, the working 
hours in a full time job would not allow the sharing 
of household chores equally and thus force one parent 
to act mainly as a homemaker. In this context, atypical 
employment increasingly emerged as a new and alter-
native way to reconcile family and work obligations by 
allowing for more flexibility in working time (Bosch 
1986). Another reason for the change in attitude to-
wards atypical employment was rising unemployment. 
By means of atypical employment it was hoped to re-
distribute an economy’s total workload to more people 
and to thereby create additional opportunities to job 
entry, especially for those with low attachment to the 
labour market (Keller / Seifert 2002). Research as well 
as the public debate have thus come to increasingly 
appreciate both types of employment for their respec-
tive advantages (i.e. stability and security as opposed to 
flexibility), without losing sight, however, of the spe-
cific downsides associated with either. In fact, chances 
and risks of atypical work have become subject to a 
wide variety of empirical studies whose outcomes I dis-
cuss in detail in chapter 3. It is important to note here 
that I do not imply any normative judgement either 
by the term atypical or standard employment. I none-
theless adhere to these names since they are established 
and frequently used, reflecting a reality in the labour 
market where dependent, full time, and permanent 
employment is still much more widespread than any 
more flexible type (at least in a large majority of de-
veloped countries). Social safety nets, too, are often as-
sumed to be more closely knit for standard employees, 
risking that part-time and fixed term workers might 
more easily slip through.
2.2 PART-TIME WORK
This section gives an overview of the empirical evolution 
of part-time employment in those OECD countries in-
cluded in the data set. First, I present data on how part-
time has changed as a share of total employees, and then 
further break down how the proportions of part-time 
differ between various branches of the economy being at 
the heart of this study. Since the approach to the iden-
tification of part-time work adopted by Eurostat is very 
different from the OECD’s and from statistical offices’ 
outside Europe, it is somewhat troublesome to compare 
shares of part-timers across many countries. Whereas 
the EU Labour Force Survey leaves it entirely to the re-
spondents of the questionnaires to classify themselves, 
the statistical bureaus of Australia, Canada, Japan, New 
Zealand and the OECD choose a clear cut-off point at 
30 hours of work per week below which a job is consid-
ered part-time. One possible way around this problem 
would be to solely rely on OECD sources, covering all 
countries in the data set, but unfortunately the OECD 
data do not provide information in sufficient detail 
down to the level of single economic sectors, leaving 
no other alternative than to draw on each country bu-
reau’s data, even when these are not always directly com-
parable. I begin with figures on Europe because these 
originate from a single, common source and hence are 
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based on the same definition, before I subsequently add 
further data on non-European countries.
A first glance at the total proportion of part-time 
in Europe reveals that it has been growing over the past 
two decades and accounts for a significant fraction of all 
jobs (see table 2.1). In 2008, the frontrunner with the 
highest share was undoubtedly the Netherlands with 
47% of total employment, all other countries trailing 
far behind. Switzerland, the country with the second 
highest rate, had a corresponding share of merely 34%, 
still higher than the rates of Sweden (27%), Germany 
(26%), and UK (25%). By contrast, Italy (14%), Fin-
land (13%), Portugal, and Spain (both 12%) showed 
the lowest shares. Latter countries (with the exception 
of Finland), however, also saw the highest growth in 
part-time work between 1996 and 2008, no less than 
doubling their shares. Even the Netherlands with their 
already very high rate further increased it by 15 per-
centage points during the same time span. Only in 
the Scandinavian countries of Denmark, Sweden, and 
Norway did part-time employment stagnate, albeit on a 
high level. On average, there was an obvious, increasing 
trend towards part-time work whose fraction of total 
employment exceeded 25% in most European countries 
in 2008.
After this brief overview of part-time incidence in 
total employment, I will turn to single distinct branches 
of the economy and their respective part-time rates. I be-
gin with manufacturing which is traditionally closely as-
sociated with standard employment (for reasons I discuss 
in the latter part of this chapter) and therefore is expect-
ed to rely least on part-timers. Indeed, contrasted with 
the economy in total, part-time rates in manufacturing 
are conspicuously lower (see table 2.2). The Netherlands 
Table 2.1: Shares of Part-time Workers in Total Employment. Source: Eurostat
Table 2.2: Share of Part-time Workers in Manufacturing. Source: Eurostat, Data on Sweden from 2007
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are once more the frontrunner and outlier with a share of 
28%, followed by Switzerland with 16%. Even though 
there is a rising trend in most countries, part-time shares 
barely climb over a threshold of 10%, which is less than 
half as much as in the economy in total. 
In stark contrast to these figures are the part-time 
shares in services. Starting with trade and repair, it is 
eye-catching that part-time rates were at least twice as 
high as in manufacturing and even up to four times 
larger (Finland and Portugal, see table 2.3). Compared 
to the share in total employment, in four countries 
(UK, Denmark, Germany, Norway) part-time fractions 
in trade and repair were more than 10 percentage points 
higher, whereas in only two countries (Switzerland, Por-
tugal) part-time was less common. Also the long-term 
trend points to an upward direction: the proportion of 
part-time in trade and repair grew almost everywhere, 
even when the same countries saw no increase of total 
part-time shares.
The same trend is even more pronounced in the 
data on hotels and restaurants (see table 2.4). The 
Netherlands, Denmark, UK, and Norway had part-
time shares that at least came close and sometimes even 
strongly exceeded the mark of 50%, thereby implying 
that part-time work may have become the rule rather 
than the exception already. Only Spain, Italy, France, 
Austria, Portugal, and Finland fell below a rate of 30%, 
which on average is still three times as much as in man-
ufacturing. As could be seen in trade and repair, these 
figures do not appear to be the final climax of a pro-
longed evolution unfolding over the past decades, but as 
an intermediate step on a continuous growth path that 
is set to continue.
When more sophisticated, high-skill services are re-
Table 2.3: Shares of Part-time Workers in Trade and Repair. Source: Eurostat. Data on Sweden from 2007
Table 2.4: Shares of Part-time Workers in Hotels and Restaurants. Source: Eurostat, Data on Sweden from 2007.
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garded, their part-time shares turn out to be highly de-
pendent on whether these are largely supplied by private 
or public providers. In real estate and business, a service 
sector dominated by private firms, part-time was twice 
as common as in manufacturing with an increasing ten-
dency, yet considerably less widespread than in hotels 
and restaurants (see table 2.5). By and large, the pattern 
of part-time employment in real estate and business ser-
vices closely resembles that in trade and repair.
The sector of education and health, however, which 
is high-skill and, in contrary to real estate and business 
services, to a much higher degree part of the public do-
main, is in its employment structure much more similar 
to hotels and restaurants, featuring the highest part-
time rates of all sectors (see table 2.6). 70% of all Dutch 
employees in education and health did their job on a 
part-time basis; in Germany, UK, and Switzerland the 
corresponding share amounts to some 40%. Only four 
countries–Italy, Spain, Finland, and Sweden–exhibit 
rates of less than 30%.
The trend of growing part-time employment, es-
pecially in services, is further confirmed by data from 
outside Europe. As said before, the data from inside 
and outside Europe are not directly comparable because 
both the definition of part-time employment and the 
classification of business sectors differ; but even if a de-
tailed comparison is impossible, the data nonetheless 
allow us to trace the same broad developments. In Can-
ada, the fraction of part-timers in manufacturing stays 
roughly the same on a low level throughout the peri-
Table 2.5: Shares of Part-time Workers in Real Estate and Business Services. Source: Eurostat, Data on Sweden from 2007
Table 2.6: Shares of Part-time Workers in Education and Health. Source: Eurostat, Data on Sweden from 2007
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od on which there is data (see table 2.7). Contrasting 
these figures with the proportion of part-timers in other 
sectors yields that in business and building services the 
corresponding share was four times larger, in education 
and health six times larger, in retail seven times larger, 
and in accommodation and food services even ten times 
larger. New Zealand’s figures roughly match Canada’s 
(see table 2.8). For Australia and Japan there are no de-
tailed time series available, yet based on specific publica-
tions of each country’s statistical agency, it is possible to 
derive some general conclusions from these countries. 
In Australia, part-timers accounted for 20% of employ-
ment in property services, 45% in health, 52% in retail, 
and 62% in accommodation and food services, where-
as their share was only 12% in manufacturing in 2008 
(Australian Bureau of Statistics 2008). Japan is the only 
country to deviate slightly from that familiar pattern: 
in 2007, the retail sector employed 24.6% part-timers, 
manufacturing 15.4%, while health care (14.6%) and 
other services (13.6%) surprisingly fell below the level 
of manufacturing (Asao 2011). 
Summing up, services in general seem to be much 
more predisposed to part-time work than manufactur-
ing throughout virtually all countries covered by this 
study. This holds particularly for hotels and restaurants 
as well as for social services, whereas the propensity to 
hire part-timers is slightly less pronounced in retail, re-
pair, real estate, and business services. Moreover, most 
countries saw considerable increases in reduced hours 
work between 1996 and 2008, suggesting that part-
time is increasingly becoming a regular and necessary 
form of employment, primarily in services. Manufac-
turing, by contrast, remains largely unaffected by this 
trend.
Table 2.7: Shares of Part-time Workers in Canada. Source: Statistics Canada
Table 2.8: Shares of Part-time Workers in New Zealand. Source: Statistics New Zealand
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2.3 FIxED TERM WORK
Analogous to the previous section, this part gives an 
overview of the development of fixed term employment 
as a fraction of total employment in various sectors of 
the economy. There are no problems with alternating 
definitions between different statistical authorities in 
this case, allowing us to readily compare all figures. 
Since OECD data are not broken down by sectors in 
sufficient detail, I draw on national and Eurostat sourc-
es instead. It is necessary to stress that neither data on 
part-time nor on fixed term employment have been 
corrected for overlaps so that the total proportion of 
atypical employment in an economy cannot be worked 
Table 2.9: Shares of Temporary Workers in Total Employment. Source: Eurostat
Table 2.10: Shares of Temporary Workers in Manufacturing. Source: Eurostat, Data on Sweden from 2007
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out by simply adding up the percentage shares given in 
this and the previous section. Determining such a total 
share is not substantial for the purpose of this study, 
however, as the measurement tools introduced later 
are able to cope with such overlaps by design. I start 
with presenting data on temporary contracts as a share 
of total employment and take a closer look at distinct 
branches, first in European and then in non-European 
countries.
From 1996, the first year for which comprehensive 
data are available, to 2008, the European mean share 
of fixed term work in total employment rose by two 
percentage points from 10% to 12% (see table 2.9). 
That is, temporary work was only half as widespread 
as part-time work and its growth was also considerably 
weaker. The more sluggish overall growth is explicable 
by the lack of a shared international trend towards more 
fixed term jobs: after all, there were six countries, i.e. 
a little bit less than half of all European countries in-
cluded, where percentage shares decreased rather than 
rose. Unlike the evolution of part-time, temporary work 
shows no uniform growth pattern; common to both 
forms of atypical employment is only that their basic 
levels strongly vary across countries. In 2008, fractions 
of temporary employment ranged from 24% and 17% 
in Spain and Portugal to 4% in the UK.
In manufacturing, fixed term work is as widely used 
as part-time and in most cases slightly below the total 
economy average (see table 2.10). Taking a more de-
tailed look at single countries, there is hardly any differ-
ence recognisable between the share of temporary em-
ployment in the total economy and in manufacturing, 
Table 2.11: Shares of Temporary Workers in Trade and Repair. Source: Eurostat, Data on Sweden from 2007
Table 2.12: Shares of Temporary Workers in Hotels and Restaurants. Source: Eurostat, Data on Sweden from 2007
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the exception being Spain which has a far lower rate in 
manufacturing. 
Fixed-term shares in trade and repair strongly re-
semble those in manufacturing (see table 2.11), there-
by deviating from the pattern observed for part-time 
employment which had a markedly higher share in 
this segment of services. One common feature of fixed 
term and part-time employment is that the Netherlands 
once again take the position of the frontrunner with the 
highest percentage.
Considerably higher are the shares of fixed term 
jobs in hotels and restaurants (see table 2.12). Here, in 
most countries, the percentage is about twice as high 
as in manufacturing and rose by about five percent-
age points within the years between 1996 and 2008. 
Sweden, Ireland, UK, and Norway display shares even 
three times greater than in manufacturing. Only in Bel-
gium is almost no difference observable. Exceptions to 
the upward trend are Spain, Finland, UK, and Norway 
which were the only ones to decrease their figures.
Table 2.14: Shares of Temporary Workers in Education and Health. Source: Eurostat, Data on Sweden from 2007
Table 2.13: Shares of Temporary Workers in Real Estate and Business Services. Source: Eurostat, Data on Sweden from 2007
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were ranging between 9% and 12%, in accommodation 
services between 16% to 20%, in business services, real 
estate, and education between 20% and 30%. Only in 
health care shares were somewhat lower between 12% 
and 14%, thus below the corresponding European fig-
ures. Australia, Japan, and New Zealand unfortunately 
do not release data on temporary employment in a com-
prehensive time series format suitable for use here.
Summarising, fixed term employment is only about 
half as widespread as part-time work and hence not 
about to become a new form of standard employment. 
Moreover, it is in general not as highly concentrated on 
services as part-time work, but in some service sectors 
– particularly in accommodation, restaurants, educa-
tion, and health – we can nonetheless find a notably 
higher incidence of temporary employment. Therefore, 
and because fixed term jobs have been on the rise in a 
great number of countries, they should not be neglect-
ed when services and their reliance on atypical employ-
ment is to be scrutinised.
2.4 CAUSES OF ATYPICAL EMPLOYMENT 
GROWTH
In the preceding section we have seen that atypical em-
ployment is expanding and concentrated primarily in 
the tertiary sector. This section gives a summary of exist-
ing theories and empirical evidence explaining the un-
Table 2.15: Shares of Temporary Employment in Canada. Source: Statistics Canada
The pattern of temporary employment in high 
skill services is ambiguous. While proportions of fixed 
term work in real estate and business services are close 
to manufacturing (see table 2.13), the education and 
health sector resembles more the hotels and restaurants 
sector (see table 2.14). In 2008, the average share in 
the latter was five percentage points larger than in man-
ufacturing and had been growing by two percentages 
points since 1996. Turning to single countries, fixed 
term shares in education and health were no less than 
twice as big as in manufacturing in seven countries, 
and almost no country showed percentages lower than 
in manufacturing. Shrinking shares occurred only in a 
small number of Scandinavian and Anglo-Saxon coun-
tries, yet still remaining above the level of manufactur-
ing. In real estate and business services, by contrast, 
shares of temporary workers mostly did not exceed the 
single-digit threshold.
For non-European countries it is much more dif-
ficult to determine precisely the shares of temporary 
employment because many statistical offices do not 
publish reliable data on that topic. One exception is 
Canada which provides detailed time series on trends 
in fixed term work. The figures for Canada appear to 
be greater than in Europe and demonstrate a strikingly 
higher incidence of temporary workers in services than 
in manufacturing (see table 2.15). While in the latter 
sector the share was constantly at about 7% of total jobs 
between 1997 and 2008, the respective figures on trade 
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is well equipped to adapt to rapidly changing market 
conditions in a fast and efficient way. Atkinson high-
lights, among others, two specific forms of flexibility 
most important for this study. First, a company must 
be capable of functional flexibility, i.e. employees can be 
easily shifted from one field of work to another. This 
requires firms to invest permanently in their employees’ 
skills in order to qualify them for a variety of different 
tasks. To make sure that employees for which employers 
have undertaken considerable training investments do 
not leave before these investments have paid off, firms 
will try to bind them closely by offering them high pay, 
long working time, fringe benefits, and employment 
stability. Second, Atkinson calls it numerical flexibility 
if a company is also able to quickly reduce or increase 
the number of employees, or their respective working 
time, in order to better match current workload with 
the level of the firm’s labour resources. A common tool 
to achieve numerical flexibility is the use of atypical 
work contracts, stating only a reduced volume of work 
or a predefined expiration date. These contracts can be 
precisely customised to satisfy firms’ need for labour 
without incurring the costs of overemployment. Atypi-
cal work then is a means to increase numerical flexibili-
ty, whereas standard employment serves the purpose to 
endow a firm with functional flexibility. Both kinds of 
flexibility can occur at the same time and at the same 
firm. Segmentation, referring to Doeringer and Piore’s 
terminology, within the theory of the flexible firm is 
thus a deliberate strategy to enhance employers’ flexibil-
ity and competitive edge.
Another famous distinction is based on work 
by Lindbeck and Snower (1988). In their model, the 
workforce is divided into insiders and outsiders, the 
former being well trained and holding secure jobs, the 
latter looking for jobs and willing to accept work even 
if it is unstable and poorly paid. Despite their consid-
erably higher compensation, insiders cannot be readily 
replaced by outsiders because this would entail heavy 
turnover costs. Employers thus have to find ways by 
which they can deploy insiders and outsiders to the 
maximum benefit of the firm. For insiders, this is com-
derlying reasons of the growth in atypical employment 
and its linkage to the simultaneous expansion of ser-
vices. At the heart of each such theory is a modelling of 
the incentives employers face when they decide whether 
to offer an atypical job.
One of the earliest contributions stems from Do-
eringer and Piore (1971) who interpreted atypical em-
ployment in a context of labour market dualism. In 
what they term ‹segmentation theory› they distinguish 
between two types of employees. The first type is the 
‹core workers› who are effectively sheltered from pure 
market forces as they enjoy an extensive set of privileges 
awarded to them by their employers. Among the most 
crucial are the guarantee not be dismissed unless the firm 
is in existential distress, access to various fringe benefits 
and social protection. Core workers therefore usually 
do not compete with job seekers from outside the firm 
according to market rules, but rather act on internal la-
bour markets governed by hierarchies and administra-
tion. ‹Peripheral workers› on the other hand, as opposed 
to core workers, lack most of these privileges and hence 
find themselves heavily exposed to external labour mar-
kets, forcing them to settle with smaller wages, poor 
working conditions, no social protection, and less em-
ployment stability. Doeringer and Piore conclude that 
peripheral work is closely tied to atypical work which is 
particularly prevalent among low skill, labour intensive 
activities (such as many services), allowing for a high 
turn-over of staff in accordance to market fluctuations, 
given that workers on this skill level are easy to replace. 
Core employees, in turn, often are more well trained, 
fulfilling tasks most crucial to the firm, and therefore 
generally covered by standard contracts. In this view, 
atypical jobs are perceived as deprived forms of work 
only used by employers to fill vacancies with low skill 
requirements in the most flexible, cost saving way.
Atkinson (1984) has further elaborated on this 
approach by pointing out with greater precision the 
mechanism by which standard and atypical workers 
can benefit a firm. For this purpose he introduced the 
notion of the flexible firm: a firm which by its organisa-
tional features and its management of human resources 
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monly achieved through internal flexibility, i.e. compa-
nies can adjust both working time and tasks of their 
core workers as swiftly as possible. Outsiders’ utility to 
the firm, by contrast, is maximised when they are put 
on positions where they perform either very simple, low 
skill or non-recurring, non-standard operations strongly 
affected by business fluctuations. It is thus employers’ 
ability to quick numerical adjustment, called external 
flexibility, that is constitutive for outsiders’ benefits to 
firms.
Since the flexibility concepts of Atkinson and Lind-
beck and Snower show extensive overlaps, both can be 
combined to a single scheme as is done by the OECD 
(1990) and Keller and Seifert (2002):
• Internal-numerical flexibility: when capacity uti-
lisation is fluctuating, the volume of work can be 
adjusted. The primary means of doing so are reduc-
tions and increases of working time. In contrast to 
external-numerical stability, the total number of 
employees remains constant.
• Internal-functional flexibility: when production re-
quires it, organisational structures of work can be 
adjusted and employees can be rapidly shifted from 
one task to another. This is based on broad qualifi-
cations of the employees and the absence of overly 
strict work rules.
• External-numeri cal flexibility: when capacity is not 
fully utilised, labour can be easily shed. Likewise, 
workers can be hired without great efforts once the 
business situation improves. This requires the nee-
ded skills to be in sufficient supply among the work-
force and not to be too firm-specific.
• External-functional flexibility: when demand in 
the labour market changes, the workforce is able to 
adapt by acquiring new skills. This is the foremost 
requirement to avoid problems of mismatch.
Leschke (2008) lists various practical measures by 
which firms can achieve the mentioned forms of flex-
ibility.
• Internal-numerical flexibility: working hours can be 
adapted by part-time work, overtime, working time 
accounts, employment-securing reduction of wor-
king hours, and week-end working.
• Internal-functional flexibility: restructuring of work 
organisation can be facilitated by continuing edu-
cation, on-the-job training, life-long learning, and 
job rotation.
• External-numerical flexibility: for the most part, 
this category comprises measures of hire and fire. If 
comprehensive dismissal protection makes easy lay-
offs impossible, the most widespread tools are fixed 
term employment, temporary work agencies, and 
on call work.
• External-functional flexibility: To prevent mismatch 
and to enhance productive flexibility, active labour 
market policies, subcontracting, and freelance la-
bour can be used.
According to the models described above, atypical em-
ployment serves to provide employers with numerical 
flexibility by facilitating the adjustment working time 
(part-time employment) or the number of employees 
(fixed term employment) to match the workload. This 
raises the question as to the existence of the standard 
employment relationship which, at least on the face of 
it, does not seem to offer any of these flexibilities. One 
answer is that the stability the standard employment 
relationship ensures is a prerequisite for internal-func-
tional flexibility which is based on employers’ and em-
ployees’ training investments, which only pays off if the 
employment relationship is long-term.
The hypotheses on firms’ rationales to employ atyp-
ical workers have so far been quite general and did not 
offer any details on the specific circumstances under 
which employers may be particularly inclined to call for 
part-time and fixed term workers. A variety of studies 
deals with this issue in greater detail. One argument 
frequently presented in favour of part-time work is op-
timal staffing: if firms have operating hours longer than 
regular working time or if firms face rush hours during 
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the day or the week (e.g. in supermarkets), the addition-
al labour demand can most efficiently be met by part-
time employees whose working hours are precisely syn-
chronised with business peak times (Allaart / Bellmann 
2007, Euwals / Hogerbrugge 2006). The same logic also 
applies on a macro level if firms are strongly affected 
by fluctuations of the business cycle and therefore have 
to cut down on excess labour regularly (Buddelmeyer / 
Mourre / Ward 2004, Friese 1997). Although flexibili-
ty arguments seem to play the major role regarding the 
creation of part-time jobs, several studies also point to 
wage saving aspects. Since part-timers usually do not 
bear as much responsibility and occupy lower posi-
tions in their firms, they do not earn the same wage 
as standard employees. Furthermore, in some countries 
part-timers can legally be excluded from fringe benefits 
(Allaart / Bellmann 2007, Ehrenberg / Smith 2000). 
Not least, employees themselves may want to work 
shorter hours to have more leisure time or, more impor-
tantly, to be able to reconcile work with family life. As 
this is an issue still concerning mostly women, Euwals 
and Hogerbrugge (2006) can show that the proportion 
of women is a strong predictor of a firm’s number of 
part-time jobs.
As has been said, the advantage of fixed term work 
is that it adds to external flexibility by stipulating an 
exact date by which the employment contract will be 
automatically terminated. It is thus a convenient tool 
for companies coping with seasonal demands or large, 
unsolicited orders. Moreover, if firms need to realise 
special short-term projects requiring particular skills 
they cannot provide themselves, fixed term work may 
be a way to acquire the sought-after skills only for the 
given project without permanently inflating the pay 
roll (Burgess / Connell 2006). Another reason pertains 
to firms with high technology profiles, frequently fo-
cused on niche products, facing the challenge that they 
have to familiarise any new employee with intricate, 
non-standard technologies and procedures. Because 
this takes time and may not necessarily succeed, firms 
may want to prolong the probation period by initially 
making a work contract fixed term (Kalleberg 2000). 
Besides increased flexibility, the extent to which there is 
an incentive to hire on a temporary basis hinges on the 
strictness of employment protection legislation penalis-
ing the dismissal of standard employees. If firing costs 
are generally high, attempts to contain costs also mo-
tivate the use of fixed term contracts (Laird / Williams 
1996). Finally, employees too may sometimes wish to 
work in temporary arrangements, especially when they 
have been jobless and therefore see fixed term jobs as an 
opportunity to regain work experience or when family 
responsibilities do not allow them to take on work on 
a permanent basis (Morris / Vekker 2001, Schömann / 
Rogowski / Kruppe 1998).
These incentives for atypical work generally apply to 
all economic sectors, but carry more weight for services, 
which is reflected in the higher incidence of non-stan-
dard jobs in most tertiary branches of the economy. 
There are several reasons for this. First, most services, 
unlike industrial goods, cannot be stored and hence 
need to be produced in the very moment the consumer 
is present. Fluctuations in demand then translate im-
mediately to fluctuations in production, requiring any 
service company to organise their staffing accordingly 
(Smith 2005). Second, services are less capital intensive 
in production than manufactured goods so that wages 
and salaries account for a bigger share of overall costs. 
The pressure to bring down labour expenses is there-
fore higher for service producers than for manufacturers 
(Bosch 1995). A number of studies tests this interrela-
tionship empirically for various service sectors. Partic-
ularly for trade and hotels, where shares of atypically 
employed turned out to be high, Davidson / Guild-
ing  / Timo (2006), Kauhanen (2008), Künn-Nelen / 
de Grip / Fouarge (2013) and Specchia / Vandenberghe 
(2013) show that keeping costs low and matching staff-
ing as closely as possible to customer fluctuations are 
key to operate successfully in these markets. A strategy 
often pursued by employers in these segments is to re-
tain some standard employees in charge of all vital oper-
ational procedures, while all additional demand for la-
bour on less responsible positions is covered by atypical 
employees. Sightler / Adams (1999) and Baret (2005) 
carried out similar studies about the personnel policies 
of hospitals, concluding that the need to keep health fa-
cilities continuously staffed in combination with strong 
cost pressure result in increased usage of atypical em-
ployees. In high-skill and high pay services, however, the 
usage of atypical employment is less beneficial as Plant-
enga / Remery (2005) and Haipeter / Pernod-Lemattre 
(2005) show for software development and banking. As 
these sectors depend less on passing customers and their 
products do not necessitate the presence of the supplier 
of the service, numerical flexibility contributes less to 
cost saving efforts, even though especially in software 
development fixed term work is frequently used to im-
plement short-term projects.
As a conclusion, we can state that atypical em-
ployment is indeed primarily used for the numerical 
flexibility it lends to firms in adjusting labour to work-
load, whereas wage saving reasons play a more subor-
dinate role. On side of the employees, it is the wish to 
re-enter the labour market after a period of absence 
or to reconcile family and work that make (mainly fe-
male) employees want to work on non-standard terms. 
These incentives play an overwhelming role especially 
in large parts of the service sector which is most reli-
ant on precise staffing policies in order to match cus-
tomer fluctuations as closely as possible. This general 
rule, however, applies particularly to social and low-
skill services rather than to high-skill business services 
which consequently exhibit lower rates of atypical em-
ployees.
3. TERTIARISATION
‹Deindustrialisation› is frequently, and in my view false-
ly, used as a label for the trend of declining shares of 
manufacturing in total employment and total value 
added. Although there is no doubt that manufacturing 
now employs fewer people and adds less to GDP than 
in the 1970s, it is highly debated whether there is a real 
loss of industry production in developed countries. 
Savona and Lorentz (2006), for example, argue that if 
the real output is observed rather than the fraction of 
GDP or the number of jobs, the industrial sector has 
not diminished, but in fact has increased in all but 
two countries (UK and US). Manufacturing is hence 
still at the core of most countries’ economies, making 
the term ‹deindustrialisation› fairly misleading. In my 
view, ‹tertiarisation› better grasps the changes that all 
developed countries are currently undergoing, namely a 
steady shift of employment towards services and, conse-
quently, an increasing production therein, yet without 
necessarily entailing a loss of industrial substance. In 
this study, I will only deal with the employment aspect 
of tertiarisation (i.e. the rising share of service employ-
ment) and leave the value added aspect aside. The next 
section presents descriptive data illustrating the extent 
of tertiarisation, followed by another section providing 
theoretical insights and empirical results of its economic 
causes.
3.1 DESCRIPTIVE DATA
Since comprehensive data on most countries only be-
came available in the course of the 1960s, it is impossi-
ble to trace the evolution of services on a comparative 
basis further back in time. Until the beginning of the 
Table 3.1: Share of Manufacturing in Total Employment. Source: OECD, Data on Germany from 1961 and 1969, on the UK from 1963, on 
the US from 1962
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1970s, employment in manufacturing is either char-
acterised by relative stability in countries where the 
shares had already achieved a high level of more than 
25% of total employment, or by significant growth in 
countries engaged in catch-up processes, starting from 
a level significantly below 25% (see table 3.1). A result 
of this development was that, by the onset of the 1970s, 
a strong international convergence in the economic im-
portance of manufacturing had taken place as almost 
all observed countries had reached proportions of in-
dustrial employment exceeding the mark of 25%. This, 
however, has also been the moment where the trend has 
passed a tipping point after which it has reversed on a 
universal scale; during the 1970s, employment shares 
of manufacturing started to shrink in all countries, yet 
with different paces. By 2008, the Anglo-Saxon coun-
tries and Norway had the lowest shares of all countries 
(slightly more than 10%), while Germany maintained 
the highest position with a share of more than 20%. It-
aly, Austria, Japan, and Portugal, too, still had relatively 
high shares in 2008. Overall, with fractions of employ-
ment in manufacturing being down to 10%–20% in 
2008, all observed countries recorded substantial loss-
es of industrial employment as compared to the year 
1975, when the corresponding shares had been mostly 
between 20% and 30%.
With respect to total services, all countries have 
seen a rather uniform, continuous growth of employ-
ment shares from the 1960s onward, leading to a high 
convergence between countries (see table 3.2). In 1960, 
all countries had employment shares between 30% and 
50%, the only exceptions being Spain and Portugal 
with less than 30% and the US with more than 50%. 
By 2008, all countries (other than Portugal) had moved 
closer and reached portions of service employment be-
tween 65% and 75%. Therefore, each country has in-
creased its share by no less than 20 percentage points. 
It is striking that, unlike in manufacturing, most coun-
tries retained their relative positions compared to other 
countries over the decades. US, UK, Canada, Belgium, 
and Australia, for instance, exhibit the highest shares 
throughout the entire period, while Portugal, Spain, 
Germany, Italy, and Austria always rank lowest. As an 
interim conclusion, we can therefore state that, from 
1960 to 2008, all observed countries decreased employ-
ment shares in manufacturing by about 10 percentage 
points on average, which is in stark contrast to the evo-
lution of total service employment whose correspond-
ing share rose by up to 30 percentage points over the 
same time span.
Total services are a very heterogeneous catego-
ry, however, comprising lots of distinct activities with 
widely differing features. It thus appears useful to fur-
ther break down the category ‹total services› into more 
basic components. Broadly following Wren (2013: 
117), I distinguish four different types of services (for 
details on these classifications see chapter 7.2.):
1. Non-dynamic services (hotels, restaurants, retail 
Table 3.2: Share of Total Services in Total Employment. Source: OECD, Data on Australia from 1964, on Finland from 1971, on Ireland from 
1971, on New Zealand from 1971
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and wholesale trade, other community, social, and 
personal services)
2. Storage, transport, and communications
3. Dynamic-services (finance and insurance, real esta-
te, business services)
4. Welfare services (education, health and social work, 
public administration)
For non-dynamic services, time series on employment 
are available for all countries only with the beginning 
of the 1980s (see table 3.3). Despite the more restricted 
observation period, there is a clear increase in employ-
ment shares in all countries except Belgium, Switzer-
land, and the UK; in most cases the increases amount to 
three or four percentage points, which is somewhat less 
than the growth in total services. The absolute shares 
vary strongly. The highest fractions can be found in the 
Anglo-Saxon countries and Japan (about 30% to 35%), 
the lowest in Finland, Belgium, Sweden, and Norway 
(about 20%).
Hardly any growth can be noticed in transport, 
storage, and communications (see table 3.4). In 2008, 
all countries’ shares oscillate between 5% and 7% of to-
tal employment, just like they did in 1970, with only 
minor shifts among countries. It might be the peculiarly 
close conjunction with manufacturing that, contrary to 
the general trend, hindered employment shares in this 
sector from rising.
A much more striking upward movement is ob-
served in dynamic services (see table 3.5). Starting from 
an initial level no higher than 10% in any observed 
country in 1970, dynamic services rose by more than 10 
Table 3.3: Share of Non-Dynamic Services in Total Employment. Source: OECD, Data on Australia from 2006, on Canada from 1981, on 
France from 2007, on Portugal from 20061971
Table 3.4: Share of Storage, Transport, and Communication in Total Employment. Source: OECD, Data on Australia and Portugal from 2006
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percentage points in most cases, sometimes even more, 
so that in 2008, apart from Portugal, employment shares 
in this sector ranged from 12% in Spain to 22% in the 
Netherlands. Interestingly, there are only few catch-up 
effects. Countries with higher shares in the beginning 
of the time series mostly upheld their lead until the end 
of observation, sometimes even widening the distance 
to the relative laggards whose speed of growth does not 
match the frontrunners’.
Much more varied is the development of employ-
ment shares in welfare services (see table 3.6). As with 
non-dynamic services, time-series on this topic are 
short, making a comparison over the entire period im-
possible. What clearly emerges from the data, however, 
is that no uniform growth trend is inherent to all coun-
tries. While some experienced an extraordinary expan-
sion of welfare employment from 20% to 30% or more 
(e.g. Denmark, Norway, France, and Finland), others 
stagnated (e.g. Canada, at about 20%) or grew only 
moderately (e.g. Spain, from 15% to 20%, or Austria 
from 17% to 22%). Portugal and Japan were outliers 
in 1970 with shares of about 10%, but caught up to a 
certain extent over time. Yet even in cases where a sub-
stantial expansion occurred, major parts of it took place 
before 1990; later increases a far less substantial (with 
the exception of Switzerland).
As a summary, it is mostly dynamic services which, 
from the 1970s on, are accountable for service employ-
ment growth, as they have steadily and significantly 
increased in all countries over the whole period. Also 
non-dynamic services added to higher service employ-
ment shares everywhere, even though their contribution 
Table 3.5: Share of Dynamic Services in Total Employment. Source: OECD, Data on Australia and Portugal from 2006
Table 3.6: Share of Welfare Services in Total Employment. Source: OECD, Data on Australia and Portugal from 2006, on Canada from 
1981, on France from 2007
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is roughly only half as large as that of dynamic services. 
Welfare services, too, play a crucial role in service em-
ployment expansion in some countries, especially in the 
years up to 1990, but a minor one thereafter. Transport, 
storage, and communications, finally, do not make up 
for higher employment shares in 2008 as they did 30 
years earlier and therefore are negligible as a cause of 
increasing service employment.
3.2 THEORIES ON TERTIARISATION
There is a magnitude of competing theories on the prin-
cipal causes of tertiarisation most of which can be dis-
cerned by whether they choose the supply or demand 
side as a point of departure.1
1. On the supply side, it is the unequal pace of pro-
ductivity growth, which is significantly higher in man-
ufacturing than in services that is accountable for the 
secular shift to more service employment. If demand for 
manufactured goods is assumed to be constant, rising 
productivity means that ever fewer workers are need-
ed to produce the same amount of output, resulting in 
less labour-intensive production and fewer people em-
ployed therein. The service sector then will have to ab-
sorb the redundant share of the workforce since tertiary 
production is still very dependent on labour inputs. 
Dating back to the 1940s, this strand of reasoning was 
most influentially put forth by Clark (1940), Fourastié 
(1949), and Bell (1976).
Initially, technological progress was identified as 
the main source of productivity growth which is likely 
to benefit manufacturing markedly more than services. 
Because services often rely on face-to-face interaction of 
providers and customers, which can hardly be enhanced 
by technical improvements alone, they do not hold the 
1  Some theories may not neatly fit this categorisation. 
Palma (2008), for instance, argues that Dutch disease may 
induce tertiarisation by weakening a country’s local industry. 
Causes like these, however, apply only under very specific 
circumstances and do not account for the general trend obser-
vable in all advanced economies. This study focuses only on 
theories aiming to explain the general trend.
same potential for productivity hikes as industrial pro-
duction. Other attempts to rack up service productivity, 
besides technological innovations, are equally bound to 
fail as they, as a concomitant, necessarily will deterio-
rate service quality, thus neutralising the productivity 
boosting effort. If, for instance, waiters in a restaurant 
are required to service a higher number of tables, the 
quality of the service is likely to decline. There may be 
some innovations that help to increase productivity in 
services (the introduction of electronic cash registers 
may shorten the time span the waiter needs to add up 
each customers’ bills), but the improvements are mar-
ginal compared with those reached in manufacturing.
Since the time of Clark, Fourastié, and Bell, two 
more causes have gained currency in explaining why 
productivity rises faster in manufacturing (Palma 2008). 
First, international trade, particularly with non-indus-
trialised countries in the south, has helped to bring 
down the costs of manufactured goods by allowing for 
cheap imports, thereby expediting the relocation of low-
skill manufacturing jobs to countries with a lower wage 
floor. As a consequence, jobs in manufacturing become 
increasingly scarce in highly developed countries, requir-
ing former industry workers to seek jobs in the service 
sector. The theory underpinning this argumentation is 
more formally described by the Heckscher-Ohlin-Mod-
el and the Stolper-Samuelson-Model, providing some 
insights into the motivations and outcomes of trade 
among countries in different states of development. The 
Heckscher-Ohlin-Model assumes that economies pro-
duce and trade only two goods, one is labour-intensive 
and the other one capital-intensive. Once the two econ-
omies start to engage in a trading relationship, each is 
going to export the one sort of goods for which it holds 
a comparative advantage and to import the product for 
which it has a relative disadvantage. In case of trade be-
tween a highly industrialised, capital-abundant coun-
try and a less industrialised, labour-abundant country, 
this means that the more highly developed country will 
sell capital-intensive goods to the less developed coun-
try and, in turn, buy more labour-intensive ones. The 
Stolper-Samuelson-Model then predicts what is likely 
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to happen within the economies of the trading partners. 
In the more capital-abundant country, the share of in-
come that goes to the production of labour-intensive 
goods will decline as these are increasingly purchased 
from abroad; the sector will consequently shrink and 
reduce its share of employment. The capital-intensive 
sector, by contrast, steps up its revenues through exports 
and therefore can expand. Both trends may not be em-
ployment-neutral, however. Since more capital-inten-
sive production entails that demand for labour inputs 
is getting relatively smaller, it is implausible that the ex-
pansion of the capital-intensive sector can outweigh the 
loss of employment in the declining labour-intensive 
segment. The result of trade then is less total employ-
ment in the production of goods in the more advanced 
country (even though overall economic efficiency may 
have risen). In the economically less advanced country, 
the same applies in a reversed way.
These conclusions have been questioned by Nor-
dhaus (2005) who is more sanguine about the aggre-
gate gains of trade industrialised countries will be able 
to reap. If through higher imports price levels of la-
bour-intensive manufactured goods go down, it allows 
customers to buy more and thus generates additional 
demand for capital-intensive products. Likewise, firms 
get the chance to purchase cheaper, labour-intensive in-
termediates on global markets which give them an extra 
competitive edge, leading to higher sales and a more ac-
celerated expansion of business than predicted by the 
Stolper-Samuelson-Model. As such, international trade 
may cause a downsizing of labour-intensive production 
in developed countries, but these losses could be offset 
by overall gains in wealth, helping the capital-intensive 
sector to grow disproportionately on a scale sufficient to 
absorb all labour that had become redundant.
Second, outsourcing has become a new strategy of 
manufacturing firms, aiming to cut costs by purchasing 
services from external providers rather than perform-
ing them by themselves. This concerns low-skill services 
like facility cleaning as well as high-end services such 
as consulting, software applications, or advertising. The 
trend towards outsourcing is reinforced by products be-
coming more sophisticated both in terms of their tech-
nological components and their marketing as consum-
ers’ wishes have grown more demanding, raising firms’ 
needs for highly specialised services as inputs. In an ever 
more competitive environment where firms are coerced 
to keep their costs under tight control, many will have 
no other option than to outsource some of the required 
services since providing them by themselves would not 
be affordable. However, any service outsourced by a 
manufacturer is not counted as part of the manufac-
turing sector any more, but as pertaining to the service 
sector. On paper, this drives up employment and value 
added in services although, in fact, production and con-
sumption patterns have not been altered. Tertiarisation 
then may be, partly, nothing more than a mere statis-
tical artefact.
2. On the demand side, affluence has been growing 
in tandem with productivity in industrialised countries. 
With rising productivity, manufactured goods become 
ever cheaper and abundant. Once a certain level of 
supply in material goods has been reached, consumers 
may be saturated and turn their demand more towards 
services. Therefore, with growing consumer affluence a 
larger proportion of income might be spent on services, 
increasing the share of employment in this sector.
The level of wealth by which consumption patterns 
change was presumably reached in the 1970s. Earlier 
gains in manufacturing productivity and affluence used 
to have the opposite effect of further boosting indus-
try employment as described in the model by Meidner 
and Rehn (1951). They show that rising productivity 
in manufacturing can even increase the corresponding 
employment share if the gains of greater productivity 
are shared with employees in the form of higher wages. 
These will further stimulate demand for material goods 
and consequently allow for continuous expansion of the 
industrial sector. In this scenario, potential job loss due 
to productivity growth is fended off by stronger con-
sumer demand. 
In the 1970s, this win-win-situation came to an 
end as consumers’ demand for manufactured goods was 
largely satisfied, inducing them to direct more of their 
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consumption towards services. And services can thus 
be considered a kind of luxury item for which demand 
grows disproportionately once more basic needs have 
been met (Kongsrud / Wanner 2005, Kalwij / Machin 
et al. 2007). This results in services taking an ever larger 
share of output and employment as incomes grow.
How far this effect of saturation goes is highly de-
bated, however. Rowthorn and Coutts (2004) find that 
actual demand in manufactured goods does continue to 
increase with higher affluence rather than to abate, but 
that productivity growth in manufacturing outpaces de-
mand growth. As a result, a bigger part of income can be 
spent on services while consumption of manufactured 
goods still keeps on rising. In this view, saturation does 
not mean that demand for secondary products is stag-
nant in absolute terms, but that it merely grows more 
slowly than demand in tertiaries.
3.3 EVIDENCE ON THE CAUSES OF 
TERTIARISATION
These points have been subject to detailed scrutiny in 
the literature which, unfortunately, is afflicted by the 
common problem that suitable proxies for productivi-
ty growth and affluence are not readily available. Most 
researchers employ a country’s GDP instead, using it 
mostly as a substitute for exact productivity data. GDP, 
in fact, is far from being a perfect proxy for productiv-
ity as GDP can also grow, for instance, through high-
er commodity exports that do not affect productivity. 
Moreover, it is likely to simultaneously gauge a coun-
try’s affluence which is often endogenous to its produc-
tivity. Hence, by using GDP as a proxy, the effects of 
productivity and affluence cannot be separated. Despite 
these limitations, these studies are helpful in that the 
vast majority of them agree on the same conclusion that 
international trade is not the primal cause of tertiarisa-
tion, but that productivity or affluence (as measured by 
GDP) have played a much bigger role.
One recent study stems from by Kollmeyer (2009) 
who analyses 18 OECD countries between 1970 and 
2003, taking into account the indirect effects of trade as 
suggested by Nordhaus. Kollmeyer uses both GDP and 
differential productivity growth in his calculations, with 
the former acting, rather uncommonly, as a proxy for 
national wealth. He finds that the GDP has the biggest 
impact on tertiarisation with a share of 34% of the over-
all effect whereas, surprisingly, productivity accounts 
for only 15%. Trade takes on a middle position with a 
share of 24% of the aggregate effect. It is very likely that 
GDP inadvertently picks up part of productivity’s real 
effect so that 15% seems to be underestimated; given 
the multicollinearity of both variables, productivity ap-
pears not to have a smaller effect than trade. Still, trade 
is accountable for about a quarter of aggregate tertiari-
sation, implying that any demand stimulation by trade 
does not outweigh its labour shedding effect in manu-
facturing.
Rowthorn and Coutts (2004) yield the same result 
for the role of international trade in their analysis of 23 
industrialised countries during 1963 and 2002. Deviat-
ing from Kollmeyer’s approach, they do not add to their 
estimation a separate measure of productivity to stand 
besides the GDP as explanatory variable. They assess the 
effect of GDP to account for roughly 50% of the de-
cline in manufacturing employment which is equal to 
the value in Kollmeyer’s study if the parameters of GDP 
and productivity were added together. Two older studies 
by Alderson (1999) and Saeger (1997), using data from 
the late 1960s to the early 1990s in 18 and 14 OECD 
countries, essentially confirm these results. Trade is re-
sponsible for about 20% to 30% of tertiarisation, while 
GDP growth is the cause of about 50% of job share loss 
in manufacturing. Rowthorn and Ramaswamy (1997) 
are among the first to use productivity data while drop-
ping GDP completely from the regression. In their re-
sults for the EU 15, US, and Japan (1970–1994) differ-
entials in productivity growth brought about two thirds 
of tertiarisation, whereas the impact of trade is next to 
none. As this deviates markedly from results of other 
studies, it may be instructive to have more studies that 
do not include GDP as a variable, but try to proxy pro-
ductivity and wealth in a more straightforward way.
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Kucera and Milberg (2003) choose a different re-
search strategy by abandoning regression altogether and 
conducting a factor-content-analysis instead, by which 
they are able to determine the labour content embodied 
in changes in manufacturing output and the extent to 
which manufacturing trade impacts this labour content. 
Their analysis comprises ten OECD countries from 1978 
to 1995. The conclusion the authors arrive at is strikingly 
similar to the majority of results of the aforementioned 
studies: 21.5% of tertiarisation is due to international 
trade. Therefore, today’s state of knowledge about the un-
derlying causes of tertiarisation can be concisely summed 
up: roughly 50% of service employment growth has been 
triggered by growth of either productivity or affluence 
(which is hard or even impossible to keep apart), only 
20%–30% stem from the impact of international trade.
Outsourcing as a final reason for tertiarisation has 
been met with much less interest because it is measur-
able only through very detailed input-output-analyses 
for which data availability is quite limited. Montresor, 
Vittucci, and Marzetti (2011) performed one such anal-
ysis for seven OECD countries over 20 years (1980–
2000) and concluded that integration of manufacturing 
and services indeed has increased, but that the effect is 
too small to account for a significant share of tertiari-
sation. One drawback of their study is, however, that 
they are unable to estimate the exact size of the overall 
effect outsourcing takes on manufacturing and service 
employment.
McCarthy and Anagnostou (2004) tried to estimate 
the extent of outsourcing in British manufacturing be-
tween 1979 and 1998. According to their estimations, 
manufacturing might look smaller than it really is: over 
the years outsourcing has increased and is accountable 
for about 10% underestimation of real manufacturing 
output at the end of the observation period. This is 
considerable, but certainly carries less weight than the 
effects of productivity and trade.
4. THE IMPACT OF ATYPICAL EMPLOYMENT ON WAGES AND TENURE
This chapter deals with the question of which individual 
consequences it has to be employed on atypical terms. 
There are two factors central to the acquisition of social 
security entitlements: the continuity of the employment 
relationship and the wage earned. In order to under-
stand how atypical workers may be disadvantaged by 
welfare schemes, it is therefore necessary to be informed 
about the extent to which non-standard jobs differ from 
standard ones in remuneration and tenure. Over the 
past few years, a large number of micro-level studies 
on various OECD countries have been published, that 
analyse the disparities in wage and continuity between 
standard and non-standard work, which I summarise in 
this chapter. First, however, I begin with an overview of 
theoretical expectations about the individual effects of 
part-time and temporary jobs. 
4.1 THEORIES ON THE EFFECTS 
OF ATYPICAL EMPLOYMENT
The previous chapter has shown that firms’ foremost 
reason to hire atypical workers is the flexibility they 
provide in synchronising staffing levels more precisely 
with fluctuating demand and extensive operating hours. 
Yet this flexibility comes with a downside for employ-
ees’ productivity, repressing substantially the potential 
for wage growth: since atypical jobs are mostly concen-
trated in the labour-intensive service sector rather than 
in capital-intensive manufacturing, their mean labour 
productivity is below the average of the total economy. 
Beyond this sectoral effect, there are certain other fea-
tures inherent to atypical employment that are likely 
to curb labour productivity growth and hence depress 
compensation. 
Classical human capital theory states that, due to 
the reduced number of hours they are present at the 
workplace, part-time employees do not acquire the 
same work experience as full-time workers. The same 
applies to temporary workers who have to change em-
ployers regularly and thus do not gain the same senior-
ity as workers with long tenures. Moreover, firms are 
unlikely to invest as much in training measures for atyp-
ical as for standard employees. A significant fraction of 
atypical employees is therefore likely to end up as parts 
of a supplementary workforce, hired merely for the pur-
pose of preventing temporary staff shortages, while the 
main work, involving the most productive and reliable 
tasks, is still the remit of standard employees. For these 
reasons, workers on atypical jobs face a high risk to get 
stuck in positions requiring less sophistication, offering 
smaller chances to be promoted and, consequently, low-
er pay. 
Another cause of diminished productivity, closely 
associated with the use of atypical employees as an ancil-
lary workforce, may be the putative negative selection of 
workers into this kind of employment. If, for the most 
part, employers recruit part-time and temporary work-
ers to fill staffing gaps, it seems reasonable to assume 
that these positions will attract less educated or less mo-
tivated applicants who were denied a standard job (Hu / 
Tijdens 2003). This, in turn, would result in lower pro-
ductivity of atypical workers and justify smaller pay. In 
accordance with Doeringer and Piore’s theory of seg-
mented labour markets, atypical work in general may be 
stigmatised as a sort of second-rank employment suita-
ble only for less qualified and less committed job seek-
ers, leading employers to assume reduced productivity a 
priori, although in many cases this may be false.
Apart from productivity differentials, pay penalties 
can also originate from employers’ fix costs, which are 
approximately the same for standard and non-standard 
THE IMPACT OF ATYPICAL EMPLOYMENT ON WAGES AND TENURE42
workers, but with atypical employees working fewer 
hours or shorter tenures to recover them. Firms may 
therefore try to split the costs by offering lower wages. 
On the other hand, there is also a counter-argu-
ment to the previous hypotheses, predicting an extra 
pay in atypical jobs, rather than a penalty. Since working 
hours in atypical jobs are less attractive than in standard 
jobs and the associated risk is higher due to lower em-
ployment stability, workers have to be compensated by 
higher wages if firms are to satisfy their need for flexible 
work arrangements (Schömann / Rogowski / Kruppe 
1998). This rationale generally holds for part-time and 
fixed term workers alike, but might play a bigger role for 
the latter group who sometimes is specifically hired to 
fulfil special, temporary assignments the employer lacks 
the knowledge to complete by himself. Given their par-
ticular value to the firm, fixed term employees might 
therefore have a greater leverage to extract from employ-
ers an extra compensation for their insecure status.
Besides a wage penalty, we can also expect that 
atypical jobs are marked by less stability than regular 
ones, i.e. the average tenure of an atypical employment 
relationship will be shorter and more frequently be fol-
lowed by periods of unemployment. It is only natural 
to assume lower stability for temporary contracts, be-
cause it is the very purpose of such contracts to allow for 
external flexibility without incurring firing costs. Fixed 
term workers are thus continuously faced with the risk 
of recurring unemployment. The effects of part-time 
work on employment stability, by contrast, are not as 
evident. In principle, part-time contracts (unless they 
are also temporary) are subject to the same employment 
protection legislation as full-time ones,1 so that tenures 
need not be shorter based on the type of the contract. 
There are nonetheless some factors that could make 
part-time workers more vulnerable to losing their jobs 
than standard employees. Part-timers are often hired 
to cope with fluctuations and peaks in demand, which 
makes them more likely to be the first to become re-
1  There are some exceptions for part-time contracts inclu-
ding only very few hours (e.g. in Germany), which then are 
not covered by the same employment protection legislation.
dundant when demand is changing or declining (Bud-
delmeyer / Mourres / Ward 2004, Holmlund / Storrie 
2002). As many of them have less experience and lack 
seniority as well as employer provided training, their 
functional flexibility may not be as strongly developed 
as full-timers’. Moreover, if the employer has invested 
less in training of part-timers, the financial loss when 
dismissing them is also smaller. Should, on top of these 
reasons, the assumption of negative selection of un-
qualified workers into atypical employment turn out 
to hold, thereby rendering productivity of part-timers 
generally weaker than full-timers’, then the risk of part-
time employees to be among the first to lose their jobs 
will be particularly high.
Literature on this topic often suggests the opposite, 
however. Rather than focusing on growing instability, 
many authors highlight the increasing opportunities 
atypical contracts provide for job seekers with little 
labour market attachment to restart an employment 
career (Barbieri / Sestito 2008, Booth / Francesconi / 
Frank 2002, Picchio 2008). A limited duration of ser-
vice and a reduced number of working hours decrease 
the risk the employer is exposed to when hiring some-
one whose skills and motivation may be at question. 
This, in turn, could prove as a stepping stone back into 
work for unemployed persons who otherwise would not 
have been given the chance due to insufficient skills or 
long absence from the labour market. In this context, 
atypical employment could even have the counterintu-
itive effect of initiating stable, long-term employment 
relationships. 
At this point, two competing strands of theories 
about the stability of atypical work have been identified: 
the first conceives of atypical jobs as dead ends, inade-
quate to induce lasting employment, as they are highly 
sensitive to demand fluctuations and afflicted by small 
labour productivity. The second perceives non-standard 
contracts as stepping stones back into work, eventually 
leading to permanent jobs, primarily for those whose 
labour market assets are small. Since it is impossible 
to determine solely through theoretical considerations 
whether the stability enhancing effect outweighs the 
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stability undermining effect or vice versa, in the next 
section I give a summary of the empirical evidence on 
wages and tenures of atypical employees, while paying 
special attention to the direct comparison with standard 
employees. 
4.2 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
ON WAGE PENALTIES
The scale of wage penalties and its determinants are 
among the most popular research topics in the field of 
atypical work. Because the number of studies on this 
issue is large, each highlighting different countries, time 
periods, and methods, it is possible here to derive a clear 
picture of the extent of wage gaps and their underlying 
causes across most countries and years covered. In order 
to reduce the number of reported studies to a feasible 
level, I have restricted this overview to studies at least 
partially concerned with the countries and time periods 
included in my dataset.
The most recent comparative work on part-time 
employees is Colella (2014). He focused on women’s 
hourly wages in France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, 
Spain, Switzerland, and UK in the period from 2004 
to 2011. When controlling for age, educational attain-
ment, and job type, he is able to detect a significant gap 
between part-time and full-time wages in all countries 
except Sweden. The penalty is largest in Spain (19%), 
somewhat lower in Germany, Italy, and Switzerland 
(approximately 15%), and lowest in the UK and the 
Netherlands where women with reduced working time 
earn only about 10% less. In Sweden, by contrast, there 
is even a premium to part-time employment of 25%. 
The parameters used do not suffice to explain the entire 
penalty in any of the observed countries and their ex-
planatory power varies considerably across the observed 
countries. In the UK and the Netherlands, for example, 
more than 50% of the gap remain unexplained, whereas 
in France and Spain the corresponding figure is less than 
10%. Therefore, as a second step, Colella tried to ac-
count for negative selection in his regressions by includ-
ing more variables connected to household type, health 
status, and work history. If the wage gap and the unex-
plained fraction thereof widen in spite of the addition-
al controls, this is an indication that negative selection 
based on barely measurable, personal factors is present. 
In Italy, Spain, and Germany the results indeed suggest 
that this is the case. The results for UK and France do 
not change, while in the Netherlands the penalty even 
turns into a small premium. The same applies to Sweden 
where the effect was even more pronounced. In the lat-
ter two countries, rather than negative selection, it was 
positive selection of women into part-time jobs, causing 
their hourly wages to rise above the level of standard 
jobs. Colella concludes that female part-time work has 
become the new normal in the Netherlands and Swe-
den, associated with neither negative selection nor wage 
discrimination. The opposite holds for Germany, Spain, 
and Italy (less so in France and UK), where jobs with 
reduced hours appear inferior in terms of remuneration. 
Yet it remains open to question whether this inferiority 
is caused by adverse selection based on personal features 
or by genuine wage discrimination on part of the firms.
Other studies do not support Colella’s result of 
no wage gap–apart from the controlled factors–in the 
Netherlands. Hu and Tijdens (2003) compared British 
and Dutch data from 1994 to 1998 and do find wage 
discounts in both countries for part-time employees 
with short working time (between 12 and 21 hours): 
in the Netherlands, they earned on average 11% less 
than their full-time counterparts, with the usual control 
parameters unable to explain all of the gap. Part-time 
employees with long regular working time (between 22 
and 29 hours), by contrast, earned only 3% less, which 
is completely accounted for by the controls. Hence, 
Dutch part-time employees were affected by a pay pen-
alty that grows larger the fewer hours they work. Anoth-
er study by Russo and Hassink (2005) provides one pos-
sible reason for this specificity of part-time wages in the 
Netherlands. By examining Dutch firm data of the years 
1997 to 2000, they show that no wage gap exists for 20 
years old job entrants, but that pay gradually diverges 
over the course of a career due to the fact that full-time 
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employees are promoted more often, whereas part-time 
employees rarely advance to more prestigious positions. 
This is still favourable compared to the situation in 
the UK. There, according to Hu and Tijdens, part-tim-
ers earned about 30% less, no matter what their exact 
working time was. Control variables cannot explain the 
total size of the gap. Moreover, the unexplained frac-
tion is almost three times larger in the UK than in the 
Netherlands, implying that wage discrimination may be 
more pronounced in the UK. Less pessimistic are Man-
ning and Petrongolo (2008) who analysed the situation 
of working women in the UK in 2003. They describe 
a gross wage gap of only 22% for part-timers, which is 
considerably smaller than in other studies. About half of 
this gap is caused by educational variables, firm location 
and size, seniority, and economic sector, the other half 
by the current occupation. Only 2.5–3.4 percentage 
points remain unaccounted for.
Another comparative study on women’s part-time 
penalty was conducted by Bardasi and Gornick (2008) 
who used older data from 1994 and 1995. The exam-
ined countries are Canada, Germany, Italy, Sweden, UK, 
and the US. They exclude, however, women in margin-
al part-time (i.e. weekly working time of less than ten 
hours). Despite this shift in focus, their results resem-
ble Colella’s. Without controlling for any intervening 
factors, they found a gross wage gap between part-time 
and full-time of 22% in the US and Italy, 12–15% in 
Canada and the UK, 8% in Germany, and a marginal 
premium of 1% in Sweden. When control variables en-
ter the estimation, these gaps narrow to 15–18% in Ita-
ly and the US, and 9% in Canada and Germany. In the 
UK, the gap almost disappears. Bardasi and Gornick’s 
results therefore are consistent with Colella’s findings 
that in Germany and Italy a part-time pay penalty exists 
which cannot be explained by observed variables, and 
so is likely to be caused by discrimination or negative 
selection beyond characteristics such as health, house-
hold type, or work history. The same obviously holds 
for Canada and the US. Only the UK seems to deviate 
from Colella’s, as well as Hu and Tijden’s, estimates by 
displaying only small signs of a pay penalty once the 
controls are added. Bardasi and Gornick further stress 
that differences in occupation bear far more explanatory 
power for pay gaps in liberal countries such as Canada 
and the UK than in Continental Europe. This may be 
an immediate consequence of greater labour market seg-
mentation in liberal economies where part-time work in 
low-skill jobs seems more pervasive. 
O’Dorchai, Plasman, and Rycx (2007) carried out a 
similar analysis of men’s part-time wages. They use data 
from Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, Italy, Spain, and the 
UK in the year 1995. Like Bardasi and Gornick, they 
exclude marginal part-time by defining part-time as a 
regular weekly working time between 15 and 30 hours. 
In a descriptive account of the data without controls 
they identify gross wage gaps between part-time and 
full-time jobs of 14% in Spain, 19.5–22% in Belgium, 
Denmark, and Italy, 40% in the UK, and up to 75% in 
Ireland. The enormous size of the Irish gap is explained 
by the authors with a heavy clustering of part-time em-
ployment among young people, often students, holding 
auxiliary positions in the service sector. Human capital 
endowment, occupation, and the economic sector are 
found to be responsible for the complete size of the gap 
in Denmark, 80% in Spain, 72% in the UK and Bel-
gium, 66% in Ireland, and 50% in Italy. Common to all 
countries is that education contributes the largest share 
of explanatory power. Therefore, in all countries includ-
ed, except Denmark, a considerable portion of the pay 
penalty cannot be attributed to the observed variables, 
but must have other reasons. Contrasted with the re-
sults for women, men obviously suffer a larger part-time 
pay penalty, resulting for the most part from differences 
in human capital, whereas for women the occupation 
held goes the longest way in explaining the penalty.
Evidence of a possible part-time pay penalty is 
also mixed in the study of Fernandez-Kranz and Ro-
driguez-Planas (2011) for Spain during the years 
1996–2006. They estimate a wage difference between 
full-time and part-time workers of about 38 log points 
which shrinks to 23 log points when the usual controls 
are included. Once unobserved heterogeneity is con-
trolled for, the gap further decreases to 11 log points. 
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These unexplained points are then attributed to chang-
es in employer, often associated with switches to part-
time. Only for part-timers with temporary contracts an 
inexplicable fraction remains. The authors thus confirm 
a negative selection into part-time jobs for Spain, but do 
not find evidence for downright discrimination unless 
the employee is also on a temporary contract.
A large wage penalty is identified by Wolf (2014) 
for Germany during the period of 1984–2010. The 
gross wage gap averaged over the entire time span is 
41% for men in West Germany (30% in East Germany) 
and 21% for women (9% in East Germany). Adding 
work history, human capital, firm characteristics and 
household type to the wage equation reduces the gap 
down to 21% for men in West Germany (15% East 
Germany) and 6% for women (4% in East Germany). 
A relatively large portion of the disparity remains unex-
plained and implies that neither negative selection nor 
discrimination can be ruled out as possible causes. He 
further notes that work history has the strongest impact 
on the scale of the wage gap, lending support to the 
assumption that part-time work may have prolonged 
scarring effects.
So far, once controls have been added to the analy-
sis, the only countries where no unexplained part-time 
pay penalty can be found are Sweden and Denmark, 
which gives rise to the assumption that the wage gap be-
tween full-time and part-time may be smaller in North-
ern European countries. Hardoy and Schøne (2006) 
have corroborated this hypothesis with an examination 
of Norwegian data from 1997 and 1998, encompassing 
both women and men. Since people with minor skills 
and little work experience are overrepresented among 
part-time employees, there is a wage gap in absolute 
terms, yet once personal characteristics of the employee, 
education, work experience, location of the firm, and 
economic sector are controlled for, the wage penalty 
vanishes entirely. This relative equality in remuneration 
is traced back by the authors to a highly compressed 
wage structure and strict equal treatment laws, prohib-
iting effectively discrimination based on working time. 
Without controls, however, Hardoy and Schøne esti-
mate that twenty years of professional experience result 
in a 30% pay rise for full-timers, but only in a 23% 
increase for part-timers. Likewise, each additional year 
of schooling pushes up full-time wages by 5.1%, while 
the corresponding number for part-timers is only 4.6%. 
It follows that working fewer hours may not be object 
to specific discrimination in Norway, but that, as a mat-
ter of fact, its incidence is largely concentrated on less 
skill intensive activities, offering only limited prospects 
of wage rises.
Looking beyond Europe, Australia too is among the 
countries where no part-time pay penalty can be found. 
Booth and Woods (2008) analysed data from Australian 
employees between 2001 and 2004 and conclude that, 
despite a generally lower educational attainment among 
part-timers, women on reduced hours earn about 9% 
more (men even 14% more) compared to full-time, if 
other factors are controlled for. Rodgers (2004) consults 
Australian data from the year 2001 and confirms these 
numbers on a somewhat lower level. After correcting for 
the same variables, she arrives at pay premiums of 9% 
for women and 3% for men. Before any control vari-
ables are included, however, the gross part-time wage 
gap amounts to 21% for men and 9% for women.
Informed by the joined evidence of the cited stud-
ies, it is safe to state that part-time employees earn a 
lower hourly wage than their full-time colleagues in 
almost all industrialised countries. Since most studies 
differ strongly in methods, definitions, time periods 
and control variables, estimated gross wage gaps oscil-
late within a range of 10–40%, with some contradictory 
results for single countries, not allowing to carve out 
clear-cut country clusters. Most studies concur, howev-
er, that part-time employment is more common among 
low-skilled workers with fractured work histories on less 
prestigious and less paying positions in the service sec-
tor. Having small children also raises the probability of 
working reduced hours. Still unclear is whether there 
is discrimination or a negative selection into part-time 
employment beyond the mentioned factors. In Scan-
dinavian countries and Australia no such evidence has 
been found, yet results are at least mixed for all oth-
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er countries, hence not refuting the presumption that 
part-time work may be stigmatised. As a conclusion, 
our previous hypotheses predicting lower hourly wages 
for part-timers are largely confirmed by empirical evi-
dence, whereas a pay premium seems to exist only in a 
minority of countries and only when all confounding 
factors are controlled for.
The question whether there is also a wage penal-
ty for temporary workers has not yet received as much 
attention. Most researchers’ foremost interest when 
dealing with fixed term work is the stability of such em-
ployment relationships, while they turn only briefly to 
wages; still these quite cursory studies hold some inter-
esting information about the general trend in remunera-
tion of temporary workers. The most recent work stems 
from Gebel (2010) who compares earnings of German 
and British job entrants during 1991 and 2007. He 
finds a gross wage gap of 21% in Germany and 10% in 
the UK between job starters with an open-ended con-
tract and those with a fixed-term one. Over the course 
of five years, however, this initial disparity completely 
disappears, leaving no scarring effects. 
The only international overview is provided by the 
OECD (2002). Analysing employee data from 13 EU 
countries in 1997, the authors identified the largest 
gross wage differences in Southern European countries 
such as Spain (47%), Portugal (35%), and Italy (28%), 
but also in the Netherlands (37%) and Ireland (33%). 
Germany and Austria have the smallest gaps (11%). The 
study emphasises, however, that these gaps only affect 
the 75% of temporary employees with lower earnings, 
whereas those in the top earnings quartile receive at least 
as much as their colleagues with permanent contracts, 
sometimes even significantly more. Controlling for age, 
education, tenure, firm-size, and job characteristics, 
wage gaps narrow in all countries, but never vanish en-
tirely. Men suffer the highest penalties in the Nether-
lands (24%), Spain, and Finland (both 16%), women 
in France, Ireland, and the Netherlands (all 22%). The 
smallest gaps for men are found in Portugal (7%), Den-
mark, and Austria (both 6%), for women in Denmark 
(5%) and Belgium (0%). Belgium is the only country 
in the analysis where the included variables suffice to ex-
plain the entire wage discrepancy. In all other countries, 
a substantial portion of the initial gap, often more than 
half, is not accounted for, thereby implying that reasons 
other than the easy observable must play a crucial role 
here. 
Booth, Francesconi and Frank (2002) arrive at a 
similar conclusion in their analysis of UK data between 
the years 1991–1997. Using controls comparable to the 
OECD’s, their calculations yield a wage gap of 16–17% 
for men and 13–14% for women. The inclusion of fixed 
effects to correct for unobservable employee character-
istics diminishes the gap to 7–11%, but does not close 
it. This must be interpreted as an indication that wage 
discrimination or negative selection into temporary em-
ployment does occur, at least at the lower end of the 
earnings spectrum.
For Germany, Mertens and McGinnity (2003) 
carried out a detailed study about the compensation of 
male temporary employees in the period of 1995–2000. 
Based on purely descriptive data, they find that low-
skilled men are overrepresented in low-pay temporary 
jobs, leading to an average wage gap of about 32%. 
Once more, looking only at the mean size of the dis-
parity would be misleading because, in accordance with 
the results of the OECD study, the top quartile of tem-
porary employees earns more than corresponding work-
ers on permanent contracts. The authors augment the 
OECD’s set of control variables by further considering 
various household characteristics, yet nonetheless arrive 
at an estimated wage gap whose scale is even larger than 
in the OECD study (15% as compared to 10%). Ana-
lysing the quartiles reveals some important details: in 
the top quartile, the initial wage premium disappears 
and turns into a 5–10% penalty, while in the bottom 
quartile the gap shrinks slightly to 15–25%. This clear-
ly shows that, even though temporary employees are a 
quite heterogeneous group which, at least, in the up-
per parts of the earnings spectrum, comprises also well 
qualified persons in high-productivity sectors, they are 
all affected by a pay penalty, most likely caused by their 
status as atypical employees. Hagen (2002) performs 
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comparable estimations for Germany using 1999 data, 
yet without breaking them down by quartiles. Supple-
menting the OECD’s controls with fixed effects, his 
calculations return a wage disparity of even bigger size 
(23%) than previously estimated by the OECD, bol-
stering the hypothesis of wage discrimination among 
fixed-term workers.
A wage penalty of similar size is detected by 
Blanchard and Landier (2002) in French data on 20 to 
24 year old job starters between 1983 and 2000. Taking 
into account differences in education and age, tempo-
rary employees earned 29% less than permanent ones in 
1993 and 22.5% less in 2000. The wage gap was thus 
narrowing with more years on a job, which the authors 
explain by an improved economic environment and by 
firms’ increasing familiarisation to temporary contracts, 
making employers and employees abandon negative 
preconceptions about atypical work that had the effect 
of skewing wages downward.
Holmlund and Storrie (2002) complement this 
overview with results for Sweden between 1987 and 
2000, where they find a considerably smaller wage gap 
of about 10% once job and personal features are con-
trolled for. 
Despite empirical evidence on the compensation 
of temporary workers being sparse, we can nonetheless 
draw some conclusions. If intervening factors like type 
of job, economic sector, education, and work history are 
not controlled for, gross wage gaps of about 20–40% 
emerge between fixed-term and permanent workers, 
which is somewhat more than between full-time and 
part-time employees. When control variables are added, 
wage gaps shrink to a range of 10–20%, but never fully 
disappear, thereby suggesting that negative selection or 
discrimination may play a significant role in the deter-
mination of temporary employees’ wages. Contrary to 
the case of part-time work, Scandinavian countries are 
no exception in this regard, as they too penalise tem-
porary contracts by smaller remuneration. Correspond-
ing to previous conclusions on part-time work, the 
hypotheses are therefore confirmed that (i) employees 
characterised by low productivity cluster in temporary 
jobs, and (ii) these jobs are largely situated in less pres-
tigious, low paying service sectors, determining a more 
depressed wage level of fixed-term work. Only in the 
top earnings quartile do fixed term contracts seem to 
be a labour market tool that is vastly used on the most 
productive employees, thus supporting the theory that 
firms employ specialists for specific, temporary projects 
on fixed term basis. Nevertheless, this initial wage edge 
must be put into perspective as it is completely neu-
tralised by the inclusion of control variables, revealing 
that even the most qualified temporary employees are 
worse off than their standard peers.
4.3 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
ON EMPLOYMENT STABILITY
Political measures to further liberalise and promote tem-
porary employment contracts were propelled by hopes 
to stimulate labour market flexibility and job growth, 
especially to the benefit of those facing the highest ob-
stacles to employment due to low skill profiles or frag-
mented work biographies. Large parts of research on 
temporary jobs therefore scrutinise the stepping stone 
hypothesis, which posits that the probability to find a 
new job or even be offered an open-end job will be sig-
nificantly increased subsequent to a temporary one and 
that, consequently, a fixed term worker’s individual risk 
to fall back into unemployment is likely to be reduced.
Gash (2008) provides the most recent comparative 
study of this topic including France, Germany, Den-
mark, and the UK between 1995 and 2001. He finds 
that after four years about two thirds of the observed 
employees on temporary contracts in Denmark and 
Germany advanced to an open-ended job, whereas in 
France and UK only 50–60% did so. 30–40% (UK: 
20%) were unemployed four years later. Chances of 
gaining a standard job were particularly small for hold-
ers of manual jobs and if the worker’s educational level 
is low. Likewise, being unemployed prior to accepting 
a temporary job lowers the chances of attaining an 
open-ended job. Temporary employment is hence not 
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an unambiguous access point opening a steady road 
leading to the eventual award of a standard contract, 
but rather serves as a means to endow employers with 
external flexibility, leaving many employees moving 
continuously from one fixed term job to another.
Gebel (2010) focuses on UK and Germany, com-
paring data from job entrants between 1991 and 2007, 
and comes to mixed conclusions regarding the stepping 
stone hypothesis. In the UK, 22% of job starters were 
employed on a fixed term basis, only 18% of which 
(4% in total percentage points) remaining fixed term 
within a five years period. In Germany, the correspond-
ing figures are 37% and 41% (15% in total percentage 
points). The transition into regular jobs thus seems to 
be more successful in the UK than in Germany. If the 
risk of becoming unemployed is examined, the picture 
looks different; in Germany, 87% of the observed per-
sons in standard jobs were still employed after one year, 
but only 78% of the temporary ones. After five years, 
both groups had converged to the same employment 
rate of 83%. In the UK, the numbers are approximately 
the same as in Germany after one year, yet the process 
of convergence within a five years range does not oc-
cur. The gap between fixed term and open-ended jobs 
is therefore persistent in the UK, rendering fixed-term 
work constantly more volatile. Scherer (2004), just as 
Gebel, observes job entrants in UK, Germany, and It-
aly from 1983 to 1998, coming to similar conclusions. 
She identifies a stepping-stone effect in all countries (es-
pecially in Italy), but also a higher risk of temporary 
employees to become unemployed. Particularly in the 
UK, numerous temporary jobs will often closely follow 
each other, usually in less prestigious occupations than 
open-ended jobs.
Pooled data from the whole EU between 1994 and 
1998 were analysed by D’Addio and Rosholm (2005), 
shedding more light on how much time fixed term 
workers spend on temporary contracts and their re-
spective chances to eventually enter permanent employ-
ment. Controlling for personal and job characteristics, 
the authors estimate the average likelihood of a worker 
making the transition from a fixed term to an open-end-
ed job over a period of more than three years. Both sexes 
have equally low chances of being offered a standard job 
within the first two years of a fixed term job. The third 
year, however, is the point in time when most successful 
transitions happen, for men and women alike, possibly 
because a major fraction of fixed-term contracts expires 
after two years, forcing employers to make a decision 
whether or not to keep an employee on a permanent 
basis. For men, this favourable moment seems to have 
passed by the beginning of the fourth year, as the chanc-
es of a permanent job start to decrease from then on. 
Women’s chances of transition, by contrast, remain on 
a relatively high level, even after more than three years. 
Generally, individual transition rates of both sexes rise 
when there was no previous unemployment and the ed-
ucational level is high. Central to the research interest 
of the study at hand are D’Addio and Rosholm’s results 
that show temporary jobs in the majority of cases do not 
last longer than two years and indeed provide a step-
ping stone into long-term employment, particularly for 
women. Men’s prospects to enter a permanent job are 
somewhat dimmer than women’s, as they run into dan-
ger of getting trapped in fixed-term jobs if they do not 
abandon them within two or three years.
These findings are in accordance with earlier results 
from the OECD (2002) which analysed micro data 
from its member states from 1997 until 1999. In all 
observed countries, the majority of fixed-term employ-
ees had been working shorter than two years in their 
current job. In Finland and the Netherlands, more than 
70% of temporary workers indicated they had been 
on the job for less than twelve months; in Denmark, 
France, Ireland, and Spain the respective share was more 
than 60%. In the OECD on average, merely 25% of 
all temporary contracts lasted longer than 24 months. 
Compared to this relative conformity, the odds of pro-
ceeding to a standard job vary considerably across coun-
tries. Within two years, 71% of fixed-term employees 
in Austria, 67% in UK, 65% in the Netherlands, and 
63% in Denmark made the transition to an open-ended 
position, but only 42% in Belgium, 38% in France, and 
34% in Spain. These figures do not provide a complete 
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answer, however, whether or not the stepping-stone hy-
pothesis holds because it remains unclear what happens 
to fixed-term employees once their contract is terminat-
ed: do they fall into unemployment or do they easily 
move on to a new job? In Germany and France, more 
than 20% of fixed term employees became unemployed 
within the two years period, in Spain and Italy 10–20%. 
For other countries the numbers are about 10% or not 
available. These figures are twice as high as for standard 
workers, but only half (or even less) as much as for the 
initially unemployed. Temporary jobs are thus clearly 
less stable than standard ones, but do raise the chances 
of the unemployed to get back into any kind of work 
(also permanent work) if compared to the alternative of 
staying jobless.
The effects of temporary work appear less favourable 
in the study of Contini, Pacelli, and Villogio (1999). 
In Italy and Germany, 50% of fixed-term workers with 
a contract period of less than 12 months were unem-
ployed again after three years, while only 35% managed 
to find an open-ended job. In the UK, by contrast, these 
figures turn out to be reversed, indicating that the step-
ping-stone effect is much larger there. As expected by 
theory, a low status of the job, small pay and being part 
of the service sector impair the probability of transition 
into standard jobs in all analysed countries. 
Turning to single country studies, the state that 
has attracted the most research interest is Italy, where 
the evidence on the stepping-stone hypothesis is rath-
er inconclusive. The least favourable assessment comes 
from Barbieri and Scherer (2009) who, covering a pe-
riod ranging from 1969 until 2005, focused not only 
on fixed-term work but on atypical employment in a 
broader sense, including for instance also self-employ-
ment. According to the authors, atypical employment 
is not preferable to unemployment regarding the odds 
of finding a standard job. Rather, atypical jobs are like-
ly to entail further atypical jobs. More positive on the 
effects of fixed-term employment are Barbieri and Sesti-
to (2008), scrutinising temporary workers’ chances be-
tween 1993 and 2003 to reach a satisfying job position, 
i.e. a position out of which one does not seek another, 
more favourable one. The essential result of the study is 
that accepting a fixed term job increases the chances by 
about 30%, as compared to staying unemployed. This is 
in congruence with Ichino, Mealli and Nannicini (2008) 
who quantified the probability of gaining a standard job 
from a temporary contract in the years 2001 and 2002. 
After one year, the chance to hold an open-ended job is 
about 31%, twice as much as if the employee had stayed 
unemployed. Picchio (2008) estimates markedly lower 
transition rates of about 13.5%–16% from 2000 until 
2004. Each of these figures is smaller than the transition 
rate stated by the OECD in 2002 (41%). Transitions 
may thus have become more difficult over time. All Ital-
ian studies across all time periods agree that temporary 
jobs are clustering in services and among workers with 
low educational attainment.
Evidence from the Netherlands is not positive ei-
ther about the stepping-stone effect. Zijl (2004), based 
on Dutch data from 1988 until 2000, reports that after 
two years 38% of all observed fixed term workers had 
found a permanent job, 21% had become unemployed 
and 35% were still on a temporary position. Of those 
initially without a job only 30% managed to enter 
into open-ended and 6% into temporary employment. 
While this seems to support the stepping-stone hypoth-
esis at first glance, the benefit of fixed term contracts 
dissipates once a longer period is looked at. The more 
years pass, the more do the odds of finding a standard 
job converge, no matter what the initial contract type 
had been. The authors consequently conclude that 
fixed-term work is successful in shortening periods of 
unemployment rather than in helping people back into 
standard work. Inherent in temporary jobs is the risk of 
getting stuck in such work arrangements and to be able 
to proceed to an open-ended job, if at all, only after a 
very long time. 
These findings are in accordance with Hagen’s 
(2002) who works out that, in Germany, employees 
with fragmented work biographies face a higher risk of 
getting trapped in fixed-term jobs. Similarly, Blanchard 
and Landier (2002) show that French job entrants’ av-
erage past time between starting a fixed term job and 
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the transition into a standard job extended from 2.4 
to 4.8 years during the 1990s. Since the corresponding 
time span for those who preferred to stay unemployed, 
instead of accepting a temporary job, increased from 4 
to 6 years, working in a fixed term position may still 
appear as the more favourable option. The evidence that 
instability and insecurity in the French labour market 
have risen in the last decades is nonetheless conspicu-
ous. 
Holmlund and Storrie (2002) show in great detail, 
based on Swedish data from 1987 to 2000, how much 
the employment of temporary workers varies with the 
business cycle. When a downturn hits, fixed term work-
ers are the first and most affected, because they are the 
easiest to lay off, but as soon as a recovery sets in, fixed 
term jobs are created more rapidly than regular ones 
since firms are not yet sure about their future expec-
tations and therefore reluctant to hire on an open-end 
basis. Once the economic environment has consolidat-
ed again, the share of temporary employment returns to 
its initial level. Firms’ use of contracts with finite dura-
tion thus resembles that of standard ones, only that it 
is much more susceptible to cyclical fluctuations and 
hence inherently more fickle. 
Compared to the abundance of literature on tem-
porary employment, studies concerned with the em-
ployment stability of part-time workers are significant-
ly less common. One exception is Fouarge and Muffels’ 
(2008) examination of employee data of 14 EU coun-
tries between 1994 and 2001. One key result is that, 
after a time span of five years, on average 25% of male 
part-timers still worked part-time, half of them worked 
full-time, and 25% had stopped working altogether. 
Among full-timers, only 14% made the transition to 
non-employment, whereas 80% remained in full-time 
work. With respect to female part-time employees, 
20% increased their working time to full-time level 
and 25% dropped out of their jobs; among the female 
full-timers only 20% did so. The authors therefore con-
clude that employment in atypical jobs does significant 
harm to both male and female workers’ chances of 
being employed (whatever full-time or part-time) five 
years later. 
Buddelmeyer, Mourre, and Ward-Warmedinger 
(2005) analysed data similar to Fouarge and Muffel’s, 
averaged over eleven EU countries between 1994 and 
1999, but with a shorter time range of only one year. 
They emphasise that in the short term the adverse ef-
fects of part-time work on employment stability are 
even more pronounced, especially for women, than esti-
mated by Fouarge and Muffels. The risk to lose one’s job 
is about 5% for a male full-time employee, contrasted 
with 17% for a part-timer. For females, the correspond-
ing figures are 7.5% compared to 45%. 
Hence, the effects of atypical employment on job 
stability can be summed up as follows: fixed-term jobs 
rarely last longer than two years, most of them even less 
than 12 months, albeit these numbers vary depending 
on the country. The stepping stone hypothesis does hold 
to some extent, yet a transition into permanent employ-
ment is far from certain. All studies concur that a tem-
porary job does improve one’s chances of getting into 
stable standard employment as compared to a situation 
in which the job seeker would have stayed unemployed, 
but the risk of falling back into non-employment re-
mains continuously higher. Moreover, there is a clear 
risk that fixed term workers get stuck in short-term ap-
pointments, particularly when they are badly educated 
and their work histories are marked by recurring peri-
ods of unemployment. Fixed-term employment there-
fore does not offer the same stability as a permanent job 
and, consequently, involves the risk to cause long-term 
scarring effects. The evidence on part-time workers’ job 
stability is much more limited, but resembles to a large 
extent what we have already learned about fixed-term 
contracts. 
This chapter gives an overview of the basic theoretical 
concepts underpinning the existence of three social se-
curity schemes–unemployment benefit, sickness bene-
fit, and social assistance. It deals with questions as to the 
purpose these schemes serve, the way they should be set 
up, and the various sorts of secondary effects they may 
entail besides providing social security. First of all, be-
fore I start with the basic principles of welfare provision, 
in the next section I will briefly dwell on the notion of 
risk, because minimising risk is the very essence of social 
protection.
5.1 THE CONCEPT OF RISK
Among the broad range of discipline-specific concep-
tions of risk (e.g. Renn 1992), a general definition of 
risk is given by Rowe (1975: 1): «Risk is the potential 
for realization of unwanted, negative consequences of 
an event or combination of events to individual groups 
of people or to physical and biological systems.» For a 
more empirical approach, he subdivides ‹the potential 
of realization of unwanted, negative consequences› into 
three separate domains, all of which in their interaction 
yield a comprehensive measure of risk. The first domain 
is the event space domain which includes the probabil-
ity that a particular event occurs. The second domain is 
the probability-consequence domain, covering the like-
lihood that this event has a certain consequence. The 
third domain–the consequence-value domain–ascribes 
a value to this consequence, reflecting how meaningful 
the consequence is to the risk taker. The final assessment 
of risk, according to Rowe, is accomplished by multi-
plying all three domains.
In the context of this study, the specific events 
representing a risk in the event space domain are that 
employees lose their jobs or fall sick. In general, both 
events are only partly within employees’ control. It 
may be possible to positively influence one’s exposition 
through high work effort or a healthy lifestyle, but too 
often employees have no leverage on the essential mech-
anisms determining lay-offs or the outbreak of an illness 
(firm bankruptcy or genetic disposition, for instance), 
ultimately leaving everyone faced with a certain amount 
of risk. In the probability-consequence domain, being 
unemployed or sick most likely leads to a substantial 
loss of income unless there are other sources of revenue 
(e.g. capital gains) to draw on, which is probably the 
case only for a small minority of workers. Income loss is 
a consequence whose value is highly negative for most 
people as it threatens accustomed living standards and, 
more broadly, the capacity to participate in society, par-
ticularly for those with medium or low earnings whose 
accumulated savings would not allow them to get by 
without an additional source of income. For workers 
in atypical jobs with more unstable work biographies 
and lower wages, job loss and sickness thus naturally 
pose a higher risk as they (i) have a higher probability 
of finding themselves in a risky situation1 and (ii), due 
to insufficient prior earnings, have not enough financial 
reserves to handle a severe loss of income. Standard em-
ployees may be less vulnerable, but are confronted with 
a non-negligible degree of risk, too, since joblessness 
and incapacity are partly random events that can easily 
become prolonged.
The main purpose of unemployment benefits, sick-
ness benefits, and social assistance is to help people min-
1  This holds primarily for the situation of job loss which 
happens much more frequently to atypical employees (see 
chapter 4). But also sickness affects non-standard workers 
more often than standard ones (for an overview see Quinlan / 
Mayhew / Bohle 2001).
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imise their personal risk of income loss. In theory, there 
are several different ways to do so, each influencing a 
distinct risk domain: for example, in the event space do-
main laws could be passed preventing employees from 
being dismissed when they have become redundant or 
when they are ill. Such measures are implemented in 
form of employment protection legislation in many 
countries, yet this approach reaches its limitations no 
later once a firm goes bankrupt. Instead, unemploy-
ment and sickness benefits, as well as minimum in-
comes, operate in the probability-consequence and 
consequence-value domain, as they (i) reduce the odds 
that sickness and joblessness result in income loss and 
(ii) mitigate the incurred loss. They do not, however, 
prevent negative events from occurring. The following 
sections explain according to which rules transfers from 
the mentioned welfare schemes are disbursed, how this 
contributes to the containment of risk and what kind of 
side effects this might have.
5.2 EFFECTS  
OF UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS
A common way to protect people’s income in case of 
job loss is through an insurance scheme replacing parts 
of the lost wage. Schemes of this type are established in 
most developed countries with the notable exceptions of 
Australia and New Zealand. The underlying functional 
principle of an unemployment insurance is that employ-
ees pay premiums into an insurance fund while they are 
employed, thereby acquiring entitlements to temporary 
cash transfers they can claim should they be dismissed. 
If they have made enough contributions to the fund in 
order to become eligible, they can receive transfers until 
they have either found a new job or have exhausted the 
maximum duration. The income replacement provided 
by the insurance is supposed to soften the impact of a 
full loss of earnings, but it remains important to note 
that amount and duration of transfers are subject to 
the concrete arrangement of the insurance scheme and 
therefore vary widely across countries (see chapter 6). 
One desired effect of protecting job seekers’ in-
comes is the smoothing of individual consumption pat-
terns over the long run, since cash transfers paid out 
of unemployment insurance funds render individual in-
come less vulnerable to periodic unemployment spells. 
Unemployment benefits hence not only raise employ-
ees’ utility by allowing for higher consumption, they 
also have a stabilising effect on the economy as a whole 
when, in times of a recession and rising unemployment, 
they save aggregate private demand from collapsing 
(Dolls/Fuest/Peichl 2012, Gruber 1997).
Arguments in favour of unemployment benefits 
can also be made on grounds of efficiency. The ration-
ale is that, according to matching theory, some posi-
tions fit job seekers better than others. Given that any 
worker has a specific endowment of human capital, they 
will be most productive in occupations closely match-
ing their skill profiles, while productivity levels drop 
off sharply the more a job’s skill requirements deviate 
from the competencies an employee possesses. It may 
be a protracted and arduous process, however, to track 
down among numerous employment opportunities, 
and get hold of, a position that is a good match. Un-
employment benefits give jobless people the possibility 
of taking time for their search and thus enabling them 
to find a position which matches their skills in the most 
productive way, rather than forcing them to accept the 
first job on offer (Belzil 2001, Caliendo/Tatsiramos/ 
Uhlendorff 2012, Centeno 2004, Marimon/Zilibotti 
1999). If there were no cash transfers, job seekers would 
have to take on any job they could get, irrespective of 
the matching quality, just in order to generate a new 
income. The result, consequently, would be a multitude 
of mismatches, an underutilisation of individual skills, 
and frequent break-ups of employment relationships 
because of bad matching quality, and thus potentially 
damaging an economy’s overall efficiency.
Another mechanism by which unemployment ben-
efits can spur labour productivity is that they help to 
create high-profile jobs based on very specific skill pro-
files on part of the employees. This argument is strongly 
related to matching theory and was first elaborated by 
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Acemoglu and Shimer (1999, 2000). According to the 
authors, firms are frequently confronted with the de-
cision to offer either sophisticated positions with very 
specific skill requirements, promising high productiv-
ity gains to the company if an adequate applicant for 
the position can be found, or to offer jobs with rather 
broad training requirements, being easier to fill, but 
with a smaller potential for productivity growth. Job 
seekers, on the other side, have to decide whether to 
apply on jobs necessitating specific or broad skills. Due 
to higher productivity, activities involving the use of 
specific competencies are more generously compensat-
ed, yet carry an increased risk that, after a short pro-
bation period, a newly hired employee may turn out 
to be ill-suited for the position and, as a consequence, 
get sacked. If job seekers are risk averse to a certain de-
gree, they will therefore prefer positions with broader 
skill requirements and a lower risk of split-up. This can 
pull down the whole economy towards a low-efficiency 
equilibrium in which neither employers nor employees 
fully exploit their productivity potentials. By introduc-
ing an unemployment benefit, the risk of mismatch 
becomes less threatening to job seekers, therefore en-
couraging more people to apply for a job with a specific 
skill profile. As a result, the economy’s overall produc-
tivity is edging more strongly towards a high-efficiency 
equilibrium.
Iversen (2005: 177–255) follows this line of rea-
soning by providing another rationale for employees to 
engage, once unemployment benefits are in place, in 
jobs with specific skills. He argues that jobs with specific 
training requirements are risky not only because of their 
inherent hazard of mismatch; even if an employee has 
already proven herself to be well fitted for the job, the 
specialisation on very specific tasks may hurt her later 
on, should she lose her job for any other reason (e.g. 
bankruptcy of the firm). In this case, the employee will 
probably face serious difficulties finding a new job, since 
her specific skill endowments are in demand from only a 
very small number of firms. A risk-averse job seeker will 
thus shun any job with skill requirements too specific, 
forfeiting higher remuneration, in order to not damage 
her future employment prospects. Unemployment ben-
efits can help to lessen the risk incurred by the acquisi-
tion of specific skills, as they give employees, when they 
lose their old jobs, more time to look for suitable new 
jobs that make use of the same specific skills. Hence, 
specific skills can unfold their individual value as labour 
market assets only once unemployment cash transfers 
are provided for, boosting the proliferation of specific 
training among the workforce. Ultimately, in congru-
ence with Acemoglu and Shimer’s arguments, labour 
productivity and total efficiency rise.
The most scientifically discussed issue by far asso-
ciated with unemployment benefits is, however, not 
related to productivity considerations, but to whether 
and how these are likely to affect job seekers’ search ef-
forts, their readiness to accept job offers, and the re-
sulting duration of unemployment spells. The most 
influential theories on this topic have been introduced 
by Mortensen (1977) and van den Berg (1990). They 
establish a simple model describing the behaviour of a 
single person looking for a job while facing several in-
centives simultaneously. The basic set-up assumes that 
the job seeker strives to maximise her income and re-
ceives various job offers with random levels of remuner-
ation at random points in time. She will therefore only 
accept an offer if it pays more than what she would get 
otherwise. Decisive for the duration of unemployment 
is the so-called ‹reservation wage›, i.e. the lowest wage 
for which a jobless person would just be willing to ac-
cept an offer. The higher the reservation wage, the lon-
ger is statistically the time span until the unemployed 
person eventually receives a job offer whose prospective 
compensation exceeds the reservation wage, and which 
she would consequently take on. 
Unemployment benefits can impact the reservation 
wage in various ways depending on the design of the 
benefit scheme. For analytical clarity two features of 
any unemployment benefit can be separated: amount 
and duration of payments. If the benefit amount is 
high, it raises the reservation wage for those receiving 
the benefit, mostly during the initial period of unem-
ployment, and makes exits out of unemployment less 
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likely. Once however the benefit approaches its tem-
poral limit, the reservation wage will decrease sharply, 
resulting in a higher willingness to agree to incoming 
offers and consequently a higher exit rate. According to 
job-search-theory, generous benefit amounts thus tend 
to prolong periods of unemployment since they raise 
reservation wages, especially at the onset of joblessness, 
but hardly beyond the moment the benefit elapses. The 
predominant impact on the length of job search hence 
comes from the duration of a benefit rather than its 
amount. Benefit duration determines a precise point in 
time the benefit is going to end, which is also the same 
moment the reservation wage will drop the most. A lon-
ger benefit duration, in turn, keeps up the reservation 
wage for a longer period by deferring the point in time 
the benefit is going to be exhausted. As a brief upshot, 
job-search-theory thus states that, if the average period 
of unemployment is to be shortened, the duration of 
the unemployment benefit should be curtailed rather 
than its amount.
This line of theoretical reasoning only applies to 
jobless persons eligible for unemployment benefits; for 
those who are ineligible, job-search-theory predicts a 
contrary behaviour. These persons perceive unemploy-
ment benefits as an additional reward for future work, 
i.e. as a top-up to regular remuneration, which increas-
es the incentive to accept job offers whose prospective 
pay would be less than the reservation wage other-
wise. Higher unemployment benefits, both in terms 
of amount and duration, will hence lead to shorter job 
search periods for unemployed persons who are not en-
titled to benefits.
Whereas job-search-theory has been subject to 
serious criticism, e.g. for ignoring the role of personal 
savings, its predictions–in particular that benefit du-
ration has a stronger protracting impact on job search 
than benefit amounts–have found large empirical sup-
port. What remains unclear is whether unemployment 
benefits also have an effect on aggregate jobless figures 
or whether their impact is limited to the micro level 
(see for reviews Holmlund 1998, Tatsiramos / van Ours 
2012). 
5.3 INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS  
OF UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS
It is striking that in international comparisons all unem-
ployment insurance schemes share the institutional fea-
ture of being publicly provided rather than privately, and 
that most of the schemes (with exception of Denmark, 
Finland, Sweden, and Norway) are mandatory for em-
ployees. Furthermore, in almost every country the cost 
of unemployment insurance is split between employees, 
employers, and the state, although the respective shares 
of the burden born by each side vary considerably. In 
most schemes, employers and employees shoulder the 
brunt of the costs,2 with the state’s role being limited 
to occasional financial injections if a deficit needs to be 
balanced. Once again, the Nordic countries are an ex-
ception to this rule, demanding no contributions from 
employers, but substituting their share with extra tax 
money (Schmid 2010: 261–272).
It is no mere coincidence that all unemployment in-
surance schemes look fairly similar in their institutional 
set-up. There are indeed good reasons to provide unem-
ployment benefits through public, instead of private, in-
surance and to make it mandatory. Given the risk-aver-
sion of employees, a market for private, voluntary 
unemployment insurance could surely be established, 
yet there are serious caveats to this solution, rendering 
a public, compulsory insurance the more practical and 
effective approach (Barr 1992, Feilcke 2012). 
The first and foremost problem any unemployment 
insurance has to face is moral hazard. That is, the insur-
er needs to make sure that no insured employee takes 
undue advantage of the benefits, e.g. by giving up a 
job without good reason or by not actively looking for 
work, and chooses to continuously live on cash transfers. 
To rule out such abuse, several measures can be taken, 
the simplest of which is to make payments dependent 
2  The respective shares for each side do vary, though. In 
France and Spain, for example, firms have to take a higher 
share of the cost than their employees, while in other coun-
tries (e.g. Germany) the cost is born by both sides in equal 
parts.
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on a certain period in paid employment immediately 
preceding the claim, in order to make sure that only 
people with sufficient attachment to the labour market 
gain access to benefits. Equally simple is to grant only 
a fraction of the former wage as benefit, rather than the 
full amount, or to hand out transfers only for a limited 
period of time, giving better incentives to stay employed 
and to seek work. More laborious, yet essential, is prop-
er monitoring of the recipients’ behaviour. This, howev-
er, needs to take place not only once (like with a doctor 
diagnosing a certain illness, for instance), but on a con-
tinuous basis, requiring huge efforts from the insurers. 
Nonetheless, in many cases it will be virtually impossi-
ble to tell–even by the best monitoring means–whether 
a recipient became unemployed by circumstances be-
yond her control or, in fact, by her own fault. Verifying 
whether a job seeker’s search effort meets the standards 
stipulated in the insurer’s terms is equally hard to ac-
complish. Therefore, all unemployment insurance has 
to cope with considerable moral hazard which can be 
contained only to a limited degree and only at big costs. 
A second problem is that unemployment risks are 
not independent and equally distributed over the work-
force and all points in time. In the midst of a recession 
more people become unemployed than in economic 
boom times. To complicate matters for the insurers, 
the extent and occurrence of such downturns is hardly 
predictable. Likewise, some groups of employees, e.g. 
non-standard ones, are constantly faced with a higher 
probability of job loss than others, making them less 
lucrative clients from the insurers’ perspective.
Under these conditions private insurers have only 
limited options at hand to provide unemployment in-
surance in a profitable way: they can raise contribution 
rates in order to make up for costs arising from mor-
al hazard, the extensive monitoring apparatus, and the 
accumulation of financial reserves they need to brace 
themselves against the next economic downturn whose 
scale is unforeseeable. Higher rates, in turn, would drive 
the best risks, namely the employees with the highest 
income and lowest probability of job loss, out of the 
insurance because its costs seem to exceed the risk they 
face. For the persons who remain insured, most like-
ly belonging to the group with higher unemployment 
risks, this means that rates soar, up to the point where 
they become unaffordable. In this scenario, the unem-
ployment insurance is bound to collapse, leaving em-
ployees without adequate protection. Another possible 
scenario is that insurance companies diversify their tar-
iff structure, offering attractive conditions to employees 
with characteristics that supposedly make them good 
risks (e.g. tertiary education, no previous unemploy-
ment spells), while granting less favourable terms to 
employees with bad risks. As a result, those with good 
risks have an attractive opportunity to insure themselves 
against unemployment, whereas those with bad risks are 
likely be left without insurance since their rates would 
be too high. It is evident, therefore, that, no matter 
which of both ways insurance companies choose, an un-
employment protection scheme organised privately in a 
non-compulsory manner does not have the capacity to 
serve its original purpose as it fails to cover particularly 
those who are most vulnerable.
A mandatory public insurance for all employees 
can resolve some of the problems afflicting private pro-
vision. First, a public insurance can institute a single 
administration whose remit it is to review the rightful-
ness of new claims and to monitor recipients’ job search 
efforts. Such a single, publicly run institution helps to 
reduce transaction costs by avoiding parallel structures 
that would emerge if several competing insurance firms 
each set up their own administrations. Having only 
one public unemployment insurance scheme instead 
of many thus brings down monitoring costs and makes 
tariffs more affordable. Furthermore, eliminating com-
petition among insurance providers will stop firms from 
poaching good risks by offering targeted lower tariffs; a 
practice that, if unchecked, would accelerate negative 
selection of risks and eventually cause the schemes to 
break down. Second, a mandatory insurance prohibits 
employees with better risks from abandoning unem-
ployment insurance altogether and thus keeps rates for 
all employees on a sustainable level. It is important to 
emphasise that for this reason a compulsory insurance 
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always entails some financial redistribution from good 
to bad risks, because employees holding a more favour-
able labour market position necessarily pay more into 
the scheme than they will probably ever get out. The 
extent of redistribution differs in international compari-
son, yet in order to realise an unemployment protection 
insurance that serves the interests of all employees, it is 
a generally well-proven path to make insurance man-
datory and to allow for a pooling of risks. A deviating 
path has been chosen by the Nordic countries where in-
surance is voluntary, but its funds are heavily subsidised 
out of tax money to keep tariffs viable. Many of the 
considerations explained above also apply to sickness 
benefits to which I turn in the next section.
5.4  EFFECTS OF SICKNESS BENEFITS
In this study, the notion of sickness benefit is defined to 
cover two things. First, it includes obligatory continu-
ation of wage payments by the employer and, second, 
allowances of a public insurance scheme in case an em-
ployee falls sick. Whatever the various specific forms of 
sickness benefits, their purpose is essentially the same, 
namely to protect employees from temporary income 
loss due to illness until they are fit for work again. Oth-
er cash transfers, meant to replace the income of em-
ployees whose health is permanently damaged so that 
return into work is impossible or highly unlikely, are 
not subsumed under the concept of sickness benefit in 
this study. As with unemployment benefits, the right to 
sick pay must be acquired by previous employment and, 
where applicable, the corresponding contributions to an 
insurance fund.
The main purpose any sickness benefit serves is to 
secure an income when an employee is incapacitated 
due to illness. This has many positive effects both on 
employers and employees (Heymann et al. 2009): if 
days of absence are compensated, employees may feel 
less compelled to show up at work when they actually 
feel unable to. Instead, they are given more time to re-
cuperate and will return to work only once their health 
is fully restored. This way, the benefit helps to avoid the 
adverse effects related to working when sick. One of 
these is that sick workers frequently pass on infectious 
diseases to colleagues and therefore drive up firms’ over-
all sickness levels. Another one is that sick workers’ pro-
ductivity is likely to be seriously diminished, even down 
to the point that it becomes negative, since diseased 
employees are more prone to make serious mistakes or 
undermine work morale (Chatterji 2002). Moreover, 
without enough time to recover illnesses can get worse 
and become persistent, so that employees’ productivity 
is impaired longer than necessary. Finally, sickness ben-
efits, especially in form of compulsory wage continua-
tion, can lower a firm’s turnover of staff by forcing the 
company to retain its employees, even when they are 
absent for health-related reasons. This is more expensive 
in the short-run, but summed up over a longer period, 
it can save a firm recruitment and training costs that 
would otherwise have been caused by a higher fluctua-
tion of personnel. This argument is also closely related 
to employees’ acquisition of specific skills; as has been 
discussed in the section on unemployment benefits, 
jobs requiring specific skills are highly productive, yet 
carry the risk that employees develop a skill profile so 
unique that they might struggle to find an adequate new 
job should they lose their former one. In this context, 
sickness benefits function as a guarantee that employees’ 
income is protected and that they will not be dismissed 
unless the sickness lasts longer than a certain maximum 
period. Sickness benefits thus do not only promote the 
interests of workers to be able to recuperate, but they are 
also beneficial to labour productivity, mostly by creating 
a standard of social protection which is a prerequisite 
for investments in specific skills.
However, these positive effects may be offset by an-
other, detrimental influence of sickness benefits on work 
effort. Allen (1981) and Barmby, Sessions, and Treble 
(1994) were the first to set up a simple model in which 
employees have to determine their actual working time. 
If the number of hours stipulated in the employment 
contract is above the number desired by the employee, 
she has an incentive to use sick days as a means to bring 
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actual hours worked closer to the number of hours pre-
ferred. In order to do so, an employee will simply report 
sick when in fact she is able to work. The introduction 
of sick pay further increases this incentive as the loss of 
income resulting from absence becomes smaller. Gen-
erous sickness benefits therefore hold the potential to 
be misused for shirking. Theoretically, these negative 
incentives can be contained by setting a temporal limit 
to benefit receipt, because employees in this case would 
probably want to save up their sick days for the moment 
they really fall ill, rather than recklessly spend them on 
shirking. In their review of empirical studies, Brown 
and Sessions (1996) nevertheless collect evidence that 
sick pay increases absenteeism, particularly when regu-
lar working hours are long and thus far above what most 
employees desire. To sum up, sickness benefits can have 
both a productivity enhancing as well as a dampening 
effect, and it is impossible to decide a priori, solely based 
on theory, which one is predominant.
5.5 INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS 
OF SICKNESS BENEFITS
All countries included in this study offer sickness ben-
efits either exclusively by employer provided wage con-
tinuation (Australia, New Zealand, Netherlands, Swit-
zerland), or exclusively by social insurance (Canada, 
France, Ireland, Italy, Japan), or by a combination of 
both, with wage continuation usually covering the initial 
phase of an illness and insurance benefits ensuing if the 
incapacity lasts longer. In the vast majority of schemes, 
the insurance part of sick pay is funded out of general 
health insurance. A small number of countries–particu-
larly where there is a tax funded national health system 
instead of an insurance–has set up specific schemes only 
for sick pay (e.g. Italy) or draws on financial means of 
other welfare programmes (e.g. unemployment insur-
ance in Canada). Just like the costs of unemployment 
benefits, the expenses for insurance-based sick pay are 
always divided between employers, employees, and the 
state, albeit the state’s role is often reduced to compen-
sate for potentially occurring deficits. Irrespective of the 
specific design and funding of each insurance system, 
all share the features of compulsory membership and a 
public form of organisation (Heymann 2009, Schmid 
2010: 289–298).
One striking difference compared to unemploy-
ment protection schemes is that many countries oblige 
employers to pay wages (not necessarily at the same 
amount, however) even when an employee is incapaci-
tated and therefore absent. Although the financial bur-
den is entirely born by the firm, wage continuation is 
similar to an insurance-based benefit in that it is usu-
ally granted only after a predefined period of service 
for the employer. That is, the employee must earn her-
self the right to wage continuation through previous 
efforts. The objective to be achieved by introducing 
wage continuation, instead of a purely insurance-based 
benefit, is to avert employers’ moral hazard. If the costs 
of a worker’s illness were entirely borne by an insur-
ance, employers would have low incentives to provide 
for the safety of their workplaces. By making employers 
share in the costs of absence through wage continu-
ation, firms have a vested interest to ensure that em-
ployees work in an environment non-harmful to their 
health (see, for instance, recent sick pay reforms in the 
Netherlands (van Oorschot/Boos 2000) and Sweden 
(Edebalk 2009) which were strongly motivated by this 
rationale).
The insurance based part of sick pay is structured 
in a way that shows remarkable similarities to unem-
ployment insurance in that both are public and man-
datory; for widely different reasons, however. As de-
scribed above, some employees might want to misuse 
sick pay as a pretext for shirking, but, unlike job search 
efforts in case of unemployment, it is simple to check 
whether an employee is really sick or just pretending, 
for example by demanding a doctor’s certificate for in-
capacity. Remaining incentives for shirking can be fur-
ther minimised by the introduction of waiting days, 
qualification periods and replacement rates below the 
regular wage. Moral hazard then plays a more limited 
role in the provision of sickness benefits (Barr 1992). 
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Thus, there is no compelling reason to opt for a public, 
mandatory insurance only on grounds of efficiency or 
moral hazard.
The actual problem precluding a decentralised, pri-
vate solution is negative selection. As with the risk of 
job loss, the risks of falling ill are not evenly distribut-
ed among employees. Those in physically or mentally 
stressful jobs, often badly remunerated, are likely to rely 
on sick pay much more frequently than employees on 
more favourable positions with higher pay (Barmby/ 
Ercolani/Treble 2002). Hence, the same mechanisms 
start to operate as in case of unemployment insurance: 
employees with better risks decide to change into con-
tracts offering them better conditions or drop out alto-
gether, whereas people with higher risks become unable 
to afford their insurance. As a consequence, the latter 
group will end up without any insurance coverage, al-
though it would benefit most. By making the insurance 
obligatory and ruling out competition, unequal risks 
can be pooled, allowing for the implementation of one 
single tariff affordable for all. Once again, a uniform in-
surance rate entails considerable redistribution between 
risk types without which the complete coverage of the 
workforce would be impossible to accomplish. The 
striking commonalities in the institutional design be-
tween unemployment and sickness benefits is therefore 
grounded on a shared problem of negative selection, 
which in both cases is resolved the same way.
5.6 BASIC CONCEPT 
OF MINIMUM INCOME SUPPORT
Unemployment and sickness benefits are supposed to 
be only a temporary aid with a limited duration. Once 
the maximum length has been reached, the benefit is 
exhausted and no further payments can be received. If 
at this point a former recipient is still jobless or unfit for 
work, she will be left without financial support unless 
another type of benefit steps in to prevent a total loss of 
income. This benefit is usually referred to as social as-
sistance or, more generally, minimum income support. 
Its founding principle and governing rules differ funda-
mentally from insurance based benefits.
Immervoll (2010) identifies two defining criteria 
both of which must be satisfied by any given cash trans-
fer scheme in order to be classified as minimum income. 
Most importantly, it has to be needs-based, i.e. eligible 
are only people lacking access to any other sources of 
income, whereas insurance-based benefits are available 
to everyone who has earned an entitlement through pre-
vious contributions, no matter whether or not any other 
income exists. Neither does the definition encompass 
any benefit that is targeted to specific groups without 
being needs-based (such as child benefits, orphans’ or 
widows’ pensions). The second criterion is that mini-
mum income must be a replacement or supplement to 
income from work. Allowances to people beyond work-
ing age (e.g. minimum retirement pensions) are thus 
excluded, as is support to people unable to work (e.g. 
disability pensions). It is important to note in this con-
text that many people, although de facto they are are 
unfit to work, are not officially recognised as disabled 
since their health status is in a midway condition nei-
ther bad enough to meet the disability standards nor 
good enough to fully participate in employment. Such 
people, despite their delicate health, have nonetheless to 
rely on minimum income support. The second defining 
criterion is thus necessarily blurry to a certain degree.
Minimum incomes can be handed out in various 
forms and can both comprise benefits in kind and in 
cash. Often, there is a magnitude of various assistance 
schemes coexisting, all of which covering distinct areas 
of need such as housing benefits or subsidies to heating 
costs. Unlike insurance-based benefits, basic incomes 
are always funded out of global tax revenue and can typ-
ically be received without temporal limit. All countries 
in this study operate some kind of general social assis-
tance programme, with Italy being the only exception.
The right to social assistance emerges from the 
simple fact that one is part of a society (Marshall/Bot-
tomore 1992: 8). Requested in order to be allowed to 
obtain social assistance is merely «...to live the life of a 
good citizen, giving such service as one can to promote 
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the welfare of the community» (Marshall/Bottomore 
1992: 26). The basic principle guiding this statement is 
that recipients are not to take undue advantage of their 
fellow citizens, but have to abide to the general rules 
and requirements of the society they live in. What these 
rules and requirements look like in practice and how 
draconically they are enforced, varies across countries, 
yet there is large agreement in that being able to fend 
for oneself without having to rely on public support is a 
core value anyone capable of work should try to comply 
with. Minimum income support, as it exists today, is 
hence mostly tied to the obligation to make credible at-
tempts to abandon the current status by actively seeking 
employment (Immervoll 2010: 35–38).3
This obligation necessarily induces moral haz-
ard. As with unemployment and sickness benefits, the 
more leisure is valued and the less labour, the higher 
are recipients’ incentives to put insufficient effort into 
job search, even more so as social assistance is typically 
unlimited in time (Pellizzari 2006, Coe/Snower 1997). 
To reduce moral hazard, minimum incomes normal-
ly come with two strings attached whose objective it 
is to increase work incentives without compromising 
the main purpose of income maintenance (Immervoll 
2010: 29–31): first, all basic incomes are dependent on 
a means test, i.e. they can only be received if there are 
no other sources of income including savings. Second, 
in most countries social assistance is significantly lower 
than insurance-based benefits to offset the detrimental 
3 This is in stark contrast to Van Parij’s (1997) proposal of 
an unconditional basic income which can be received even 
without any willingness to work. He argues that a just society 
must remove any obligations to work in order to achieve ‹real 
freedom› for all individuals to do whatever one wants to do.
impact of infinite payments. Additionally, more or less 
the same behavioural obligations apply as to unemploy-
ment benefits. For instance, numerous countries have 
introduced work duties, either on public or on private 
positions, to strengthen job seekers’ attachment to the 
labour market and as a test of their willingness to work. 
Social assistance recipients are also often required to re-
port regularly on their job search and the steps they have 
undertaken to find employment. If they refuse to look 
for jobs or turn down suitable offers, sanctions can be 
imposed, mostly by suspending or curtailing payments. 
The state can also try to enhance recipients’ appeal to 
employers by offering mandatory training courses.
In combination, these measures render minimum 
income support–for people able to work–less generous 
and more restrictive than insurance-based benefits. 
This is deemed necessary in order to legitimise it to-
wards tax payers, who are carefully watching that their 
money is handed out only to people considered deserv-
ing, and to contain outlays of the public purse. Ideally, 
social assistance should not serve as a mere safety net 
for those uncovered by unemployment and sickness 
benefits, but as a trampoline catapulting people back 
into employment. With regard to atypical employees, 
minimum incomes play a pivotal role, since a signifi-
cant share of non-standard workers will regularly fail 
to qualify for insurance-based benefits and has to rely 
on social assistance instead. This means part-time and 
fixed term employees find themselves in a less favour-
able position compared to their standard peers, not 
only in terms of remuneration and tenure, but also 
with respect to benefit entitlements, as they can expect 
to receive smaller amounts and to be confronted with 
harsher conditions. 

6. SOCIAL PROTECTION ARRANGEMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON
Previous chapters described in detail how atypical em-
ployees differ from standard ones in that on average they 
earn less, work fewer hours, and stay on their jobs for 
shorter periods of time. Social security systems, which, 
however, were established in times when atypical work 
was clearly the exception, are designed to primarily ac-
commodate the needs of standard workers. Therefore, 
benefit systems are most likely ill-suited to provide so-
cial protection to atypical workers on the same scale. 
To get a more accurate impression of the treatment of 
atypical employees by unemployment and sickness ben-
efit schemes, I develop three indices to analyse in direct 
comparison each of the distinct aspects of benefit pro-
vision central to atypical and standard employees’ social 
protection. I further add a measure of the generosity of 
means-tested minimum incomes as this kind of basic 
financial support often is the only benefit atypical em-
ployees have access to, hence constituting a crucial part 
of their social safety net. Countries can combine each of 
the different aspects of social protection gauged by the 
four indices in many different ways, forming what in 
this thesis is called social protection arrangements. To 
discover which kinds of social protection arrangements 
empirically exist, how frequent they are, and how they 
have evolved over time, I finally perform a cluster and a 
regression analysis.
6.1 BASIC CONCEPTION OF THE INDICES
If the generosity of social protection is to be measured 
for different types of employees, it first needs to be 
clarified which specific features of social safety schemes 
affect and potentially restrict benefits and eligibility. At-
kinson and Micklewright (1991) provide a list of such 
institutional features for unemployment benefits: (a) 
benefits are not paid to those who quit a job voluntarily, 
(b) during the initial phase of unemployment no benefit 
is paid (waiting days), (c) actively seeking for a job is 
required, (d) suitable job offers may not be refused, (e) 
eligibility is tied to a certain amount or duration of past 
contributions, (f ) benefit amount is related to past earn-
ings, (g) benefits are paid only for a limited duration. 
Since it is welfare dualism which is at the heart of this 
study, I focus only on the latter three features–which 
are also applicable to sickness benefits–because these 
will differ in their impacts on atypical and standard 
employees, whereas the former items affect all employ-
ees in the same way (and thus cannot cause dualism). 
Especially condition (e) is important for atypical em-
ployees: if access to benefits is restricted to those who 
earn a minimum amount, work a minimum number of 
hours or exceed a minimum job tenure, it will lead to 
the exclusion of numerous non-standard workers due 
to their lower working time and shorter contract terms. 
Conditions (f ) and (g), too, are particularly disadvanta-
geous for atypical workers because they result in lower 
benefit amounts and shorter durations if these depend 
on previous contribution records as usually is the case. 
Yet there is one fundamental difference between condi-
tion (e) and conditions (f ) and (g). Whereas (e) refers 
to conditions determining if at all a claimant’s past con-
tributions suffice to become eligible, (f ) and (g) define 
how much is going to be disbursed once all qualification 
requirements of condition (e) have been met. That is, 
conditions (f ) and (g) do not take effect until condi-
tion (e) is fulfilled. The rules deciding on eligibility and 
the rules determining amount and duration of benefits 
are profoundly different aspects of how social securi-
ty schemes operate which, in my view, should not be 
mixed up or blended into one single measure as is done, 
for instance, by Esping-Andersen’s decommodification 
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index. More precisely, the reason why I consider such a 
procedure flawed is that including both aspects in one 
index would imply that a high score in one dimension 
could possibly compensate for a low score in the other. 
That is obviously false: high and long potential bene-
fits have no use if a claimant gains no access to them. 
Nor is universal access to benefits valuable if payouts 
are negligible. Therefore, when computing a compos-
ite generosity index, accessibility should be kept sep-
arate from amount and duration of benefits to avoid 
that both wrongly offset each other. Rather, the various 
single features restricting accessibility should form one 
single index of their own which is described in the next 
paragraphs.
The attention researchers pay to accessibility, i.e. 
condition (e), has so far been modest. The decommodi-
fication index includes as explicit accessibility indicator 
only the minimum number of work weeks required for 
eligibility, while there are three indicators measuring the 
generosity of payments. The index is also weighted by 
the benefit’s coverage rate which may act as a proxy for 
the strictness of access, but it does not tell much about 
the design of access conditions. Since the original focus 
of the decommodification index, and the major frac-
tion of welfare state research in general, has been on 
standard workers with long-lasting job tenures and full-
time work who normally have no difficulties accessing 
unemployment or sickness benefits,1 there has been no 
marked interest in eligibility rules. Once, however, the 
situation of atypical workers is made the focal point of 
a study, accessibility must be given special importance. 
The study at hand is thus taking into particular account 
the design and restrictiveness of accessibility rules by 
proposing an index exclusively measuring the strictness 
of access requirements. This index is called accessibility 
index to differentiate it from the broader notion of el-
igibility which also comprises additional requirements 
1  There are only two cases in which standard workers are 
likely to be excluded from benefits. The first is when they lose 
their job or fall sick within their probation period. The second 
is when they fail to meet conditions (a) to (d) as stated by 
Atkinson and Micklewright (1991). These conditions, howe-
ver, are not a subject of this study.
unrelated to preceding work periods (such as job search 
efforts, availability etc.). Accessibility, more narrowly, 
refers only to employment criteria that need to be met 
prior to benefit receipt which pose the main obstacle to 
atypical workers’ chances to receive welfare handouts. 
One essential part of the index is the minimum 
number of hours (or minimum earnings in some coun-
tries) that must be reached within a given time span if 
an atypical worker is to receive a benefit. A high hours 
threshold is thus most detrimental to part-time workers 
whose working time is naturally more likely to be less 
than the required length. Another part of the index is 
the minimum number of weeks in employment prior 
to benefit receipt a claimant has to certify. This is most 
important to employees on fixed term contracts whose 
tenure might fall short of the required amount of weeks. 
Yet in most countries eligibility rules do not demand 
minimum weeks to be fulfilled by one continuous, un-
interrupted stint, but set a greater time frame within 
which the required weeks in employment can be accu-
mulated on various jobs. This time frame is the third 
part of the accessibility index.
Only few studies examine the lock-out effect of 
contribution requirements, the most recent and exten-
sive of which is Leschke (2008). Based on micro data 
from the mid-1990s, she compares entitlements to un-
employment benefits and minimum income support 
of full-time, part-time, and fixed term workers in Den-
mark, Germany, Spain, and the United Kingdom. Al-
though she does not distinguish between means-tested 
and non-means-tested benefits, her results nonetheless 
give a valuable hint as to the adverse effects of strict 
qualification requirements on the odds of atypical em-
ployees to become eligible. Using descriptive statistics, 
Leschke shows that the coverage rate of atypical workers 
is at least 10 percentage points below that of standard 
workers in all considered countries (the only exception 
being temporary workers in the UK).2 A multivariate 
regression analysis further corroborates this result. She 
2  If all unemployed are considered irrespective of their 
official registration status.
BASIC  CONCEPTION OF THE INDICES 63
finds that shorter working hours, shorter tenures, and a 
lower income significantly diminish the chance to qual-
ify for benefits.3 Even if personal and job characteris-
tics (such as age, qualification, occupation, and wage) 
are controlled for, a direct, negative effect of part-time 
work on accessibility can be identified in Denmark, the 
UK, and Germany. For fixed term work a similar nega-
tive impact is detected only in Spain. Once temporary 
employment is interacted with part-time employment 
however, a negative effect emerges also in Germany and 
the UK. The hypothesis that atypical employees are less 
likely to qualify for benefits is thus largely confirmed by 
Leschke’s study. Some older, less extensive studies report 
similar results (Cebulla 2002, Ghysels/Thirion/ Cantil-
lon 1999, Immervoll/Marianna/Mira D’Ercole 2004). 
Besides accessibility, it is amount and duration of 
payouts that define a social protection arrangement. 
Both dimensions, duration and amount, can be reason-
ably joined into one single index due to their compen-
satory nature; a high benefit amount would allow one 
to build up financial reserves which can be consumed 
should the benefit term end before a recipient goes back 
to work. The same logic also holds when reversed: if a 
benefit is too low to establish substantial savings, it can 
be made up for by a longer duration. Based on these 
two, compensatory dimensions, I therefore propose two 
more indices: the benefit index for atypical employees 
and the benefit index for standard employees. Both in-
dices consist of measures of benefit amount and dura-
tion, but each adapted to the respective situation of ei-
ther atypical or standard workers. Establishing distinct 
indices for each type of employee is necessary since the 
question whether or not there are differences in welfare 
entitlements between both groups is at the heart of this 
thesis. 
As to the determination of benefit amounts paid 
out to the recipients, most countries fix them as a per-
centage of the previous wage, but not without attach-
ing some additional strings to this rule, resulting in a 
3  The only exception is Denmark where former income is 
found to have no impact on benefit receipt.
more favourable treatment of either group. For exam-
ple, some countries apply varying percentage rates de-
pending on income. Also widespread is to set minimum 
or maximum amounts to guarantee a basic rate to low 
pay earners while capping benefits for the more well-
off. Pure flat rate benefits tend to be more generous for 
atypical employees in terms of percentage replacement 
rates. Likewise, the rules on benefit duration may in 
practice lead to very different entitlement periods for 
atypical and standard workers. Since benefit duration is 
frequently defined as a function of the previous length 
of employment, non-standard workers are very likely to 
receive payments only for a shorter time span than stan-
dard ones. As with benefit amounts, however, the intro-
duction of minimum, maximum, or flat-rate terms is 
able to amplify or extenuate this disparity. Other factors 
determining benefit amounts and durations unrelated 
to employment status (such as age or number of house-
hold members) are disregarded in this study.
Leschke (2008), who used ECHP data from 1993 
until 2000, does not cover the duration of benefits, but 
examines empirically the amount disbursed to job seek-
ers broken down by their former employment status. 
Unsurprisingly, former part-time employees are paid on 
average roughly 50 to 100 Euros (in purchasing power 
parities) less than their full-time peers, yet converted to 
net replacement rates, part-time employees’ mean ben-
efits are even somewhat higher than standard employ-
ees’. Leschke thus concludes that redistribution towards 
part-time workers takes place in all considered coun-
tries. For temporary workers, she is not able to detect 
any notable difference in benefits compared to standard 
workers in any country other than Spain. In the ensuing 
multivariate analysis, controlling for gender, age, house-
hold situation, and job characteristics, she finds signifi-
cant negative effects for part-time workers in Germany 
and fixed term workers in Spain. The assumption that, 
as a general rule, atypical employees do not receive the 
same benefits as standard employees is hence confirmed 
only on an absolute basis. Furthermore, an addition-
al penalty on atypical workers’ benefits beyond their 
personal and job characteristics seems not pervasive. 
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It must be kept in mind, however, that Leschke does 
not take into account benefit duration and lumps to-
gether unemployment benefits with minimum income 
support. If dualism will still remain absent even when 
the analysis distinguishes between first and second tier 
benefits and the duration is also considered, is open to 
question. The next section gives more technical defini-
tions of unemployment and sickness benefits, then pro-
poses an operationalisation of each benefit system by 
identifying measurable indicators and a way to merge 
them into composite indices.
6.2 CONSTRUCTION OF THE INDICES
6.2.1. DEFINITIONS
The accessibility index, the benefit index for atypical em-
ployees and the benefit index for standard employees are 
to be designed to be applicable for both unemployment 
and sickness benefits. In this context, unemployment 
benefit is defined to comprise all public, non-means-
tested payments effected to compensate for a loss of 
income due to joblessness and all public, means-tested 
payments for the same purpose, access to which is tied 
to the fulfilment of qualifying conditions prior to claim-
ing the benefit. It might not be intuitively clear why 
some means-tested benefits, such as the former German 
Arbeitslosenhilfe, a tax-funded financial aid targeted 
mostly to long-term jobless people, are subsumed un-
der the notion of unemployment benefits given that 
means-testing is widely considered a classic feature of 
second-tier minimum income schemes. I argue, how-
ever, that benefits combining means-testing with ac-
cessibility requirements resemble insurance-based pro-
grammes more closely than social assistance schemes as 
they are typically and significantly more generous than 
the minimum income, not open to anyone in need but 
only to those with an employment record, and strong-
ly demand recipients to seek work (minimum income 
schemes need not do so). Therefore, I decided to classify 
this kind of financial support as unemployment benefit 
as well. 
Sickness benefit is defined as any non-means-test-
ed, statutory payment by the public or the employer 
effected to compensate for a temporary loss of income 
due to sickness. Voluntary employer payments or pay-
ments based on collective agreements are excluded. 
Means-tested payments tied to qualification require-
ments, as encompassed by the definition of unemploy-
ment benefits, do not exist in the realm of sick pay. One 
important difference between unemployment and sick-
ness benefits is that, in case of an illness, it is frequent-
ly the employer rather than the public who is initially 
called on to provide the benefit. I consider both kinds of 
sick pay–regardless of whatever party is obliged to bear 
the costs–as equal components of sickness benefits since 
neither is established in competition to the other but 
to form one coherent system. For instance, a common 
pattern shown by numerous countries in the data set 
(e.g. Austria, Denmark, Germany) is to stipulate wage 
continuation by the employer in the initial phase of an 
illness, followed by another phase of contribution-based 
or tax-based benefits if the illness is persisting. More-
over, on closer inspection both sources of funding turn 
out to be more interwoven than it may seem at first 
glance. In the Netherlands, for example, the state takes 
on the responsibility to continue wage payments if the 
employer is unable to. Therefore, both statutory em-
ployer and public benefits need to be included in the 
calculation of the sickness benefit. Excluded remain all 
kinds of open-ended invalidity pensions not based on 
the premise the recipient is to return to work within the 
foreseeable future. 
It is also important to briefly point out the differ-
ence between unemployment and sickness benefits as 
compared to minimum income schemes. In contrast 
to the former, the latter serves as a last resort to those 
who have no other sources of income left. It provides 
means-tested financial aid granted irrespective of the 
causes of a claimant’s distress and without demanding 
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an employment record.4 Unless they have sufficient 
savings or other sources of revenue, recipients of un-
employment and sickness benefits who have exhausted 
their entitlements and have not yet found a new job or 
still feel unfit for work (while not being incapacitated 
enough to qualify for invalidity pension) consequently 
have no other choice than to claim minimum income 
support. Also those who, in the first place, have never 
qualified for either first-tier benefit due to patchy work 
histories must rely on basic incomes because under 
these circumstances no other support is available. In 
this study, minimum income schemes are thus inter-
preted as either sequel or substitute to unemployment 
and sickness benefits.5
6.2.2. OPERATIONALISATION 
  OF THE INDICATORS
In this section, I present how the basic concepts intro-
duced above are operationalised by means of quantita-
tive indicators. All indicators are chosen to be readily 
applicable to both unemployment and sickness benefits. 
I begin with the accessibility index which consists of 
three different indicators.
Minimum hours: in many countries, eligibility to 
benefits is limited to employees whose volume of work 
exceeds a predefined amount. Most often, this amount 
is measured in working hours that must be fulfilled on 
a regular basis within a given time span. As an alterna-
tive to an hours threshold, some countries (e.g. Austria 
and Germany) demand a minimum amount of regular 
earnings necessary for eligibility. In order to transform 
4  A detailed definition of minimum income following Nelson 
(2007) is given in section 6.5.
5  It is important to add that minimum income schemes also 
address people who are permanently out of the workforce and 
for whom minimum income is the only kind of support they 
are entitled to. In this case, of course, it would not be appro-
priate to describe the minimum income as sequel or substitu-
te. This description is valid only for members of the workforce, 
i.e. employed or looking for work, who are at the focus of this 
study.
the height of this threshold into a measurable value, I 
assume a part-time employee with an open-ended con-
tract and compute the minimum number of weekly 
working hours required to qualify for the most marginal 
benefit in either social security scheme. If the threshold 
is stated in terms of remuneration, I assume a part-time 
employee’s hourly rate of two thirds of the hourly mean 
wage in the total economy; given this wage, I calculate 
how many hours of work per week would be needed 
to access the benefit. The lowest possible value of this 
indicator is naturally zero, implying that qualification 
is possible regardless of the volume of work, which is 
hence the most favourable rule for the atypically em-
ployed. The higher the value, the less favourable is the 
rule for part-timers vice versa.
Example: in Austria, the minimum earnings thresh-
old for the unemployment benefit was 349 € per month 
in 2008, 2/3 of average hourly earnings were 15.99 €. 
The required number of hours worked per month giv-
en this wage then was 21.83 (349/15.99). This figure 
is divided by the average number of working days per 
month (21.6) and multiplied by the number of weekly 
working days (5), yielding a result of 5.05 for the indi-
cator. 
Minimum weeks: another common requirement 
to qualify for benefits is that any claimant must have 
accomplished a certain minimum tenure before she be-
comes entitled. The corresponding indicator is defined 
as the minimum number of weeks on one or sever-
al jobs an employee with 20 hours of weekly working 
time must have accumulated before she is entitled to 
receive the most marginal benefit of either scheme. The 
amount of 20 hours of weekly working time, although 
ultimately an arbitrary figure, has been chosen because 
of two practical advantages. First, it is low enough to 
be unambiguously considered part-time and, second, 
it is yet high enough to meet qualification criteria of 
both schemes in all included countries. Again, zero is 
the indicator value most favourable for the atypically 
employed, allowing an employee to become eligible by 
the moment the job starts, whereas increasing values in-
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dicate a longer required tenure, and hence stricter qual-
ification criteria. 
Example: In 2008, unemployment benefits in 
Switzerland were conditional on 12 months of previous 
contributions from paid work. The corresponding value 
of the indicator then simply is the number of months 
converted into weeks (52).
Time frame: this indicator was originally proposed 
by Palme et al. (2009) who applied it to standard em-
ployees. It refers to the fact that in most countries the 
required minimum tenure (as measured by the previous 
indicator) need not be reached on one single position, 
but merely within a greater time period. The required 
tenure can thus be distributed on various jobs, even 
when these have interruptions; crucial for benefit re-
ceipt is only whether the accumulated total duration of 
employment within the given time frame is sufficient to 
meet the tenure requirement. The larger the time frame 
in proportion to the necessary employment period, the 
greater is the accessibility of a welfare scheme. This can 
be easily measured by calculating the minimum fraction 
of the time frame that needs to be filled with paid work 
in order to gain access to the most marginal benefit 
of either scheme. Technically, this is done by dividing 
the indicator minimum weeks by the length of the time 
frame. The indicator hence can take on values between 
zero and one; lower values indicate a more generous reg-
ulation. The value of one stands for the strictest regula-
tion possible, ruling out any chance to accumulate work 
weeks if these have interruptions.
Example: 52 weeks in employment within the last 
104 weeks were needed to qualify for the unemploy-
ment benefit in Germany in 2008. Dividing the former 
by the latter yields 0.5 (= 52/104). 
Next, I present the indicators of the benefit index 
for atypical employees. The generosity of benefits is gen-
erally dependent on two aspects: how much is disbursed 
for how long. 
Replacement Rates: to measure the amount of social 
welfare payments (i.e. the how much aspect), I compute 
the percentage rate of a former reference net income 
that is replaced by benefits. I deviate, however, from 
other attempts by referring to a part-time and fixed 
term worker rather than to an average production work-
er with a full-time permanent contract. The reference 
atypical employee is 40 years old, childless and has 20 
hours of weekly working time. The age of 40 has been 
chosen to avoid that any special rules for younger or old-
er employees enter into the calculation. The employee 
had continuously been in paid work for 52 weeks prior 
to the benefit claim and has exhausted all further benefit 
entitlements other than those directly accruing from the 
last employment period. 52 weeks of work were chosen 
as a convenient assumption since it is a time span suf-
ficient to qualify for benefits in each included country, 
yet short-term enough to be unambiguously considered 
atypical. In order to obtain country and time-specific 
net incomes for the reference employee, I use OECD 
data of annual mean wages and divide them by the av-
erage number of annual hours worked in the pertaining 
country, yielding the annual hourly mean rate. This fig-
ure is then reduced by one third to take into account 
atypical employees’ wage penalty6 and multiplied by the 
sum of hours the reference employee with a 20-hours 
week works per year. The result is the reference employ-
ee’s annual gross wage. Now the various country and 
time-specific benefit rules (including waiting days) are 
applied to these reference incomes to determine each 
benefit’s gross replacement rate. Subsequently, gross 
benefits and gross wages are converted into net values 
using comparative OECD data on taxation and social 
contributions (see chapter 6.2.4.). Finally, a division of 
net benefits by net earnings yields the net replacement 
rate, i.e. the proportion of disposable income replaced 
by the respective benefit. Higher values imply higher 
generosity. In accordance with OECD procedures, I 
only take into account the amount of gross benefits paid 
out during the first six months of receipt and annualise 
it by multiplying it by two (OECD 2007: 68–75).
6 This is a higher wage penalty than estimated by most of 
the literature. I nonetheless decided to choose a somewhat 
exaggerated figure, in order to work out the effect of the 
wage penalty more clearly and to avoid underestimating its 
real impact.
CONSTRUCTION OF THE INDICES 67
Duration: how long a claimant will be entitled to 
benefit receipt is mostly dependent on the length of the 
preceding work period. This link can be easily expressed 
by a function stating precisely how tenure translates 
into benefit duration: the x-axis shows the number of 
weeks in employment, with the y-axis representing the 
resulting number of benefit weeks. The characteristics 
of the reference worker, to which the function is ap-
plied, are identical to those used in the computation 
of replacement rates; the only exception is that the as-
sumption of exactly 52 weeks of tenure is dropped. In-
stead, I consider the reference worker’s first 104 weeks 
in employment to accommodate the fact that tempo-
rary contracts frequently run longer than one year. The 
value of the indicator is determined by working out the 
integral  of the function between x = 0 and x = 104, 
divided by the number of weeks for which x ≤ 104 and 
f(x) > 0 (i.e. the sum of weeks during which the access 
requirements are met within a contract’s assumed ten-
ure of two years). Higher values imply a higher possible 
duration of benefit receipt for the atypically employed. 
The number of weeks during which f(x) = 0 (i.e. the 
qualification requirements are not met) does not enter 
into the calculation of benefit duration. This is import-
ant because this number is identical to the indicator 
minimum weeks in the accessibility index. If it were 
allowed to influence the indicator benefit duration as 
well, the benefit index for atypical employees would be 
distorted, as a result, by a measure that is actually gaug-
ing accessibility. 
A major objection against the proposed duration 
indicator is, however, that it does not inform us as to 
the precise course of the function, but merely gives a 
summed up and averaged value. This is true, yet it still 
provides more information on the treatment of part-
time and fixed term employees than it would if we just 
considered the benefit duration resulting from one ar-
bitrarily chosen employment period (e.g. benefit weeks 
after 2 years on a job).
Example: Figure 6.1. presents the duration func-
tion of Germany in 2008. The size of the area limited 
by the function and the x-axis up to the point where x = 
104 is 1796.43. The section where f(x) > 0 and x ≤ 104 
has a length of 52, so that the final indicator value is 
given by 1796.43 / 52 = 34.55.
The indicators of the benefit index for standard em-
ployees are closely connected to those included in the 
corresponding index for atypical employees.
Replacement rate: the procedure to compute stan-
dard workers’ replacement rates is analogous to atypi-
cal employees’ with only two minor differences. First, a 
standard employee is used as reference who is 40 years 
old and without children, but unlike her atypical coun-
terpart, has a weekly working time of 40 hours and an 
uninterrupted employment record of 20 years of service 
for one or several employers. Second, the replacement 
Table 6.1: Duration Function of Unemployment
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rate is calculated based on the undiminished coun-
try-specific mean income.
Benefit Duration: assessing standard workers’ ben-
efit duration is an easier task than atypical workers’. I 
assume the same reference standard employee as used in 
the preceding paragraph. The indicator then is simply 
the number of weeks the employee is entitled to either 
benefit. In most cases, this is equal to the maximum 
duration the payment can be drawn.7 
The next section explains how these raw indicators 
are further processed so as to form single indices.
6.2.3. COMPUTATION OF THE INDICES
Before the indicators can be aggregated to indices, it is 
necessary to harmonise their measurement units. This is 
done using min-max normalisation, based on the simple 
principle of assigning zero to the lowest empirical value 
of each indicator and one to the highest. All values in 
between are hence transformed to oscillate between zero 
and one (European Commission / OECD 2008: 28).8 
Next, the polarity of the indicators needs to be adjusted 
since the accessibility indicators report more favourable 
rules by lower values, whereas the benefit indicators do 
so by higher ones. As it is most intuitive if higher values 
imply higher generosity, the polarity of the accessibility 
indicators is reversed by subtracting their harmonised 
values from one. Because the aggregation of the indi-
cators will later be conducted by use of the geometric 
mean, it is further necessary to correct for two more 
issues. First, it must be ensured that the processed num-
7  Some countries pay benefits for an infinite period of time. 
In this case, I use the longest finite duration a country ever 
granted in the entire dataset: in Denmark, the unemployment 
benefit could be received for up to nine years until 1994 when 
it was cut to seven years. As for sick pay, the longest finite 
duration was three years in France. This rule was in place 
throughout all observed years.
8 Mathematically, this transformation works by subtracting 
from each indicator value the lowest empirical value and divi-
ding it by the difference between the highest and the lowest 
value.
bers are sufficiently large.9 Therefore, all indicators are 
multiplied by 10. Second, since the geometric mean 
needs all included values to be larger than zero, the in-
dicators are not allowed to assume values smaller than 
0.01. After these transformations and corrections have 
been applied, each indicator finally moves on a scale 
between 0.01 and 10, with higher numbers implying 
greater generosity.
The next step is to assign weights to the indicators. 
This process is always a source of contention because 
any weighting is necessarily based on subjective assess-
ments rather than purely objective principles. The best 
way to cope with this subjectivity is thus by being trans-
parent about the rationale informing the assignment. 
Starting with the accessibility index, I argue that require-
ments concerning minimum volumes of work bear no 
greater importance on the chances of atypical employees 
to become eligible than requirements for minimum ten-
ures. Which factor actually turns out to be more or less 
detrimental to atypical workers depends on the terms 
of each individual employment contract and cannot be 
determined a priori. Both aspects should thus be given 
the same weight. Since the necessary volume of work is 
captured solely by the indicator minimum hours, it is 
consequently assigned a 0.5 weight. Tenure, however, 
is jointly measured by the indicators minimum weeks 
and time frame, the latter of which mitigating the effect 
of minimum weeks by allowing to accumulate working 
weeks within a greater span of time, even when there are 
interruptions between employment periods. Due to the 
resulting close interrelation of both indicators, the re-
maining 0.5 weight is shared equally between minimum 
weeks and time frame. With regard to the benefit indi-
ces, the assignment of weights is more straightforward: 
benefit duration and replacement rate are each allotted 
the same weight of 0.5 because there is no reason to 
assume that either aspect is more beneficial to atypical 
employees than the other.
Finally, the weighted indicators must be joined to-
9 The smaller the numbers the geometric mean is applied 
to, the less will its results deviate from the simple arithmetic 
mean.
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gether to form the indices. A simple and frequently used 
way–e.g. by Esping-Andersen to construct the decom-
modification index–would be to add up the indicators. 
Concomitant to this procedure is that it renders the 
indicators compensatory, with high scores of one indi-
cator possibly making up for low values of another. Yet 
this logic barely applies to the indices proposed here. 
This becomes most obvious for the accessibility index: if 
a work contract comprises not enough hours to qualify 
for a benefit, it cannot be offset by longer tenure and 
vice versa. The benefit indicators, by contrast, are com-
pensatory, but only to a limited extent: a higher ben-
efit amount can theoretically compensate for shorter 
duration by providing the means to build up savings; 
in practice, however, almost all benefits will be lower 
than regular income and hence entail a reduced savings 
propensity. 
One possible way to make indices less compensato-
ry is the application of the geometric mean, instead of 
the arithmetic mean or a simple addition, to aggregate 
the indicators. The geometric mean is conveniently cal-
culated for every year and country by multiplying all 
indicators with their respective weights as exponents. 
Compensation is not fully ruled out, but significantly 
more weight is put on smaller values, so that low scores 
are more difficult to make up for. This way, the geomet-
ric mean can at least partly factor in the non-compensa-
tory nature of the indicators by prohibiting that low val-
ues are fully offset by higher ones. The only indicators 
that do share a compensatory relationship are the ones 
gauging tenure requirements, i.e. minimum weeks and 
time frame, to which the geometric mean consequently 
would not be rightly applied. Both variables are hence 
better combined by using the arithmetic mean whose 
outcome then enters into the further computation of 
the final index.
The formulas of the indices are accordingly:
Subscript i denotes the country, j the year. To scruti-
nise how the results are affected by whether the geo-
metric or the arithmetic mean is used for aggregation, 
I compute each index in both ways. As it is impossible 
to compare the outcomes at face value, I convert each 
index into a rank scale, i.e. all values are replaced by 
their specific ranks across all countries and years. This 
exercise results in a total of 361 ranks10 for each index 
and allows for the comparison of outcomes obtained 
through either method of aggregation. By and large, the 
difference between both methods is not too big for all 
indices measuring unemployment benefits; ranks devi-
ate by only three to ten percent on average (see table 
6.2). Yet some countries show notable discrepancies (see 
appendix): averaged over all years, Japan ranks 60 places 
lower in the benefit index for standard employees if the 
geometric mean is used. In the corresponding index for 
atypical employees the disparity is even 118 places, de-
spite very high replacement rates, as the aggregated index 
is inevitably dragged down by a particularly short benefit 
duration. Finland, Spain, and Ireland, by contrast, rank 
twenty to thirty places higher in the benefit index for 
standard employees once the geometric mean is used. 
Accessibility Index of  Unemploy-
ment Benefits
2.84%
Unemployment Benefit Index for 
Atypical Workers
10.13%
Unemployment Benefit Index for 
Standard Workers
6.15%
Accessibility Index of  Sickness 
Benefits
4.57%
Sickness Benefit Index for Atypical 
Workers
14.62%
Sickness Benefit Index for Standard 
Workers
12.94%
More pronounced are the overall differences in outcomes 
concerning sickness benefits, amounting to average dif-
ferences in ranks of 5% to 15%. Australia, Canada, 
Denmark, Ireland, New Zealand, Switzerland, and the 
10  Identical indicator scores are assigned their average rank.
Table 6.2: Average Rank Differences between Geometric and  
Arithmetic Mean
SOCIAL PROTECT ION ARRANGEMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON70
UK are affected by the highest rank disparities of up to 
110 ranks. In Australia, Ireland, and New Zealand, this 
is caused by unusually short benefit durations, making 
the benefit indices drop steeply in spite of very generous 
replacement rates, once the geometric mean is applied. 
Benefit indices, in general, seem to react more sensitive-
ly to the choice of aggregation method because wide di-
vergences between benefit duration and replacement rates 
are more common than between access criteria. 
What can be seen from this is that, although the 
scale of averaged total rank disparities across time and 
space is only moderate, the geometric mean nonetheless 
has a substantial impact on some single outcomes. A 
closer look at country details reveals that the geometric 
mean does what it is expected to do, namely to penalise 
countries with particularly low values on single indica-
tors, thereby making the indices less compensatory and 
shifting them closer to the reality of many standard and 
atypical employees.
6.2.4. DATA
The rules governing benefit entitlements to both un-
employment and sickness benefits were obtained from 
the Comparative Tables on Social Protection, provided 
by the Mutual Information System on Social Protection 
(MISSOC), reaching back to the year 1997. Addition-
al details about unemployment benefits were found in 
the country chapters of the OECD series Benefits and 
Wages, starting in the year 2001, but for some coun-
tries even going further back to 1995. Most data on 
earlier years stem from country-specific case studies, 
covering various particular aspects of social welfare 
systems (see annex for a detailed list). In order to 
convert gross incomes into net incomes, annual data 
were used from the Taxing Wages series, published by 
the OECD, starting in 1995.11 Earlier tax data were 
collected from The Tax/Benefit Position of Production 
Workers 1991–1994 (OECD 1995) and from The 
Tax/Benefit Position of Production Workers 1990–1993 
(OECD 1994). 
6.3 DESCRIPTIVE RESULTS 
FOR UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS
6.3.1. ACCESSIBILITY INDEx
First, I give a brief overview of the evolution of the 
raw indicators between 1990 and 2008, before I turn 
to present in more detail the final results of the index. 
Starting with minimum hours in the year 1990, the Scan-
dinavian countries of Denmark, Sweden, and Finland 
together with Ireland and Japan had the most restrictive 
requirements of at least 15 weekly working hours (see 
11  With additional data on Sweden by Blomquist et al. 
(1997) and Edmark et al. (2012)
Table 6.3: Minimum Hours Table 6.4: Minimum Weeks
DESCRIPT IVE RESULTSFOR UNEMPLOYMENT BENEF ITS 71
table 6.3). Austria, Germany, Norway, and the UK had 
more lenient rules, demanding between five and eight 
hours, while all other countries allowed access to unem-
ployment benefits regardless of work volume. By 2008, 
many countries had relaxed their hours requirements. 
Ireland did most significantly so by cutting the thresh-
old from 18 to 2 hours, but also Canada, Denmark, 
Germany, and the UK saw some loosening, albeit on a 
smaller scale. Only Austria and Norway slightly tight-
ened up their rules. 
In sharp contrast to this change towards more 
inclusiveness is the sharpening of minimum weeks re-
quirements, taking place in almost all countries in the 
data set (see table 6.4). In 1990, only Belgium required 
a qualification period of more than one year; Denmark, 
Germany, and Spain expected more than half a year. 
Eighteen years later, already six countries (up from one) 
required employment periods of at least one year. At the 
same time, the number of countries where tenures of 
less than half a year were sufficient for eligibility had de-
creased by half (in 2008, it was only Ireland, Italy, and 
the UK). No country had made its rules substantially 
less restrictive.
The same trend also holds for time frame (see table 
6.5). At the onset of the observation, Belgium and Ger-
many had the strictest conditions of about 60%, where-
as half of all countries demanded only 30% or less. By 
the end of the observation, these proportions had almost 
reversed. Half of all countries now required more than 
50% of the time frame to be spent in paid employment; 
only France, Ireland, Spain, and the UK stuck with less 
than 30%. Surprisingly, these two countries that used to 
have the harshest rules in 1990 and 1991–Germany and 
Belgium–are the only cases to make their time frames 
more accommodating.
Turning towards the aggregated index, in 1990 and 
1991 there used to be the top group of France, Italy, 
Spain, and Switzerland with index values of about nine 
points (see table 6.6). This group was closely followed by 
Austria, Norway, the Netherlands, and the UK, show-
ing index values of about seven to eight points. Other 
countries were trailing behind these frontrunners with 
a significant distance: the next highest ranking country 
was Germany with a value of 5.7 points; Belgium, Can-
ada, and Denmark scored between four and five points. 
Sweden and Finland attained values of 2.8 to 3.3. Out-
lier was Japan with a score of less than one. 
In light of the substantial tightening of minimum 
weeks and time frame, we expect the accessibility index to 
fall significantly in most countries. In fact, all countries 
other than Belgium, Denmark, and Ireland are marked 
either by a clear decrease or by stagnation. By 2008, 
the frontrunners were nonetheless mostly the same as 
18 years earlier, albeit with generally somewhat low-
er values. Switzerland and Norway, however, had left 
the highest ranks and were replaced by Ireland, being 
the highest climber. Belgium and Denmark caught up 
with Germany and Norway to form a new intermediate 
group, whereas Canada, almost on par with Belgium 
and Denmark in 1991, hardly changed its accessibility. 
Table 6.5: Time Frame Table 6.6: Accessibility Index 
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Finland, Sweden and Japan were still the three lowest 
ranking countries.
Ireland’s sudden and steep rise in 1991 was brought 
about by the abolition of an hours threshold which had 
been among the highest in the data set before. In Bel-
gium, the increase of the index was caused by an extend-
ed time frame, while all other indicators remained un-
changed. The development of accessibility in Denmark 
was more complicated, in comparison, as it was marked 
by a strong reduction of required minimum hours, out-
weighing a parallel tightening of minimum weeks and 
time frame. The sharpest drops were seen by Norway 
and Switzerland, both losing two points due to more 
restrictive rules on time frame and minimum weeks. 
6.3.2. BENEFIT INDEx 
  FOR ATYPICAL EMPLOYEES
In parallel to accessibility rules growing less inclusive, 
there is a trend towards less generous benefit amounts 
and shorter duration (see tables 6.7 and 6.8). In 1990, 
benefits were particularly generous in Denmark, France, 
Japan, and Sweden, replacing about 90% of former in-
come or more. On the other side of the spectrum, it was 
Ireland, Italy, and the UK that compensated the smallest 
fraction of previous wages (40% or less). All other coun-
tries replaced between about 60% and 75%. 18 years 
onwards, however, the former top group had dispersed: 
Denmark, the most generous country in 1990, had even 
further increased its replacement rate, whereas France 
and Sweden cut it considerably. Nevertheless, they still 
are part of a broader, more generous group, also includ-
ing Belgium, Italy, Norway, Portugal, and Switzerland, 
compensating 60%–80% of lost income. Likewise, also 
the group with the lowest benefits had ceased to exist 18 
years later. The UK even further downsized its already 
modest level of compensation (30%). Italy, by contrast, 
had seen the steepest increase in replacement rates of all 
observed cases, rising from about 20% to almost 70%, 
enough to propel it into the group of more generous 
countries. Ireland, too, raised its benefits by about ten 
percentage points to match those of the Netherlands 
and Spain (50%–55%) which, in turn, had significantly 
trimmed their support to the unemployed as compared 
to the year 1990. These three countries form a new 
group marked by moderate replacement rates.
The duration of benefits either did not change or 
was considerably reduced in all countries over the ob-
served time span with the exception of Austria, Italy, 
and Switzerland. The countries with the most beneficial 
rules in 1990 (or 1991) were Austria, Belgium, Den-
mark, and Germany where benefits could be drawn for 
at least nine years or even infinitely. Norway, Sweden, 
Finland, and France offered somewhat shorter benefits, 
but pertained nonetheless to a more generous group 
of countries. The remaining countries formed a quite 
homogeneous lower group with shorter durations. By 
2008, Austria and Belgium, which used to provide 
benefits infinitely, had not changed their regulations, 
Table 6.7: Replacement Rate for Atypical Employees Table 6.8: Duration for Atypical Employees
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therefore retaining their status as the most generous 
countries by far. Denmark almost halved its value, yet 
was still the third highest ranking country. Finland and 
Norway stayed among the higher scoring countries on 
a somewhat lower level, but were newly joined by Swit-
zerland which had extended its duration. By contrast, 
Germany and, less dramatically, Sweden, substantially 
cut the duration of unemployment benefits and con-
sequently dropped to the group of countries with less 
favourable rules.
It comes as no surprise, then, that the final index 
scores of Denmark, Belgium, Germany, and Austria in 
the first year of observation were the highest by far due 
to their extraordinary benefit durations (see table 6.9). 
An intermediate position was taken by Finland, France, 
Norway, and Sweden. The remaining half of countries 
formed a cluster of low generosity. Among the former 
frontrunners, it is only Austria and Belgium that pre-
served their initial level of benefits over the entire pe-
riod, while Denmark and, most sharply, Germany cut 
back on generosity. In the latter case, these cuts were 
so deep that the generosity of German unemployment 
benefits plunged from the top to the low group. Fin-
land, France, Norway, Sweden, and, more recently, 
Switzerland continued to form an intermediate group. 
Summed up, there was a general propensity in almost 
each observed state to retrench unemployment benefits, 
sometimes very rigorously. The exceptions are Italy and 
Ireland which expanded their benefits, yet departing 
from a very low level. On a higher level, it is merely 
Switzerland that considerably increased benefits both in 
duration and amount.
6.3.3. BENEFIT INDEx 
  FOR STANDARD EMPLOYEES
In 1990, replacement rates for standard employees were 
generally on a level similar to those for atypical ones, 
or slightly less (see table 6.10). Striking differences 
existed only in Denmark, France, Japan, and the UK, 
where replacement rates for standard employees were 
about twenty percentage points lower. In the course of 
the following 18 years, however, a gap manifested itself 
between standard and atypical employees’ benefits: al-
though both indices are subject to a common trend of 
retrenchment, replacement rates for standard workers 
turn out to be relatively more affected. By the end of 
the observation period, the majority of countries grant-
ed benefits to standard employees at least ten percent-
age points lower than to atypical employees. Exceptions 
are the Netherlands and Portugal, emerging as the only 
countries that provide standard workers with higher re-
placement rates.
As for the duration of benefits, it is Austria, Bel-
gium, Germany, and Denmark that offered the lon-
gest benefits of up to nine years or even infinite in 
1991 (see table 6.11). These were followed by the 
Netherlands, Norway, France, Sweden, Spain, and 
Finland, where unemployment benefits could be re-
Table 6.9: Benefit Index for Atypical Employees Table 6.10: Replacement Rates for Standard Workers
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ceived for at least 100 and up to 208 weeks. Ireland, 
the UK, Switzerland, and Canada had more limited 
durations of about one year or slightly more. Only 
Italy and Japan restricted their payouts to last no lon-
ger than half a year. Therefore, as with replacement 
rates, benefit duration for standard employees closely 
resembled that for atypical employees in 1991. Only 
the Netherlands and Spain deviated from this pattern, 
granting substantially longer benefits to standard 
rather than to atypical workers. By 2008, benefits had 
been shortened or had stagnated in all countries other 
than Italy, Portugal, and Switzerland, where they in-
creased. Hence, only Austria and Belgium continued 
to form a top group, while all other former members 
sank to lower levels. Denmark dropped the position 
formerly occupied by the Netherlands; Germany 
retrenched its benefits in such a way that it left the 
highest group and joined the lower one with benefits 
of about one year. Among other more generous coun-
tries, the development in Finland, France, Norway, 
and Spain was characterised by a downward tendency, 
but holding on to a more favourable position with 
benefits of about 100 weeks. Sweden and the Neth-
erlands, on the other hand, cut back their benefits so 
sharply that duration fell below 100 weeks. In the re-
maining countries, duration remained at about one 
year or shorter, with the UK further retrenching to 
an already low level. Only Switzerland, bucking the 
trend, increased the duration of unemployment bene-
fits to match the Netherlands’.
With respect to the aggregate benefit index for 
standard workers, Denmark, Germany, Belgium, and 
Austria come out as the highest scoring countries in 
1991 (see table 6.12), which is primarily due to their 
very long, quasi-infinite durations, with replacement 
rates only on a more intermediate level (except for 
Denmark). Norway, Sweden, France, and the Neth-
erlands ranked somewhat lower despite generous re-
placement rates (in the case of Sweden and France 
even markedly above the level of the highest ranking 
countries), as these were outweighed by a more limited 
duration. On a larger scale, the same also applied to 
Spain, Finland, and Canada. The remaining countries 
showed small overall index scores because of low values 
in both indicators. By 2008, four countries that had 
been part of the top group or just behind (Denmark, 
Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden) had decreased 
their values sharply, almost entirely through severe cut 
backs to duration. Thus, the former top group shrunk 
to contain only Belgium and Austria, while a new 
group is formed of Denmark and Portugal, followed 
by a lower group of Finland, France, the Netherlands 
(dropping from the intermediate group), Norway, 
Spain, and Switzerland. The lowest group, finally, ex-
tended to include Germany (dropping from the high-
est group), Sweden (dropping from the intermediate 
group), Canada, Ireland, Italy, and the UK. In sum-
mary, it was mostly cuts to duration, rather than to 
replacement rates, that account for the trend towards 
retrenchment.
Table 6.11: Duration for Standard Workers
Table 6.12: Benefit Index for Standard Workers
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6.4 DESCRIPTIVE RESULTS 
FOR SICKNESS BENEFITS
6.4.1. ACCESSIBILITY INDEx
The indicators employed to measure sickness benefits 
are marked by much greater stability over the observa-
tion period than the variables gauging unemployment 
benefits. This holds in particular for the accessibility 
indicators. Minimum hours were varying in merely six 
countries between 1990 and 2008, mostly easing the 
condition (see table 6.13). Germany and Ireland low-
ered the threshold from initially high levels (10 and 18 
hours, respectively) to almost zero; Canada, Sweden, 
and the UK reduced their thresholds as well to fewer 
than four hours. Spain, by contrast, was the only coun-
try to tighten its volume requirement by four hours. All 
in all in 2008, only a minority of countries required 
minimum hours to be greater than zero which means, 
in turn, that a total of eleven countries allowed access 
regardless of weekly working time. The strictest rules 
were in force in France, Denmark, Japan, and Canada 
(despite the easing), demanding more than ten hours. 
Somewhat less strict were Belgium, Ireland, and the UK 
with less than ten hours. Japan, as with unemployment 
benefits, is an outlier through all years, offering sick pay 
only to employees with more than thirty hours a week, 
thereby effectively excluding the vast majority of atyp-
ical workers. 
Minimum weeks, just like minimum hours, show a 
high consistency too, yet with a slight tendency towards 
more restrictiveness (see table 6.14). In 2008, 12 of 19 
countries in the data set defined a minimum weeks re-
quirement of whom seven countries required 13 weeks 
or less. The toughest conditions were set by Canada 
and Ireland with more than thirty weeks; these were 
also the only countries where a pronounced tightening 
happened, increasing the threshold by no less than ten 
weeks. Norway, Germany, and Portugal also increased 
the number of weeks, but to a much smaller extent of 
about 2 to 4 weeks. Ireland, on the other hand, made 
its rather strict criteria more inclusive. Minimum hours 
and minimum weeks are hence much less challenging for 
sickness than for unemployment benefits.
The opposite is true for time frame, tending to be signif-
icantly stricter for sickness benefits. In 2008, a minority 
of six countries defined no time frame at all, while just 
as many countries required all minimum weeks to be ac-
cumulated without interruption. Even the less challeng-
ing regulations expected in most cases that at least fifty 
percent of the time frame were to be filled with work, 
much more than was needed to qualify for unemploy-
ment benefits. Canada, Germany, Spain and Portugal 
restricted their time frames in the observed period, Ire-
land relaxed it.
Since there is less variation in the indicators, there 
is also less in the aggregated accessibility index (see ta-
ble 6.16). During the observed 18 years, only Germa-
ny, Ireland, and Spain notably changed their scores. 
Table 6.13: Minimum Hours Table 6.14: Minimum Weeks
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By 2008, access to sick pay was almost universal for 
atypical employees in Australia, Austria, Finland, Italy, 
Netherlands, Portugal, and Sweden. Somewhat less ac-
cessible were sickness benefits in Denmark, Germany 
(declining from almost universal access in 1991), and 
Norway. More austere were rules in Belgium, Canada, 
France, New Zealand, Spain (losing about two points 
compared to 1990), Switzerland and the UK. Ireland 
almost tripled its score, but remained the second lowest 
ranking country in the index, with only Japan trailing 
further behind.
6.4.2. BENEFIT INDEx 
  FOR ATYPICAL EMPLOYEES
Replacement rates of sickness benefits varied more over 
time than the accessibility indicators, but still less than 
compared to unemployment benefits’ (see table 6.17). 
They were also considerably higher than unemployment 
benefits’ and displayed less of a downward tendency. At 
the end of the observation period, Denmark was the 
most generous country almost overcompensating, but 
also Australia, Norway, New Zealand, and Switzerland 
completely replaced forfeited income due to illness. 
Austria and Germany offered above average payments of 
more than eighty percent of former net wage. The ma-
jority of countries chose replacements of between sev-
enty and eighty percent. Finland, Canada, and France 
paid about sixty percent of former wage to sick workers, 
characterising them as less generous schemes, undercut 
only by Ireland and the UK with the lowest replace-
ment rates below fifty percent. The sharpest retrench-
ment happened in Finland and the UK by up to twenty 
percentage points; Germany, Canada, and Sweden did 
the same on smaller scale of only about ten percentage 
points. By contrast, Ireland and Japan were raising re-
placement rates by nearly ten percentage points.
Unlike replacement rates, benefit duration was 
marked by stability (see table 6.18). Its values of 2008 
were widely in correspondence with those 18 years earli-
er. The most generous rules by far had Sweden and Por-
tugal, then came France, the Netherlands and Ireland; 
the latter two being among the few countries to increase 
their durations. Slightly less generous was Germany. 
The largest cluster of countries is formed between val-
ues of about 4000 to 5000 total weeks (the UK joined 
Table 6.15: Time Frame Table 6.16: Accessibility Index
Table 6.17: Replacement Rate for Atypical Workers
DESCRIPT IVE RESULTSFOR S ICKNESS BENEF ITS 77
this group in 1995, starting from a lower value), while 
Italy, Australia, Canada, New Zealand and Switzerland 
ranked far behind.
Converted into the benefit index for atypical employ-
ees, Sweden and Portugal turned out to be the highest 
ranking countries as they had the highest values for 
both duration and replacement rate. Most countries, 
however, showed medium index values between five and 
six. In this context, Ireland and the Netherlands need 
to be highlighted, being the only countries to substan-
tially increase their scores. Austria and Belgium reached 
values between four and five over the entire time span, 
while Finland, even though its values initially equalled 
Austria’s and Belgium’s, decreased its score to below four 
through cuts to the replacement rate. The remaining 
countries formed a group of particularly less generous 
countries, the extremes being Japan, Australia, and New 
Zealand. In case of the latter two this may come un-
expectedly since they offer high replacement rates, but 
their index scores were inexorably dragged down by the 
unusually short duration of payments.
6.4.3. BENEFIT INDEx 
  FOR STANDARD EMPLOYEES
Replacement rates for standard employees were very 
similar to atypical employees’, in most countries even 
nearly identical (see table 6.20). Major exceptions were 
Belgium, Germany, and Spain where standard workers 
despite their higher wages received replacement rates 
about ten percentage points higher than their atypical 
colleagues. The opposite was true in an extreme way in 
Denmark where standard workers’ benefits were at least 
forty percentage points lower than atypical workers’. 
In the UK, Canada, and Ireland a similar gap existed, 
amounting to about ten to twenty percentage points. 
In all of these countries (except in the UK), atypical 
workers were doing considerably better in terms of re-
placement rates; cuts have thus been concentrated on 
standard workers.
Sweden and Ireland stick out among other coun-
tries in that sickness benefits can be received without 
any temporal limit (see table 6.21). In France and 
Spain, maximum duration was three years, in the Neth-
erlands two years, Germany, Japan, and Spain allowed 
receipt of up to 78 weeks. Six countries limited sick pay 
Table 6.18: Duration for Atypical Workers Table 6.19: Benefit Index for Atypical Workers
Table 6.20: Replacement Rates for Standard Workers
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to about one year. Shorter durations existed only in Ita-
ly, Switzerland, and Canada where 15 to 26 weeks were 
the maximum. Australia and New Zealand had the least 
generous regulations, granting merely one or two weeks 
of wage continuation. Changes occurred only in the 
Netherlands and the UK, both doubling the maximum 
length.
Accordingly, the final index looks very similar 
to the index for atypical workers (see table 6.22). Yet 
some exceptions stand out: Denmark, Ireland, and the 
UK show significantly smaller values because of lower 
replacement rates for standard employees. Japan, by 
contrast, offers high benefits to standard workers even 
though it denies them to atypical ones. Likewise, rules 
in Finland, France, Portugal, and Switzerland seem to 
privilege standard employees.
6.5 MINIMUM INCOME PROTECTION
It is one core objective of this study to set unemploy-
ment and sickness benefits in relation to minimum in-
come protection schemes put in place to help out if all 
other benefits have been exhausted. It is reasonable to 
analyse both types of protection schemes in interaction 
since they may act as functional equivalents. If, for in-
stance, the incentives to take on a job are examined (as 
is done in this study), it may not suffice to solely focus 
on the generosity of unemployment benefits because 
many job seekers will rely on minimum income pro-
tection instead, thus are not affected by adjustments of 
insurance-based benefits. In particular, this is more of 
a concern for atypical employees than standard ones as 
the latter face a higher risk of failing the access criteria of 
first-tier benefits. Any analysis of the effects of benefits 
for atypical employees should therefore take minimum 
income schemes into account.
In order to operationalise the generosity of mini-
mum incomes in such a way as to make them compa-
rable to first-tier benefits, I refer to the Social Assistance 
and Minimum Income Protection Interim Data-Set (Ver-
sion: 2.5 Beta, 2010) collected and described by Nel-
son (2007a) for the years 1990 to 2009. The data set 
contains information on the amounts paid out in form 
of social assistance, housing benefits, and various oth-
er support measures (such as refundable tax credits or 
child benefits) which, added up, yield the final amount 
of minimum income protection. Then, I work out the 
net replacement rates of such minimum incomes across 
all countries and years. Just like replacement rates of 
unemployment and sickness benefits, minimum in-
comes are thus expressed as fractions of net mean wages 
for each country and year. As has been elaborated in 
chapter 5.6., eligibility to such basic provision is usually 
tied to strict job search requirements, means-testing or 
even community service, which can seriously impair a 
claimant’s chances of receiving it. Nonetheless, it is not 
possible to consider the strictness of these criteria in this 
study as to this day there are no comprehensive data on 
this topic available.
Table 6.21: Duration for Standard Workers Table 6.22: Benefit Index for Standard Workers
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At the onset of observation, the dispersion of mini-
mum incomes was relatively wide (see table 6.23). Nor-
way had the highest replacement rate (70%), followed 
by Denmark and Sweden (60%); Germany and Finland 
reached values between 50% and 60%. Norway’s replace-
ment rate is thus about as high as the corresponding rate 
of the unemployment benefit. In Denmark, Germany, 
and Finland minimum incomes were about ten points 
lower, whereas in Sweden the difference was 25 percent-
age points. Gaps of this size seem to be the standard in 
most other countries: Ireland, the Netherlands, New 
Zealand, and Switzerland compensated between forty 
and fifty percent of a mean income which was at least 
twenty percentage points less than the unemployment 
benefit. The exception was Ireland where minimum in-
come and unemployment benefit could hardly be distin-
guished by amount. The remaining countries replaced 
between thirty and forty percent, being at least thirty 
points below the level of the unemployment benefit (ex-
cept in Italy and the UK where the unemployment ben-
efit was particularly ungenerous). Portugal was an outlier 
by offering only 15% as minimum income. Compared 
to replacement rates of atypical workers’ unemployment 
benefits the gaps between minimum income and in-
surance-based benefits would be even higher; the same 
holds for sickness benefits. The only countries deviating 
from this pattern are the UK and Ireland whose unem-
ployment, sickness, and minimum income benefits were 
all of about the same amount.
At the end of the period, the picture had not pro-
foundly altered although the majority of countries 
had lost a few percentage points in replacement rates. 
Those countries with the most generous rules in 1990, 
however, slashed their minimum incomes much more 
than the rest. Sweden, for example, cut its scheme by 
20 points, Denmark by more than 15 points, Norway 
and Finland by roughly ten points. Only Germany did 
not reduce its minimum income and therefore was the 
country with the highest replacement rate in 2008. On 
the other side of the spectrum, Canada and Spain re-
duced their replacement rates by about ten points de-
spite their already low levels. Considerable hikes were 
taking place only in Italy and Japan where minimum 
incomes were rising by eight and 18 percentage points. 
Since unemployment benefits were falling in line with 
minimum incomes over the same period, there was no 
general trend towards convergence among them.
6.6 CONFIGURATIONS OF SOCIAL 
PROTECTION ARRANGEMENTS
6.6.1. CLUSTERING METHOD
With four indices in place gauging accessibility, payouts 
for standard and atypical employees as well as mini-
mum incomes, the configurations of social protection 
arrangements covering the risks of unemployment and 
sickness are ready to be analysed for different countries 
and years. In order to do so, hierarchical clustering has 
been applied, sorting the observed countries into groups 
based on similar index scores. For both unemployment 
and sickness benefits there are two analyses each, one at 
the onset of the observation in 1991 and another one 
over to the end in 2006.12 A direct comparison of the 
12 For most countries there are data ranging from 1990 to 
2008, yet due to some missing values for Germany, Swit-
zerland, Portugal, Sweden, and (for sickness benefits) New 
Zealand in 1990 and for Norway in 2007 and 2008 the years 
1991 and 2006 have been chosen to perform the cluster ana-
lysis. Furthermore, Portugal is excluded from the analysis as 
data on this country are particularly patchy.
Table 6.23: Minimum Incomes
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resulting clusters gives us an overview of how social 
protection arrangements evolved during the included 
years. 
There are several methods by which clustering can 
be conducted. Since there are no objective criteria de-
termining which one returns the best results, I decided 
to use four established hierarchical algorithms–Ward 
Method, Complete Linkage, Unweighted Average, and 
Weighted Average13 – and to compare the outcomes. 
A brief overview of the mathematical details of each 
algorithm is given in European Commission / OECD 
(2008: 74):
Ward Method: clusters are formed by joining coun-
tries that increase the variance, i.e. the sum of squared 
deviations from the cluster mean, by the smallest possi-
ble amount. In a first step, two countries with the small-
est variance are joined together, then more countries or 
clusters are gradually added to the existing ones. This 
method is likely to generate very homogeneous clusters 
(Leschke 2008: 202).
Complete Linkage: under this method, it is not the 
variance, but the distance between clusters that deter-
mines which countries or clusters are joined together. 
The distance between clusters is determined by the 
greatest distance between any two countries belonging 
to different clusters. In each step of the clustering proce-
dure, two clusters with the smallest distance are merged.
Unweighted Average: this method functions just 
like Complete Linkage, except that the distance between 
clusters is computed as the average distance between all 
pairs of countries in two clusters.
Weighted Average: this algorithm is identical to Un-
weighted Average, adding just one computational step 
by weighting the average pair-group distance by the size 
of the cluster, i.e. the number of countries contained.
To run the algorithms described above the distance 
between countries needs to be computed. I decided to 
use the squared Euclidean distance which puts more 
13 Another frequently applied algorithm, Single Linkage, is 
not used because of its inherent propensity to return single 
country clusters, running counter to the aim of this study to 
assort countries to groups.
weight on greater distances and is the common distance 
measure in social science.14 It is sensitive to differences 
in variable scales, however, and needs normalised indi-
cators as inputs. For minimum income this is done by a 
simple min-max-normalisation, just as it was performed 
to calculate accessibility and benefit indices. For the lat-
ter, normalisation is more difficult to achieve because 
their underlying concepts are complex and not directly 
comparable. This is illustrated by a simple example: even 
though all indices range from 0.01 to 10, with higher 
values indicating higher generosity, a one point increase 
in the benefit index for atypical employees may not have 
the same quality as a one point increase in the accessi-
bility index. Therefore, I have used a method proposed 
by Tangian (2011) which exploits rank differences to 
quantify abstract or qualitative notions. The logic un-
derpinning his method is that, even if certain concepts 
cannot be expressed by exact numbers, it might none-
theless be possible to put them in a rank order across 
time and space. This is clearly the case for the accessi-
bility and benefit indices since higher scores always rep-
resent greater generosity. Then, the ranks are converted 
into a metrical scale by a normal min-max-normalisa-
tion. This results in a rounding error as the exact index 
values are abandoned in favour of relative ranks, but the 
error is shown to be small and decreasing in the number 
of ranks (Tangian 2011). Yet it allows a more relative 
interpretation of the values: if, for example, a country 
has a value of 0.5 in the accessibility index in one year, it 
means that accessibility in this specific country and year 
takes the middle rank relative to accessibility in all other 
countries across all covered years. It also allows for com-
parisons across indices. If a country holds 0.5 points in 
the benefit index for atypical employees, but only 0.3 
points in the accessibility index, one can conclude that 
accessibility is less generous than benefits for atypical 
employees relative to other countries’ rules.
14  The Euclidean distance is mathematically defined as: 
d is the distance between countries i and j, k denotes the 
number of variable x.
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Once all cluster solutions returned by each algo-
rithm have been calculated, it must be decided which 
solution is the most convincing and informative. While 
there can be no objective criteria guiding this choice, 
there are some measures, called stopping rules, that can 
act as a source of orientation. In this thesis, I employ the 
established Calinski-Harabasz stopping rule (Calinski / 
Harabasz 1974). I first check which cluster solutions the 
Calinski-Harabasz rule supports for each algorithm, ex-
cluding also every solution with less than three or more 
than six clusters as well as solutions containing single 
country clusters, and then further explore in detail to 
what extent these solutions differ from each other and 
whether they can be interpreted in a conclusive way. 
Based on this deliberation the decisions on the final 
solutions are made.
Besides the general information it provides on 
common patterns in the configuration of social protec-
tion arrangements, clustering can also inform us on the 
scale and variety of dualism inherent to these patterns. 
It can manifest itself in the clusters in three different 
ways: first, the accessibility score tells us to what extent 
atypical employees have access to first-tier benefits; low-
er scores (i.e. more restrictive accessibility) thus indicate 
a greater extent of dualism by excluding an increasing 
number of atypical employees from first-tier benefits. 
Second, the gap between benefit index scores for stan-
dard and for atypical employees informs us as to how 
part-time and fixed term workers are treated compared 
to standard ones in terms of amount and duration of 
benefits. If the scores of standard benefits are higher 
than of atypical ones, it is considered dualisation be-
cause it means that atypical workers receive relatively 
less generous benefits. Third, the difference between 
benefits for standard employees and minimum incomes 
is another form of dualism as it indicates how much 
atypical workers who do not qualify for first-tier ben-
efits lose compared to their standard peers who usual-
ly do. Minimum incomes being smaller than first-tier 
benefits is thus a potential source of dualisation. It must 
be stressed, however, that all scores used to compute the 
clusters can only be interpreted as measures of generosi-
ty relative to other countries. A score of 0.5 for benefits 
for atypical employees and for minimum incomes does 
not mean that both are equal in amount and duration. 
Rather, it means that benefits and minimum income 
both take the middle position in their respective rank-
ing. Any outcome of dualisation is thus merely a com-
parison of each scheme’s relative generosity and cannot 
be interpreted in absolute terms.
6.6.2. PATTERNS OF 
  UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS
For the year 1991, all algorithms return the same results 
when the number of clusters is four or less, only with 
more than four clusters do the outcomes start to differ. 
The Ward Method and Complete Linkage are identical 
even up the ninth cluster. The Calinski-Harabasz stop-
ping rule gives the strongest support to the six clusters 
solution suggested by the Ward Method and Complete 
Linkage, with the four clusters solution not being far 
behind. A closer look at both solutions reveals that they 
are identical with only two differences: in the six clusters 
solution, Finland and Sweden are separated from Bel-
gium, Germany, and Denmark to form a single cluster, 
and Japan and Canada are assorted to a single cluster 
without Australia and New Zealand. In my view, both 
additional clusters are not sufficiently distinct from the 
other clusters to justify the six clusters solution. Fin-
land and Sweden closely resemble Belgium, Germany 
and Denmark in terms of accessibility and minimum 
income; benefits are somewhat lower, yet still clearly 
among the highest. Japan and Canada, in turn, share 
Australia’s and New Zealand’s strict accessibility and low 
minimum income, diverging only in that the former 
pay somewhat more generous benefits. These, however, 
are still among the lowest in the sample. Therefore, the 
four clusters solution is chosen. It contains the follow-
ing clusters (see tables 6.23 and 6.24):
Mediterranean and European Anglo-Saxon Cluster: 
It contains the UK, Ireland, Spain, and Italy, as well as 
Switzerland as a special case. These countries have in 
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Table 6.24: Ward Clusters of Unemployment Benefits in 1991
common the highest accessibility of unemployment 
benefits in the data set which is accompanied by rather 
low benefits for both atypical and standard employees. 
Minimum income, too, is particularly ungenerous, bare-
ly above the level of the Non-European cluster. Dualism 
is thus no major issue in this cluster since all benefits 
are easy to access and relatively equal on a generally low 
level. There are no striking differences between standard 
and atypical employees’ benefits, nor do minimum in-
comes substantially deviate from first-tier benefits. 
Exclusive Continental Cluster: This cluster is most 
distinct from the Mediterranean and Anglo-Saxon 
Cluster in that it combines the strictest rules on accessi-
bility with the highest benefits and minimum income. 
It consists of Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Germany, and 
Belgium. Dualism is conspicuously present in shape of 
very restrictive contribution conditions, barring many 
atypical workers from benefits. If, however, an atypical 
worker gains access, she can expect to receive benefits 
equal to standard workers’. Minimum incomes are the 
most generous by international standards, but do not 
match the level of first-tier benefits. Dualism in this 
cluster is thus primarily a matter of highly condition-
al access requirements while the gap between first and 
second-tier payments–albeit clearly evident–is compar-
atively smaller.
Inclusive Continental Cluster: In France, the Neth-
erlands, Austria, and Norway, benefits for standard 
employees on average are almost as generous as in the 
Exclusive Cluster, yet somewhat lower for atypical em-
ployees. Minimum incomes too are smaller than in the 
Exclusive Continental Cluster, but larger than in any of 
the other two clusters. Salient, however, is that accessi-
bility is almost as inclusive as in the Mediterranean and 
Anglo-Saxon Cluster. Greater access therefore comes 
at the price of lower benefits for atypical employees 
and minimum incomes. Dualism then is not so much 
caused by restricted openness (as in the Exclusive Clus-
ter), but instead is found to a smaller extent in the gap 
between benefits for standard and atypical employees, 
as well as in smaller minimum incomes, disadvantaging 
those who fail to meet the (however lenient) contribu-
tion conditions of first-tier benefits.
Non-European Cluster: Australia, New Zealand, Ja-
pan, and Canada form a cluster which is characterised 
by a combination of strict qualification criteria with 
the least generous benefits and minimum income. This 
cluster thus offered the smallest support to jobless peo-
ple in 1991. Despite the universally low level of social 
protection, there exists a certain extent of dualism in 
that access is heavily restricted. Minimum incomes, by 
contrast, exist on a similar scale as in the Mediterranean 
and Anglo-Saxon Cluster, which is to the advantage of 
atypical employees.
It can be summarised that in general benefits for 
standard and atypical employees do not differ much 
relative to each other in 1991. Discrimination against 
atypical employees happens mostly through qualifica-
tion requirements, not through diverging benefits. On 
a smaller scale, it is also the low level of basic incomes 
that is another source of dualism. It is further important 
to note that in the Exclusive Continental and the Med-
iterranean and Anglo-Saxon Cluster there is a negative 
correlation between accessibility and benefits, whereas 
in the other two clusters the relationship is positive. The 
descriptive evidence on the link between accessibility 
and benefits is therefore mixed for the year 1991. More 
striking is the correlation between accessibility and 
minimum incomes. The Mediterranean and Anglo-Sax-
on Cluster and the Exclusive Continental Cluster share 
a negative relation between both indices, i.e. if access 
to first-tier benefits is restricted, basic income schemes 
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become more generous as, for example, in the Exclusive 
Cluster. This relationship, albeit weaker, is also visible 
in the Inclusive Cluster where minimum incomes are 
somewhat lower than in the Exclusive Cluster. Only the 
Non-European Cluster does not fit this pattern. 
In 2006, clusters are less clear-cut. The Ward Meth-
od and Complete Linkage give identical results for solu-
tions with up to six clusters and diverge only once the 
number of clusters grows larger. Average Unweighted 
Linkage and Average Weighted Linkage show an op-
posite pattern as they converge only once the solutions 
include more than seven clusters; with solutions con-
taining seven or fewer clusters, both algorithms return 
differing results. The Calinski-Harabasz rule suggests 
three possible solutions: either the four or six cluster 
solutions resulting from the Ward Method and Com-
plete Linkage, or the three cluster solution returned by 
Average Weighted Linkage. At closer inspection of the 
clusters, it becomes apparent that, unlike the clusters in 
1991, the six cluster solution contains several crucial de-
tails that would be lost with any smaller number of clus-
ters. In the four cluster solution, for instance, UK and 
Spain are added to a Mediterranean Cluster which can 
be justified due to their similarity in terms of accessibili-
ty and benefits for standard employees, however the UK 
and Spain also strongly deviate from the rest of the clus-
ter by a substantially lower benefit for atypical employ-
ees and a significantly smaller minimum income. Like-
wise, Japan and New Zealand are joined with Australia 
and Canada into a Non-European cluster, even though 
minimum income protection considerably varies in this 
cluster since Japan and New Zealand reach almost Eu-
ropean levels of generosity. If the three cluster solution 
were selected, the loss of important details would be 
even more severe. It is hence the six cluster solution as 
returned by the Ward Method and Complete Linkage 
that is chosen for the year 2006. The clusters are com-
posed as follows (see tables 6.25 and 6.26):
Mediterranean and Anglo-Saxon Cluster: this cluster 
resembles its predecessor from 1991, but Spain and the 
UK have been excluded to form a cluster of their own, 
while France has newly joined the group. The split of 
the original 1991 cluster is caused by the contrary devel-
opments of Switzerland, Ireland, and Italy on one side 
and Spain and the UK on the other side. The former 
three countries increased their unemployment protec-
tion, whereas Spain and the UK took the opposite path 
of retrenchment. France has seen notable cuts as well, 
but since it came from a very high level (former mem-
ber of the Inclusive Continental Cluster), it converged 
with Switzerland, Ireland, and Italy to form a new Med-
iterranean and Anglo-Saxon cluster. The cluster is char-
acterised by broad access, modest benefits for standard 
workers and minimum income, yet surprisingly exten-
sive benefits for atypical employees. Dualism is thus a 
matter only of slim basic incomes far below the standard 
of first-tier benefits for atypical employees.
Residual Mediterranean and Anglo-Saxon Cluster: 
Table 6.25: Average Normalised Values of Unemployment Benefit-Clusters in 1991
Accessibility 
Index
Benefit Index 
for Standard 
Employees
Benefit Index 
for Atypical 
Employees
Minimum 
Income
Mediterranean and European 
Anglo-Saxon Cluster  
IRE, ITA, SPA, SWZ, UK
0,78 0,25 0,28 0,33
Exclusive Continental Cluster 
BEL, DNK, FIN, GER, SWE
0,11 0,83 0,86 0,6
Inclusive Continental Cluster 
AUT, FRA, NDL, NOR
0,77 0,8 0,71 0,48
Non-European Cluster 
AUS, CAN, JAP, NZL
0,03 0,14 0,19 0,34
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this cluster consists of Spain and the UK, sharing the fea-
tures of easy accessibility in combination with the low-
est benefits for atypical workers and minimum incomes 
in the sample, which have further decreased compared 
to 1991. Standard benefits are modest in Spain and low 
in the UK. Spain thus shows a distinct pattern of dual-
ism in that benefits for part-time and fixed term workers 
are much lower relative to standard workers’ benefits. In 
the UK, this is less pronounced since benefits for both 
types of employees are much more similar in size. In 
both countries, mean values of basic incomes are almost 
equal to first-tier benefits for atypical workers. Atypical 
employees are therefore not confronted with challeng-
ing qualification criteria, but cannot expect to receive 
substantial benefits in any case.
Continental European Cluster with Extended Protec-
tion: Austria, Denmark, Belgium, and Sweden consti-
tute a cluster combining relatively strict access condi-
tions with the most generous benefits, particularly for 
atypical employees, and a modest basic income, there-
fore closely resembling the former Exclusive Cluster. 
Denmark, Belgium, and Sweden, by and large, retained 
their 1991 level of benefit generosity tied to tough con-
tribution conditions. Since accessibility declined in 
Austria while benefits remained high, it is newly sorted 
to this group, leaving the former Inclusive Cluster. This 
entails, however, that no cluster exists any more that 
grants generous payments without demanding challeng-
ing accessibility requirements. Dualisation is primarily 
caused by restricted access opportunities and minimum 
incomes, being significantly smaller than first-tier ben-
efits, albeit still moderate in international comparison. 
Generosity is thus reserved for employees with contri-
bution records, whereas all others are provided less.
Continental European Cluster with Restricted Protec-
tion: the remaining Continental European countries of 
Germany, Finland, the Netherlands, and Norway form 
another European cluster characterised by very strict 
accessibility. In contrast to 1991, however, restrictive 
accessibility does not lead to extraordinary benefits, 
trailing behind those of the other Continental Clus-
ter. Minimum incomes, surprisingly, are the highest of 
all clusters. This new kind of cluster has emerged be-
cause Germany and Finland, which used to have strict 
accessibility before, trimmed their benefits (in case of 
Germany very substantially), while Norway and the 
Netherlands cut both accessibility and benefits, thereby 
abandoning the former Inclusive Continental Cluster. 
Like in the Continental European Cluster with Extend-
ed Protection, the exclusive rules on accessibility act as 
Accessibility 
Index
Benefit 
Index for 
Standard 
Employees
Benefit 
Index for 
Atypical 
Employees
Minimum 
Income
Mediterranean and Anglo-Saxon Cluster 
FRA, IRE, ITA, SWZ
0,78 0,32 0,48 0,31
Residual Mediterranean and Anglo-
Saxon Cluster: SPA, UK
0,73 0,22 0,1 0,13
Continental European Cluster with 
Extended Protection: AUT, DEN, BEL, SWE
0,19 0,78 0,87 0,4
Continental European Cluster with 
Restricted Protection: GER, FIN, NDL, NOR
0,21 0,48 0,44 0,59
Non-European Cluster with Extended 
Basic Protection: JAP, NZL
0,01 0,06 0,13 0,51
Non-European Cluster with Residual 
Basic Protection: AUS, CAN
0,05 0,13 0,09 0,15
Table 6.26: Ward Clusters of Unemployment Benefits in 2006
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the main source of dualisation; benefits do not differ 
much on a generally moderate level. The major differ-
ence between both clusters is the generous amount of 
minimum incomes, alleviating the discriminating effect 
of restrictive access.
Non-European Cluster with Extended Basic Protec-
tion: Japan and New Zealand still offer only residual 
benefits to job seekers. Nonetheless, they significantly 
stepped up the minimum income, leaving the cluster 
with Australia and Canada to form their own. Since 
first-tier benefits are particularly ungenerous (despite 
harsh qualification requirements in Japan), whereas ba-
sic protection is among the highest, dualism is no key 
characteristic of this cluster.
Non-European Cluster with only Residual Basic Pro-
tection: Australia and Canada have very low values in 
any category.
Compared to the clusters of 1991, the negative 
correlation of benefits for standard workers and acces-
sibility rules reappears in a reinforced way, as the for-
mer Inclusive Continental Cluster has given way to 
new Continental groups with more restricted access. 
In Continental Europe, generous benefits therefore 
must now be acquired through longer contribution 
records. Unchanged is that exclusive accessibility rules 
are often accompanied by more generous minimum in-
come schemes as apparent in the Continental as well as 
Mediterranean and Anglo-Saxon Clusters. Benefits for 
atypical employees remain similar to those for standard 
employees (although this relation may have weakened 
since in the Mediterranean and Anglo-Saxon Cluster 
the indices show higher scores for atypical employees’ 
benefits). Yet there is one tentative new trend: among 
the Mediterranean, the Continental, and the Non-Eu-
ropean Clusters, it is always the cluster with higher ac-
cessibility that also offers higher benefits to atypical em-
ployees. Accessibility may thus have become positively 
related to benefits for atypical employees. 
Dualism comes in three different guises in 2006. 
On a high level, the Continental Cluster with Extend-
ed Protection provides the most generous benefits, but 
targets them precisely on standard workers. Atypical 
employees will often find themselves excluded because 
accessibility rules are tight and minimum incomes are 
significantly less than first-tier benefits. The Continen-
tal Cluster with Restricted Protection is less dualised, 
even though accessibility is equally restrictive, since 
first-tier benefits and basic incomes are closer to each 
other. This is beneficial for atypical workers who fail 
to qualify, but is achieved at the price of lower insur-
Accessibility 
Index
Benefit 
Index for 
Standard 
Employees
Benefit 
Index for 
Atypical 
Employees
Minimum 
Income
Mediterranean and Anglo-Saxon Cluster  
FRA, IRE, ITA, SWZ
0,78 0,32 0,48 0,31
Residual Mediterranean and Anglo-
Saxon Cluster: SPA, UK
0,73 0,22 0,1 0,13
Continental European Cluster with 
Extended Protection: AUT, DEN, BEL, SWE
0,19 0,78 0,87 0,4
Continental European Cluster with 
Restricted Protection: GER, FIN, NDL, NOR
0,21 0,48 0,44 0,59
Non-European Cluster with Extended 
Basic Protection: JAP, NZL
0,01 0,06 0,13 0,51
Non-European Cluster with Residual 
Basic Protection: AUS, CAN 0,05 0,13 0,09 0,15
Table 6.27: Average Normalised Values of Unemployment Benefit Clusters in 2006
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ance-based payments. On a low level, it is the Residual 
Mediterranean and Anglo-Saxon Cluster, and there-
in mainly Spain, that are showing signs of dualism. 
While first-tier benefits are much more accessible than 
in Continental Europe, they are lower for atypical than 
for standard employees (in spite of a generally low level 
for both types of employees). Minimum incomes, too, 
are stingy. That is, atypical employees must expect to 
receive only small support, no matter whether they are 
eligible to first-tier benefits or not. Strong dualisation 
is avoided, by contrast, in the other Mediterranean and 
Anglo-Saxon Cluster, by granting broad access with rel-
atively high benefits to atypical employees in combina-
tion with moderate basic incomes, offering support es-
pecially to the more vulnerable group of part-time and 
temporary employees. The overall level of generosity is 
only very modest, however. 
Any cluster analysis is only capable of giving a de-
scriptive overview of how countries configured their so-
cial policy arrangements and how these configurations 
have changed over time. To obtain more conclusive 
results on general trends in configuration patterns, I 
perform four multivariate panel data analyses across all 
countries and years in the data set, each of the indices 
being the dependent variable in one estimation, having 
the other three indices regressed on it. It is important 
to stress that this is not intended to be an analysis of 
the underlying societal, political, or economic reasons 
of unemployment benefit reform, but only serves a 
heuristic purpose of identifying common patterns in 
the configuration of social protection arrangements. 
Hence, adopting the same method as Nelson (2007b), I 
perform a simple regression including neither fixed nor 
time effects nor a lagged dependent variable; instead, I 
correct for serial correlation by a Prais-Winsten transfor-
mation with country specific AR-terms. Standard errors 
are panel corrected (Beck / Katz 1995).
When accessibility is the dependent variable, re-
sults show that, as expected, minimum income exerts a 
strongly negative influence, thereby confirming the im-
pression gained from clustering that basic income pro-
tection serves as functional equivalent for job seekers 
ineligible to unemployment benefits. That is, if dualism 
decreases by rising minimum incomes, it has the inher-
ent propensity to create more dualism on part of the 
accessibility rules. Unexpectedly, the coefficient of bene-
fits for standard employees is low and insignificant, even 
though the sign shows in the expected negative direc-
tion. The coefficient of benefits for atypical employees 
is positive but also insignificant. Throughout the whole 
period, there is thus no support that accessibility is de-
termined by the generosity of first-tier benefits.
Accessibility 
Index
Benefit Index 
for Standard 
Employees
Benefit Index 
for Atypical 
Employees
Minimum Income
Accessibility Index -0.046** 
(0.021)
0.049*** 
(0.018)
0.005** 
(0.002)
Benefit Index for Standard 
Employees
-0.053 
(0.14)
0.776*** 
(0.036)
0.804 
(0.005)
Benefit Index for Atypical 
Employees
0.058 
(0.159)
0.977*** 
(0.046)
0.007 
(0.006)
Minimum Income -3.171** 
(1.546)
-0.547* 
(0.305)
0.919*** 
(0.345)
Intercept 7.425*** 
(0.953)
1.25*** 
(0.221)
-0.356*** 
(0.129)
0.447*** 
(0.02)
Adj. R² 0,8 0,96 0,95 0,81
N 299 299 299 299
Table 6.28: Regression Results for Unemployment Benefits
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Turning to benefits for standard employees, the 
most striking result is that they are most strongly and 
significantly influenced by benefits for atypical employ-
ees which is in line with observations from the cluster 
analysis. Countries raising support to standard workers 
evidently tend do so–almost in equal scale–for atypi-
cal workers as well. There is also a weak negative but 
significant impact of accessibility which needs to be 
highlighted because, when the same regression was run 
with accessibility as dependent variable, the coefficient 
was insignificant. This further corroborates the inter-
pretation derived from the cluster analysis that there is 
a slight trend in the time series to more directly link the 
generosity of benefits to the strictness of access require-
ments. Yet it seems that it is the benefits being adjusted 
according to changing accessibility rather than the other 
way round. The coefficient of minimum income is neg-
ative, though significant only on the ten percent level, 
leading to the conclusion that high benefits are targeted 
on standard workers, thereby creating dualism in two 
dimensions: first, by exclusion through stricter access 
requirements and, second, by small minimum incomes. 
Compared to the coefficient of benefits for atypical 
employees, the effects of accessibility and minimum in-
comes are tiny, however. It is thus the benefits for atypi-
cal workers that is predominant in the determination of 
benefits for standard employees.
Once benefits for atypical employees is made the 
dependent variable, all coefficients are positive and 
highly significant. This shows, on the one hand, that 
benefits for both kinds of workers share a reciprocal pos-
itive relationship, refuting the hypothesis that dualism 
generally manifests itself in smaller amounts and short-
er duration for atypical workers. On the other hand, it 
reveals one key difference compared to standard bene-
fits: while these are higher when they are targeted, i.e. 
when accessibility and minimum incomes grow more 
restrictive, benefits for atypical employees increase in 
parallel to more generous accessibility and basic income 
support, with the effect of latter parameter outweighing 
all others, whereas accessibility’s influence is nearly as 
weak as on standard employees’ benefits. Nonetheless, 
the impression is confirmed that benefits for atypical 
workers are determined based on a partly different log-
ic: rather than targeting entitlements, higher benefits 
are granted to atypical employees if all other support is 
generous as well. 
The regression with minimum income as depen-
dent variable displays the same pattern as with acces-
sibility. Only access criteria exert a significant negative 
influence, further confirming that both variables are in-
terdependent and act as functional equivalents. Amount 
and duration of unemployment benefits have no impact 
on the generosity of basic incomes.
6.6.3. CONFIGURATION OF SICKNESS BENEFITS
This section repeats the cluster analysis of the previous 
section, but performs it on sickness benefits. The meth-
od employed is the same. For the year 1991, each algo-
rithm creates equal results once the number of clusters 
exceeds ten; for smaller numbers of clusters, however, 
the proposed solutions diverge. Only the Ward Method 
and Complete Linkage yield the same results for solu-
tions with five clusters or fewer. According to the Ca-
linski-Harabasz stopping rule, there is just one unam-
biguous choice: the five cluster solution returned by the 
Ward Method and Complete Linkage is deemed best. 
Other possible solutions contain seven or more clusters, 
exceeding the maximum limit of six clusters, and are 
therefore disregarded. 
Table 6.29: Ward Clusters of Sickness Benefits in 1991
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Compared to the pattern that emerged with unem-
ployment benefits, the clusters for sickness benefits are 
notably less clear-cut and cannot be classified accord-
ing to conventional geographical or cultural affiliations. 
Sick pay clusters are thus labelled by their core features 
instead of their geography (see tables 6.28 and 6.29).
Cluster 1: High accessibility, high benefits, high min-
imum income:15 the smallest and most generous cluster 
contains only Germany and Sweden, providing nearly 
universal access to sick pay with the highest benefits of 
all countries in the sample for both standard and atyp-
ical employees. Minimum income protection, too, is 
among the highest. This cluster is split from cluster two 
as benefits are dramatically higher than in any other 
observed country. Accessibility and minimum incomes, 
however, strongly resemble those of cluster two. Du-
alism is only a concern insofar as minimum incomes–
despite their high level–do not reach the same scale as 
first-tier benefits.
Cluster 2: High accessibility, moderate benefits, high 
minimum income: this cluster comprises Denmark, Fin-
15  Cluster averages are classified low if its value is below 
0.33, classified moderate if it is between 0.33 and 0.66, and 
classified high if it is above 0.66.
land, the Netherlands, and Norway. Its features are very 
similar to those of cluster one except that benefits are 
significantly smaller, particularly for standard workers. 
Minimum incomes reach the same top level as in cluster 
one, even surpassing the values of sick pay. Therefore, 
dualism is barely recognisable.
Cluster 3: High accessibility, moderate benefits, low 
minimum income: Austria, Belgium, and Spain form 
a cluster of their own due to their very low level of 
minimum income, separating them from clusters one 
and two. Apart from that, this cluster shares with the 
previous two a high level of accessibility and moderate 
benefits. However, Austria, Spain, and Belgium are on 
average somewhat more generous towards standard em-
ployees than cluster two. There is thus a certain degree 
of dualisation, not only because of the differences in 
benefits, but also since, despite the openness of the ben-
efit, those who do not qualify receive significantly lower 
minimum incomes.
Cluster 4: Moderate to high accessibility, low benefits, 
moderate minimum income: The largest cluster includes 
Australia, Canada, Italy, New Zealand, Switzerland, and 
the UK. They all have in common that all first-tier ben-
efits are the lowest in the data set for that year. The same 
Accessibility 
Index
Benefit 
Index for 
Standard 
Employees
Benefit 
Index for 
Atypical 
Employees
Minimum 
Income
Cluster1: High accessibility, high benefits, 
high minimum income: GER, SWE
0,96 0,9 0,9 0,65
Cluster 2: High accessibility, moderate 
benefits, high minimum income  
DEN, FIN, NDL, NOR
0,85 0,46 0,58 0,67
Cluster 3: High accessibility, moderate 
benefits, low minimum income: AUT, BEL, SPA
0,79 0,6 0,53 0,28
Cluster 4: Moderate to high accessibility, 
low benefits, moderate minimum income 
AUS, CAN, ITA, NZL, SWZ, UK
0,63 0,11 0,11 0,34
Cluster 5: Low accessibility, low to 
moderate benefits, moderate minimum 
income: FRA, IRE, JAP
0,08 0,65 0,33 0,33
Table 6.30: Average Normalised Values of Sickness Benefit Clusters in 1991
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holds for minimum incomes. Accessibility, by contrast, 
shows a higher intra-cluster variance than the other vari-
ables. On average, it is more restrictive than in clusters 
one to three, yet still more open than cluster five. Aus-
tralia and Italy deviate from the cluster mean by notably 
higher levels of accessibility; Canada, on the other hand, 
swings to the other end of the spectrum with a value sig-
nificantly below the average. Since there is a great con-
formity regarding all other variables, however, I decided 
not to split up this cluster any further. There is some 
dualism in this cluster stemming from restricted access 
in some countries, but it is mitigated by the universally 
low level of benefits (relative to other countries in this 
year) and moderate minimum income.
Cluster 5: Low accessibility, low to moderate benefits, 
moderate minimum income: France, Ireland, and Japan 
are quite distinct from the other clusters in their mark-
edly reduced accessibility combined with moderate ben-
efits for standard employees and low benefits for atyp-
ical ones. Hence, this cluster is the only one to show a 
clear dualisation in terms of differences in benefits to 
the detriment of atypical workers. Further dualisation 
can also be found in restrictive access criteria, leading to 
the interpretation that more generous benefits are tar-
geted to standard workers. Some dualisation also comes 
from minimum incomes, reaching lower scores than 
benefits for standard employees.
Notable is the difference between unemployment 
and sickness benefits regarding the relationship of acces-
sibility and minimum income. In all clusters (other than 
cluster three) strict qualification criteria are not linked 
to more extensive basic incomes and vice versa, but in-
stead the correlation between both indices seems to be 
positive. Therefore, access to sick pay and minimum in-
come apparently do not serve as functional equivalents. 
With regard to other variables, however, patterns known 
from unemployment benefits re-emerge. First, benefits 
for standard and atypical workers seem to be quite sim-
ilar in general, although a pronounced form of dualisa-
tion can be detected in cluster five, favouring standard 
workers, whereas in cluster two atypical employees are 
somewhat better off. Second, more inclusive rules on 
accessibility are combined with higher benefits for the 
atypically employed. Summed up, all factors primarily 
favouring fixed term and part-time employees, i.e. easy 
accessibility, generous benefits for atypical employees, 
and a high minimum income, seemed to share a gener-
ally positive relationship in 1991; the relation between 
standard benefits and other indices remains obscure.
In the year 2006, deciding on the optimal number 
of clusters is more complicated. The Calinski-Harabasz 
stopping rule prefers the three, six or seven cluster solu-
tions given both by the Ward Method and Complete 
Linkage. While the three cluster solution intuitively 
seems most appealing due to its parsimony, a closer 
look reveals that the small number of clusters comes 
at the cost of oversimplification. Australia, Belgium, 
France, and Spain are lumped together in one cluster 
even though these countries show significant variance 
in their levels of benefits and accessibility. Six and sev-
en clusters, as otherwise suggested solutions, are quite 
many considering that only 18 countries are included, 
directing our focus to alternative solutions even if, ac-
cording to the Calinski-Harabasz rule, these appear less 
preferable. One potential candidate in this respect is the 
five cluster solution returned by all algorithms other 
than Complete Linkage. For Average Weighted Linkage 
this also the optimal solution and the second best for 
Average Unweighted Linkage. Nonetheless, compared 
to the other outcomes just described, the five cluster 
solution does rather poorly if assessed by the Calins-
ki-Harabasz rule, still I argue that it is the best option 
Table 6.31: Ward Clusters of Sickness Benefits in 2006
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to choose. First, it facilitates comparison with the year 
1991 as the number of clusters stays the same. Second, 
the six cluster solution, which was evaluated best by the 
Calinski-Harabasz rule, and the five clusters solutions 
are largely identical with the only difference being that, 
in the six cluster solution, Austria, Denmark, Finland 
on one side and Australia, Italy, Switzerland on the oth-
er side are split up in two separate clusters based only on 
their disparities in the size of benefits. These are not too 
big, however. In the former three countries, benefits are 
moderate at best, while in the latter they are low. There-
fore, taking the mean of all six countries does not ob-
scure too much of the variance, making it reasonable to 
pool them in one single cluster. The clusters are labelled 
in the same way as in 1991 (see tables 6.30 and 6.31).
Cluster 1: High accessibility, moderate to low benefits, 
moderate minimum income: this cluster is the biggest, 
consisting of Australia, Austria, Denmark, Finland, It-
aly, and Switzerland. It is comparable to cluster four of 
the year 1991, of which it retains its members Austra-
lia, Italy, and Switzerland which have not profoundly 
reformed their sickness benefit schemes. Denmark and 
Finland newly joined the cluster by significantly de-
creasing their minimum incomes; Austria did the op-
posite. Given almost universal access and a minimum 
income moderate by international standards, dualism is 
weak in this cluster. 
Cluster 2: High accessibility, high benefits, high min-
imum income: this cluster used to include only Germa-
ny and Sweden in 1991 but was by 2006 extended to 
comprise Norway and the Netherlands as well. This is 
not, however, because more countries have become as 
generous as Germany and Sweden 15 years earlier–actu-
ally, only the Netherlands have done so. Instead, other 
countries have become less generous. As to this cluster, 
Sweden exhibits the same generosity as in 1991, while 
Germany’s rules have grown tighter; Norway’s stayed 
constant. Just like before, dualism is apparent only in 
minimum incomes not matching the extraordinary gen-
erosity of first-tier benefits.
Cluster 3: Moderate accessibility, moderate to high 
benefits, low minimum income: Belgium, France, and 
Spain constitute a cluster closely resembling cluster 
number three of 1991, albeit with more restrictive 
qualification requirements. The only shift is Austria 
with rising benefits being assigned to a new cluster and 
replaced by France. Dualism thus stems from tougher 
contribution requirements and the second lowest mean 
minimum income, far below the level of benefits for 
standard employees.
Cluster 4: Low accessibility, low benefits, low min-
imum income: this kind of cluster did not exist in 
1991 and comprises Canada, Ireland, and the UK. It 
is formed primarily because these countries have cut 
their minimum incomes parallel to some expansions 
in accessibility and benefits, granting higher benefits 
to atypical employees than to standard ones. These ex-
pansions, however, do not suffice to sort them into any 
of the more generous clusters. Given the generally low 
levels of support, first-tier benefits do not deviate much 
from minimum incomes, the latter being the lowest of 
all clusters, thereby creating dualism primarily by tight 
access rules.
Cluster 5: Low accessibility, low benefits, high min-
imum income: Japan and New Zealand raised their 
minimum incomes by so much that they form a new 
cluster of their own in which restricted accessibility and 
low benefits are compensated by a very accommodating 
basic income support. There is nonetheless a sharp con-
trast between standard and atypical employees’ benefits, 
implying high dualisation in the realm of first-tier ben-
efits and accessibility. 
Contrasted with the clusters of 1991 there is clear-
ly visible a downward trend in generosity concerning 
all observed variables. Yet, albeit on a generally reduced 
level, the same correlations hold as before: benefits for 
standard and atypical employees are often very similar, 
access and minimum income share a positive association 
as do access and benefits, particularly for atypical work-
ers. An exception is cluster five, but it contains only two 
countries. As was done for unemployment benefits, a re-
gression analysis follows to add more analytical evidence 
to the descriptive results. 
The method employed is the same as for unemploy-
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ment benefits. Results, however, differ in some respects 
(see table 6.32). Accessibility is strongly influenced by 
minimum income whose positive significant coefficient 
confirms the descriptive impression that, in the area of 
sickness benefits, accessibility and minimum income 
do not act as functional equivalents. This is the most 
striking difference in results between unemployment 
and sickness benefits. The coefficients of the benefit 
variables generally correspond to those in the analysis of 
unemployment benefits. Benefits for atypical employ-
ees have a positive sign and twice the effect as benefits 
for standard workers whose sign is negative. This lends 
support to the results of the cluster analysis that benefits 
for atypical employees and accessibility are positively 
linked. For atypical workers these findings are likely to 
translate into more dualism if accessibility is tight be-
cause in this case restricted openness is not mitigated by 
greater basic incomes, nor is it rewarded by more gener-
ous benefits. Standard workers, by contrast, can expect 
to receive higher payments once they meet the criteria.
If benefits for standard workers enter the regression 
as a dependent variable, all regressors turn out to be 
significant. The coefficient of benefits for atypical em-
ployees points in a positive direction as expected from 
clustering. The sign of minimum income is positive 
too, running counter to the results of unemployment 
benefits. Only the coefficient of accessibility is negative, 
confirming the pattern already observed when accessi-
bility was the dependent variable. Another difference 
compared to unemployment benefits is that accessibil-
ity exerts a much stronger influence, while the effect 
of atypical benefits and minimum income is marked-
ly lower. Targeting is thus a more predominant trend 
in the provision of sick pay than in unemployment 
benefits since changes in accessibility more than offset 
changes in benefits for atypical employees.
The evidence on the positive relationship between 
both kinds of payments is further bolstered once ben-
efits for atypical employees are used as an outcome 
variable. The impact of benefits for standard workers 
seems to have a much stronger positive impact on 
benefits for atypical ones than the other way round. 
Very strong and positive is also the effect accessibility 
takes on benefits for part-time and fixed term workers. 
There is thus a parallel between unemployment and 
sickness benefits in that both schemes tie more gener-
ous benefits for standard workers to more challenging 
access criteria, whereas atypical employees’ benefits 
even seem to decrease if access becomes more exclu-
sive. It must be emphasised, however, that benefits for 
both standard and atypical employees generally rise in 
line with each other, thereby potentially outweighing 
Accessibility 
Index
Benefit Index 
for Standard 
Employees“
Benefit Index 
for Atypical 
Employees
Minimum 
Income
Cluster 1: High accessibility, moderate to 
low benefits, moderate minimum income 
AUS, AUT, DEN, FIN, ITA, SWZ
0,89 0,27 0,31 0,38
Cluster 2: High accessibility, high benefits, 
high minimum income: GER, NDL, NOR, SWE
0,83 0,77 0,82 0,59
Cluster 3: Moderate accessibility, 
moderate to high benefits, low minimum 
income: BEL, FRA, SPA
0,48 0,68 0,61 0,21
Cluster 4: Low accessibility, low benefits, 
low minimum income: CAN, IRE, UK
0,26 0,09 0,23 0,17
Cluster 5: Low accessibility, low benefits, 
high minimum income: JAP, NZL
0,08 0,31 0,02 0,51
Table 6.32: Average Normalised Values of Sickness Benefit Clusters in 2006
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is apparently not affected by the evolution of access cri-
teria, but only by the generosity of benefits for standard 
employees whose coefficient is positive and significant. 
All other regressors are insignificant. As with unem-
ployment benefits, minimum income appears to be re-
markably unaffected by other social protection schemes. 
Minimum income and access to sickness benefits seem 
not to be functional equivalents. Rather, sick pay and 
minimum income are perceived as two schemes serving 
the same purpose of supporting those in need.
accessibility’s impact on either of the variables. Yet this 
is not the case. The influence both benefit variables 
exert on each other is not large enough to compensate 
for the effect of changes in accessibility, but merely 
slows the divergence. In summary, tightening accessi-
bility results in higher benefits towards standard em-
ployees and lower benefits towards atypical workers. 
An influence of minimum income on benefits for the 
atypically employed is not discernible.
Unlike unemployment benefits, minimum income 
Accessibility 
Index
Benefit 
Index for 
Standard 
Employees
Benefit 
Index for 
Atypical 
Employees
Minimum 
Income
Accessibility Index -0.225 *** 
(0.074)
0.613 *** 
(0.155)
-0.00007 
(0.004)
Benefit Index for Standard Employees -0.12 * 
(0.072)
0.489 ** 
(0.193)
0.008 ** 
(0.003)
Benefit Index for Atypical Employees 0.266 *** 
(0.041)
0.183 ** 
(0.075)
0.002 
(0.002)
Minimum Income 1.9 ** 
(0.944)
1.382 ** 
(0.649)
-0.557 
(0.847)
Intercept 5.779 *** 
(0.464)
5.528 *** 
(0.784)
-2.242 
(1.774)
0.4 *** 
(0.038)
Adj. R² 0,85 0,82 0,66 0,78
N 299 299 299 299
Table 6.33: Regression Results for Sickness Benefits
*p < 0.1 **p < 0.05 ***p < 0.01 Standard errors in parantheses
7. SOCIAL PROTECTION AND THE SERVICE ECONOMY
Labour markets in developed countries have been char-
acterised for decades by an ever growing share of jobs 
in the tertiary sector. The reasons for this shift were dis-
cussed in detail in chapter 3. The rise of service jobs, 
however, is no uniform trend that unfolds in the same 
manner in all industrialised economies. Rather, there is 
a magnitude of distinct paths towards more service em-
ployment (as outlined in the introduction) whose eco-
nomic parameters differ widely. Some countries display 
a preponderance of jobs in private service sectors (such 
as retail and catering) while others chose to opt for a 
higher share of welfare services instead (such as various 
health care services and education). A few countries also 
managed to retain a relatively larger number of jobs in 
manufacturing. This marked variation can be explained 
by differences in the design of institutions shaping the 
economic environment in each country and thus busi-
ness segments and strategies that firms select to engage 
in. This chapter examines to what extent institutions 
and economic policies impact on job shares of various 
economic sectors. A particular focus of the examina-
tion will be on the influence of unemployment bene-
fits, sickness benefits, and minimum income protection 
schemes. Before I discuss the specific labour market im-
pacts of distinct institutions, a brief review is given on 
the basic mechanisms governing the fundamental shift 
to service employment.
7.1 THE SERVICE ECONOMY TRILEMMA
Most thinking on service jobs is based on Baumol’s 
(1967, 2007) famous notion of ‹cost disease›. His theo-
ry mainly draws on the supply side arguments described 
in chapter 3; namely, that manufacturing regularly 
reaches a high level of productivity growth, whereas in 
services the scope for similar increases is more limited. If 
in a two sector economy output shares of industry and 
services are assumed constant, the divergence of pro-
ductivity growth therefore leads to a higher proportion 
of total employment being absorbed by the less produc-
tive service sector. In practice, however, this shift is not 
going to take place without frictions. Baumol notes that 
wages in services have risen more strongly in the past 
than their poor record of productivity growth would 
have justified. The underlying reason stated by Baumol 
why wages have not diverged as much as productivity is 
that any incentive would be lost to go for a career in the 
tertiary sector if wages in services fell too far below the 
standard in manufacturing. Wages above productivity 
are thus a necessary condition of retaining a number of 
staff sufficient for the provision of services. As a result, 
services will either become too costly relative to manu-
factured goods, thereby effectively stifling demand for 
tertiaries, or, alternatively, service quality will decline as 
providers try to cut back on the number of personnel 
in order to stay affordable for customers. This is what 
Baumol labelled as ‹cost disease›. 
One upshot of the ‹cost disease› then is that the 
expansion of tertiary jobs is hindered by excessive wage 
hikes, decoupling pay from productivity. If the service 
sector is to absorb all redundant manufacturing work-
ers, wages must be aligned more closely with real labour 
efficiency. More tertiary employment consequently 
comes at the cost of a yawning gap in earnings opportu-
nities between industry and services. For former indus-
trial workers, it is thus likely to feel as social relegation if 
they have to take on a new, probably badly remunerated 
job in services. 
Iversen and Wren (1998) see three ways how gov-
ernments can decide given this economic background, 
yet none of these ways is fully satisfying in that each 
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has one specific drawback. More precisely, governments 
are confronted with a ‹service economy trilemma›, i.e. a 
decision between three aims only two of which can be 
achieved simultaneously. These aims are employment, a 
low tax burden (or low public debt), and income equal-
ity. The liberal way to decide in this trilemma is to pri-
oritise employment and small taxes over equality. This 
entails that the earnings differential between manufac-
turing and services is allowed to play out in full, creat-
ing a sufficient number of service jobs to keep unem-
ployment down, while the burden on the public purse 
remains small. The social-democratic way, by contrast, 
expands service employment primarily through a larger 
public sector (i.e. mostly jobs in welfare services such 
as day care or health) where pay on average is higher 
than in private services, hence preserving high income 
equality. This must be paid for, however, by heavy taxes. 
The Christian-democratic way, finally, is to either accept 
rising unemployment or to restrict the size of the labour 
force (for example by discouraging mothers from work 
or by early retirement schemes) in favour of relative 
earnings equality and low taxation.
More recently, Wren, Fodor, and Theodoropoulou 
(2013) have provided evidence that the trilemma might 
be less inescapable than it initially seemed. They argue 
that, by the use of advanced information and communi-
cation technology (ICT) and better possibilities to trade 
services internationally, specific segments of advanced 
services (such as finance or business services) achieve 
levels of productivity growth comparable to manufac-
turing or even higher. This may open a route to en-
hanced private service employment without the accom-
panying need to allow for gaping earnings differentials. 
By promoting job growth in high productivity services, 
the trilemma may be avoided and all three aims–em-
ployment, earnings equality, and a low tax burden–may 
be achieved at the same time. 
The number of jobs in high productivity services is 
highly contingent, however, on the particular skill struc-
ture prevalent in an economy (Wren 2013:27 et sqq.). 
ICT can be very effectively used to substitute routine 
tasks for which only a medium skill level is necessary. 
For more challenging cognitive tasks relying on «flexi-
bility, creativity, generalized problem solving, and com-
plex communications» (Autor et al. 2003: 5), it rather 
acts as a complement helping college-educated employ-
ees reach higher standards of productivity (Acemoglu / 
Autor 2011, Goos / Manning / Salomons 2009). Broad 
incidence of college education among employees with 
its typical focus on more general skills is hence a nec-
essary condition for a strong development in high-end 
services. Economies whose educational systems are pri-
marily committed to teaching industry- or firm-specific 
skills on a medium level, as they have been conducive 
for numerous manufacturing occupations, are likely to 
see a less marked growth in high productivity services.
This illustrates that the distribution of employ-
ment shares over various economic sectors is not only 
a function of productivity differentials. Services are a 
diverse category whose single segments vary strongly 
in degrees of productivity, proportions of public versus 
private provision, and educational requirements. The 
institutional environment within which service provid-
ers operate can have a huge direct or indirect impact 
on the fact which type of service expands in terms of 
jobs created. Apart from the education system, political 
economy literature also suggests it is the extent to which 
the state itself engages to provide services, the social pro-
tection offered to different types of workers, and unions’ 
bargaining power which substantially affect an econo-
my’s employment structure. It is the influence of these 
institutions, particularly of social protection, on the de-
velopment of employment shares that I scrutinise in this 
chapter. Therefore, I define the share of the labour force 
pertaining to distinct segments of the economy as my 
dependent variable and try to explain it by a variety of 
institutional variables while controlling for productivi-
ty. The underlying causes of disparities in productivity 
(e.g. technical innovation, ICT, international trade) are 
not the subject I analyse here; I treat the level of produc-
tivity as exogenous and focus exclusively on institutions. 
In order to develop hypotheses about the impact 
of institutions on distinct segments of the economy, it 
is necessary to understand each segment’s specific eco-
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nomic and organisational features, particularly with re-
gards to wage structures, educational requirements, and 
the organisation of work; only then will it be possible to 
make assumptions as to how specific institutions might 
foster or interfere with job growth in selected sectors. 
The next section therefore introduces a division of the 
economy into four segments, each of which is going to 
be analysed separately later in this chapter, and describes 
in detail the individual characteristics of each. 
7.2 CHARACTERISTICS OF 
FOUR ECONOMIC SEGMENTS
Modelled after Wren / Fodor / Theodoropoulou (2013), 
I divide the economy into four segments each of which 
has distinct characteristics: manufacturing (ISIC1 cate-
gory D), non-dynamic services (trade, repair, hotels and 
restaurants, other personal services: ISIC category G, 
H, O), dynamic services (financial intermediation, real 
estate, business services: ISIC category J, K), and wel-
fare services (public administration, education, health 
and social services: ISIC category L, M, N)2. 
I distinguish the characteristics of each segment 
based on three criteria. The first is the income level 
which is–with one exception–highly contingent on la-
bour productivity. According to Baumol (1967, 2007) 
and Autor (2003), labour productivity is high in man-
ufacturing, allowing more generous remuneration for 
employees. Non-dynamic services, essentially based on 
human interaction, do not hold the same potential to 
raise productivity, as reflected in a generally low wage 
floor. The productivity of dynamic services, by contrast, 
recently has seen a dramatic boost in productivity in-
duced by heavy ICT investment, taking remuneration 
1  International Standard Industrial Classification of All 
Economic Activities, Rev. 3.1. For details see United Nations 
(2002).
2  I decided to alter the classifications in one point. Trans-
port, storage and communication (ISIC category I) were added 
by Wren / Fodor / Theodoropoulou to the segment of dynamic 
services. Due to their close conjunction with manufacturing, 
however, I chose to exclude these items from the analysis.
to a level similar to that of manufacturing. The excep-
tion is welfare services where pay is significantly exceed-
ing productivity, since they are largely provided by the 
state. The second criterion is the dependence on atypical 
employment, which is substantially higher in all kinds of 
services than in manufacturing, to cope with increased 
operational flexibility (see chapter 2). Finally, skill re-
quirements vary widely across segments; while manu-
facturing is dependent on firm- and industry-specific 
skills, service occupations usually rely on broader and 
more general skills.
Manufacturing: The skill structure is the key id-
iosyncrasy of manufacturing. Since the Fordistic mass 
production of simple goods has been either relocated to 
low wage countries or taken over by more advanced ma-
chines, manufacturers need to specialise on production 
of high-value goods that remain profitable even in a high 
wage, high productivity environment. Such a high-val-
ue product can come about in many different shapes. 
It may involve, among other things, intricate techno-
logical refinement, precise customisation, extraordinary 
quality, or faster delivery (Appelbaum 2000). One co-
herent strategy to raise the value of industrial goods, 
called diversified mass production (DMP), has been 
adopted by Japanese firms capable of churning out a 
huge variety of different goods in great numbers. Exam-
ples are the Japanese car industry and makers of domes-
tic electronic appliances (Estevez-Abe / Iversen 2003). 
Another strategy towards higher value production is to 
slightly move away from mass production and to focus 
more on customised, high-quality goods, demand for 
which is limited to small, yet lucrative niche markets. 
This strategy of diversified quality production (DQP) is 
epitomised by German manufacturers (Streeck 1992).
Both strategies have in common that they are high-
ly dependent on a specifically trained workforce familiar 
with all production lines and capable of quickly adjust-
ing to changes in routines. Furthermore, they need to 
have extensive craft skills to guarantee that products re-
tain a high quality standard and must be able to solve 
occurring problems during the production process. 
They may also be required to exchange information 
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with customers and management as to how the offered 
goods could be further improved and efficiency in pro-
duction enhanced. The skills needed to fulfil these tasks 
are therefore highly specific to certain industries or even 
single firms. Estevez-Abe and Iversen (2003), Iversen 
(2005), and Anderson / Hassel (2013) distinguish three 
types of skills: general skills are highly portable across 
firms, occupations, and industries enabling employees 
to switch jobs easily across a far range of sectors, where-
as industry-specific skills have market value only in one 
particular branch of the economy. Firm-specific skills go 
one step further than industry-specific skills in that they 
can be utilised in only one single company and have 
no value for any other firm. The acquisition of specif-
ic skills is reaffirmed by the design of training regimes. 
Anderson and Hassel (2013) identify school-based and 
workplace-based occupational training systems; in the 
former, the state runs vocational schools providing 
training whose content is set in cooperation with the 
social partners. Employers, on their part, do not invest 
in training on large scale, resulting in a training system 
that imparts mainly industry-specific skills. In work-
place-based occupational training systems most training 
happens inside the firm which employs its apprentices 
and hence bears most of the costs of training. In re-
turn, the firm can set major parts of training contents 
and tailor training programmes closely to its needs. The 
focus is thus to provide for firm-specific skills. In reali-
ty, however, almost all systems are a mixture of school- 
and workplace-based training, with each system lean-
ing more towards either side. Although both concepts 
cannot be strictly kept apart empirically, the distinction 
is nonetheless important since it is firm-specific skills 
that play a vital role in shaping an economy’s ability to 
sustain a large manufacturing sector. Therefore, specif-
ic skills is hereafter defined to denote only firm-specific 
skills.
Anderson and Hassel (2013) have dealt very spe-
cifically with the impact of training regimes on man-
ufacturing shares, analysing 18 countries in the year 
2005. One substantial result is that workplace-based 
training systems imparting specific skills lead to more 
employment in manufacturing, whereas countries with 
more school-based systems show larger proportions of 
service jobs. Interestingly, current enrolment in work-
place-based training does not correlate with today’s 
share of manufacturing, but with that of the 1970s. The 
authors conclude from this result that firms retain their 
specifically trained, highly productive workforce as long 
as possible and therefore remain competitive in global 
competition without pursuing extensive labour-saving 
strategies. More general skills, by contrast, allow for a 
higher fluctuation of the workforce and facilitate the 
transition to a service economy. Nickell, Redding, and 
Swaffield (2002) also confirmed the importance of ed-
ucation within the context of deindustrialisation, even 
though they are not primarily concerned with the spec-
ificity of skills. In their study on 14 developed countries 
between 1974 and 1994 they found a positive long-
run relationship of the abundance of men with medi-
um skills on the share of manufacturing in total GDP. 
There is also a strong long-run relationship between the 
number of men with tertiary education and growth of 
business services, thus bolstering the assumption that 
dynamic services are more reliant on higher education. 
Empirical results thus support the hypothesis that the 
skill structure prevalent in the workforce can strongly 
contribute to a flourishing manufacturing sector that 
Manufacturing 1
Non-dynamic services 0.61
Trade 0.67
Hotels and Restaurants 0.48
Other Community, Social,  
Personal services
0.58
Dynamic Services 1.58
Finance 1.92
Real Estate and  
Business Activities
1.5
Welfare Services 0.7
Education 0.71
Health 0.63
Table 7.1: Productivity Relative to Manufacturing in 2006  
(Averaged over 19 Countries) Source: OECD STAN Database for 
Structural Analysis, own calculations
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the time being, always higher than in non-dynamic 
and welfare services. In 2006, the unweighted mean of 
labour productivity in non-dynamic services across all 
countries in the data set was 40% lower than in man-
ufacturing; in welfare services the difference was 30%. 
In no single country did productivity in non-dynamic 
and welfare services reach a higher level than in manu-
facturing. Only dynamic services are on average more 
productive (see table 7.1). Manufacturing has thus a po-
tential for markedly higher wages than most segments 
of services. Indeed, as can be seen from table 7.2, mean 
labour compensation in manufacturing was 21% higher 
than in the total economy.
Non-dynamic services: This category comprises all 
such services primarily provided by the private market 
and characterised by a low level of labour productivity, 
including hotels and restaurants (48% of manufacturing 
productivity), other community, social, and personal 
services (58% of manufacturing productivity) and trade 
Total Economy 1
Manufacturing 1.21
Non-dynamic Services 0.75
Trade 0.81
Hotels and Restaurants 0.57
Other Community, Social,  
Personal Services
0.76
Dynamic Services 1.17
Finance 1.88
Real Estate 0.94
Renting of Machinery  
And Equipment
1.04
Computer Services 1.54
Research and Development 1.43
Other Business 
Activities
0.92
Welfare Services 1.06
Public Administration 1.48
Education 1.29
Health 0.98
Table 7.2: Work Compensation Relative to Total Economy in 2006 
(Averaged over 19 Countries) Source: OECD STAN Database for 
Structural Analysis, own calculations
is better able to defy the trend of deindustrialisation 
and to maintain a large employment share if there is 
sufficient provision of medium, preferably firm-specific 
skills.
In the context of skill structures it becomes clear 
why a high number of standard jobs is conducive to the 
total share of manufacturing workers. Specific training 
requires high investments on both the employer’s and 
the employee’s part, yielding a higher return if the em-
ployee works full-time. Such investments may not pay 
off if the worker is employed for only a few hours per 
week or a short time span. Specific training is thus likely 
to happen only if it is accompanied by a large number of 
stable standard jobs (Kleinknecht / van Schaik / Zhou 
2014, Vergeer et al. 2015). Yet even if no specific skills 
are required, many industrial firms will be inclined to 
prefer standard over atypical jobs. This is because their 
machinery operates most efficiently if used in a steady 
way, avoiding sporadic ups and downs in production 
as far as possible. Therefore, the need for flexible part-
time and fixed term workers is reduced (for a theoret-
ical model see Deardorff / Stafford 1976). As a result, 
atypical employment is less prevalent in manufacturing. 
In 2007, the mean fraction of part-time employment 
across all European countries in the data set was only 
about 10% in manufacturing, but between 27% and 
34% in non-dynamic services, between 15% and 22% 
in dynamic services, and between 15% and 35% in wel-
fare services. With regards to fixed term jobs, manufac-
turing has a share of 9%, non-dynamic services have a 
share between 11% and 17%, dynamic services of 6% 
and 10%, and welfare services between 11% and 15% 
(see chapter 2). The greatest discrepancy between man-
ufacturing and services is therefore in part-time employ-
ment which is much more common in services, whereas 
fixed term work is only slightly more frequent (and in 
dynamic services even less frequent). Policies encourag-
ing atypical employment are thus unlikely to increase 
the share of total jobs in manufacturing.
Whatever the prevalent skill or employment struc-
ture, due to capital intensity and international trade, 
labour productivity in manufacturing is, at least, for 
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(67% of manufacturing productivity). Investments in 
ICT so far do not hold the potential of increasing pro-
ductivity to an extent matching productivity growth in 
manufacturing, since non-dynamic services are essen-
tially based on interpersonal interaction which is barely 
complemented by new technology (Autor et al. 2003). 
As Wren (2013) estimates, ICT capital on average con-
tributed only 0.26 percentage points to value added 
growth in hotels and restaurants and 0.41 percentage 
points in retail trade between 1981 and 2007, which is 
not even half as much as in dynamic services. Workers’ 
compensation in this segment is only 75% of an average 
wage in the total economy (see table 7.2.). Non-dynam-
ic services are thus one primary subject of Baumol’s cost 
disease, necessitating flexibility to adjust wages down-
ward if this segment’s employment share is to rise.
The interpersonal nature of non-dynamic services 
entails that any demand can only be met if a sufficient 
number of employees is ready to serve the customers. 
Firms should therefore make heavy use of atypical em-
ployees to precisely attune staffing to fluctuations in 
demand. Low labour productivity in combination with 
demand being highly sensitive to price changes further 
calls for high shares of part-time and temporary work-
ers to optimise staffing efficiency. Trade and repair as 
well as hotels and restaurants indeed show high pro-
portions of part-time (27% and 34%, respectively) and 
fixed term employment (11% and 18%, respectively). 
Deployment of non-standard workers on a similar scale 
can only be found in welfare services. A greater degree 
of willingness among employees and job seekers to take 
up work in atypical arrangements is hence likely to help 
non-dynamic service employment.
As implied by low levels of productivity and small 
investments in ICT, non-dynamic services do not re-
quire a highly trained workforce. Neither do non-dy-
namic services seem to rely on specific skills because the 
high incidence of atypical work makes intensive, sus-
tained training on-the-job unprofitable for workers and 
employers. A higher prevalence of general skills, howev-
er, allows workers to switch jobs more easily and raises 
incentives to accept atypical jobs. Therefore, employ-
ees who have experienced a larger amount of general 
training fit much more tightly into the flexible staffing 
policies and job-specifications firms in non-dynamic 
services need in order to be competitive.
Dynamic Services: Financial intermediation, real es-
tate and business services together reached on average 
158% of the productivity in manufacturing in 2006. 
The main driver of productivity is finance whose pro-
ductivity is 92% higher than in manufacturing, while 
productivity in real estate and business services is 50% 
higher. The major source of productivity growth in dy-
namic services was ICT investment, contributing 1.57 
percentage points to value added growth in financial 
services and 1.05 percentage points to value added 
growth in business services between 1981 and 2007. 
This is significantly more than in manufacturing and 
non-dynamic services whose corresponding values 
range between 0.1 and 0.6 percentage points over the 
same time span (Wren 2013: 8). The reasons why ICT 
investments are propelling productivity in dynamic ser-
vices so much more than in other sectors of the econ-
omy are twofold. First, ICT has greatly advanced the 
possibilities of trading those specific kinds of services 
not essentially relying on interpersonal interaction but 
more on processing information, which is at the heart of 
most dynamic services. By allowing to store and trans-
port information worldwide at low costs, ICT has trans-
formed information-based services into regular, tradable 
commodities, thereby greatly enhancing productivity in 
their production (Freund / Weinhold 2002, Blinder 
2009). Second, as described in section 7.1., ICT acts as 
a complement to human labour in dynamic services and 
is hence suited to amplify labour efficiency. Employees 
who manage to find a job in dynamic services can ex-
pect to earn wages considerably above the level of other 
types of services and partly even above the standard in 
manufacturing. On average, the compensation in dy-
namic services is 117% of the compensation in the to-
tal economy, which is almost equal to remuneration in 
manufacturing, but with significant variation across its 
single elements. Based on productivity figures, the high-
est wages are paid in finance (88% above total economy 
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average); somewhat lower is pay in computer services 
and research (54% and 43% above average). Real estate, 
renting and other services reach values between 92% 
and 96%, which is below the standard of manufactur-
ing, yet still more than in non-dynamic services.
As Autor et al. (2003) and Wren (2013) have point-
ed out, dynamic services owe their productivity growth 
largely to heavy investments in ICT. These, however, 
have some repercussions on skill requirements in this 
sector. Since ICT is especially effective in taking on re-
petitive tasks usually performed by workers with medi-
um skills (e.g. book keeping), it reduces the demand for 
workers on this skill level. Instead, it raises the need for 
employees with a college level education, typically more 
general in nature and hardly industry or firm-specific, 
who are able to use ICT as complements to their skills 
in order to increase work productivity. ICT, for instance, 
can facilitate access to and processing of large amounts 
of data, but it is still the employees’ responsibility to in-
terpret the outcomes and to draw their own managerial 
conclusions. Dynamic services, if they are to account 
for a high fraction of total employment, are therefore 
highly dependent on sufficient supply of professionals 
with general skills acquired by tertiary education.
The incidence of atypical employment in dynam-
ic services takes something like a midway position 
between manufacturing and other services. In finance 
about 15% of employees work part-time, in real estate 
and business services it is 22%. Both figures are signifi-
cantly larger than in manufacturing (about 10%), yet 
still lower than in non-dynamic services as well as ed-
ucation and health care whose part-time fractions peak 
at 34%. Temporary work, however, is slightly less com-
mon in financial intermediation than in manufacturing 
(6% compared to 9%); real estate and business services 
are almost on the same level as manufacturing (10%). 
Altogether, dynamic services have a higher overall share 
of atypical employment, with part-time workers by far 
outnumbering fixed term workers. Since interperson-
al interaction is not fundamental to dynamic services, 
firms’ staffing strategies need not be as closely aligned 
to demand fluctuations as in other service sectors, thus 
reducing the necessity to hire atypical workers. On the 
other hand, the reliance on employees with more gen-
eral skills and less intensive firm-based training do not 
put a premium on standard employment. As a result, 
employers in dynamic services have more leeway than 
manufacturers to use to their advantage the flexibility 
provided by atypical employment, but do not depend as 
much on it as firms in non-dynamic services.
Welfare Services: The level of labour productivity 
in public administration, education, health and social 
work is similarly low as in non-dynamic services because 
both are essentially based on interpersonal interaction. 
That is, potential for productivity growth through ICT 
investments is small, which is supported by the num-
bers: only 0.2 to 0.4 percentage points of value added 
growth in welfare services between 1981 and 2007 can 
be accounted for by ICT. Mean labour productivity, rel-
ative to manufacturing, is only ten percentage points 
higher than in non-dynamic services (70%), implying 
that wages too should be only marginally better. 
Yet welfare services differ from other services with 
low productivity in two crucial points. The first is 
that, unlike major parts of non-dynamic services, wel-
fare services are no mere luxury items that can easily 
be self-provided or spared altogether without running 
the danger of incurring serious harm to personal health 
and human capital if, for example, medical treatments 
or school lessons are not carried out. Rather, demand 
for welfare services is likely to hold up even if wages in 
this segment climb above actual productivity and there-
by push up relative prices. The second point is that, in 
most developed countries, the majority of welfare ser-
vices is provided by the public sector. Therefore, they do 
not have to compete under conditions of a free market, 
but are largely tax funded and operate in tightly regulat-
ed legal frameworks stipulating fees and remunerations. 
Taken together, these two points result in wages paid 
in welfare services that lie much closer to the mean of 
the income distribution than labour productivity would 
suggest. Indeed, welfare services altogether pay wages 
6% higher than the average of the total economy (for 
comparison: in non-dynamic services pay is 25% lower 
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than the average). Public administration, defence and 
education are even more lucrative than manufacturing 
(48% and 29% above average). Wages in health match 
those in real estate (98% of average). 
Due to the interpersonal nature of welfare services, 
the need to use atypical work arrangements to increase 
staffing efficiency is approximately the same as in 
non-dynamic services. In education and health services, 
part-time employees account for a share in total em-
ployment almost identical to that in hotels and restau-
rants (35%). The same applies to the share of temporary 
employees, accounting for 18% of total jobs in educa-
tion and health compared to 15% in hotels and restau-
rants. Public administration has a considerable lower 
proportion of part-timers (16%) and fixed term workers 
(11%), but still more than manufacturing. Being able to 
hire employees on atypical terms in large numbers thus 
seems to help the growth of welfare services.
Likewise, the structure of required skills is similar as 
in non-dynamic services. Large fluctuations of demand, 
accommodated by massive use of atypical employees, 
calls for a workforce that is broadly trained with more 
general rather than specific skills. Table 7.3 gives an 
overview of each segment´s specific characteristics. 
7.3 THE IMPACT OF INSTITUTIONS 
ON SECTORAL EMPLOYMENT 
GROWTH
A leading question of this thesis is how social protection 
schemes shape sectoral employment growth. To this 
aim, I outline in this section what kind of influence un-
employment benefits, sickness benefits, and minimum 
incomes take on job seekers’ incentives to accept various 
kinds of jobs and on employers’ decisions which spe-
cific sorts of employment arrangements to offer. Cen-
tral to this issue is how the mentioned schemes interact 
with varying productivity levels, skill requirements, and 
employment structures across different economic seg-
ments. 
Unemployment Protection: As described in section 
5.2., unemployment benefits affect the reservation wage 
and therefore job seekers’ readiness to accept jobs on 
offer. Rising unemployment benefits consequently de-
crease incentives to take on low productivity, low pay 
jobs. Higher values for both unemployment benefit in-
dices are thus expected to reduce employment in low 
pay segments. This applies all the more to benefits for 
atypical workers as their remuneration is typically low-
er than standard employees’. High accessibility of un-
employment benefits is likely to amplify this effect by 
broadening the range of eligible persons. 
The theory of reservation wages also states anoth-
er way by which benefits can affect incentives to seek 
work, resulting in a conclusion contradictory to the 
preceding one. Rather than decreasing it, unemploy-
ment benefits may also enhance the appeal of a job, 
even when pay is slightly below the reservation wage, 
since benefits linked to the take up of work can be per-
ceived as supplements to an otherwise dismal wage. 
That is, if a job appears unattractive due to bad remu-
neration or short tenure, it can be partly offset by un-
employment benefits adding to the expected income. 
Higher values for both unemployment benefit indices 
and the accessibility index may thus also have the ef-
fect of increasing employment in low productivity, low 
pay segments. Whether the employment enhancing or 
Required Skills Productivity /  
Compensation Level
Essential Type of  
Employment
Manufacturing Specific High / High Standard
Non-dynamic Services General Low / Low Atypical
Dynamic Services General High / High Atypical
Welfare Services General Low / High Atypical
Table 7.3: Characteristics of Four Economic Segments
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the employment dampening effect prevails, remains an 
open empirical question.
Unemployment benefits not only have an impact 
on reservation wages, they can also make a difference 
in what kind of work arrangement one might choose. 
If workers with reduced hours and short tenures are 
precluded from benefits by strict access requirements a 
priori, standard jobs become more appealing than part-
time or fixed term ones. This effect is further reinforced 
by discrepancies in the amounts paid out and their 
respective durations. Generous unemployment bene-
fits for standard employees, while benefits for atypical 
workers remain poor, contribute to making standard 
jobs more desirable. In this way unemployment protec-
tion directly partakes in shaping an economy’s employ-
ment structure; in this case, more specifically, it influ-
ences how attractive atypical work is relative to standard 
work. Greater accessibility and more generous benefits 
for atypical employees (relative to standard benefits) 
are therefore likely to increase the incidence of atypical 
work, helping segments to build up employment that 
rely to large parts on this kind of flexible labour and 
vice versa.
Most important, however, is the role unemploy-
ment protection plays in the creation of specific skills. 
There are several institutional prerequisites that must be 
met before specific skills can become prevalent among 
the workforce. Since specific skills are portable across 
firms only to a limited degree, they involve a serious 
risk for any worker acquiring them. If an employee 
equipped with specific skills loses her job, she will find 
it exceptionally difficult to find a new job which makes 
use of her skills to the same degree as before. Any change 
of job will entail a serious and probably enduring wage 
loss, making investments in specific skills a dangerous 
and probably unprofitable undertaking. Given the high 
initial costs of investments in such skills and the risks 
associated with it, workers are likely to shun specific 
training unless there are several social security schemes 
in place to mitigate their perils (Estevez-Abe / Iversen / 
Soskice 2003, Iversen 2005). 
In the literature, three dimensions of security vital 
for specific skill investments have been identified. The 
first is employment protection which refers to the risk of 
job loss itself. If legislation exists that restricts firms’ pos-
sibilities to reduce staff, workers can be more confident 
that the relationship with their employer is going to be 
long-term and that their investments in specific skills 
will pay off. Employment protection legislation is thus 
necessary for a large, successful manufacturing sector 
dependent on specific skills (Iversen / Stephens 2008, 
Harcourt / Wood 2007, Tang 2012, Wasmer 2006). No 
less important is unemployment protection, safeguarding 
income in case a worker becomes jobless despite em-
ployment protection. The measure most highlighted 
by the literature in this context is unemployment ben-
efits which replace a significant fraction of the former 
wage for a prolonged time span once a worker has 
lost her job. This will give her the opportunity to take 
enough time to look for a suitable new job, utilising at 
least parts of her specific skills and hence minimising 
the wage loss she will suffer (Mares 2003). It is hardly 
mentioned in the literature, but sickness benefits serve 
a similar purpose, namely to protect jobs and income 
once an employee falls sick. In this case, the owner of 
specific skills is reassured that she will retain her job and 
that her pay is at least partly upheld until she has fully 
recovered and is able to return to work. However, most 
unemployment and sickness benefits are not infinite. 
The risk that a claimant will not find an adequate new 
job or recuperate before her benefit is exhausted can 
never be ruled out entirely. Therefore, generous min-
imum income schemes, established to step in if other 
support is not available any longer, are an integral part 
of unemployment protection and wrongly neglected 
by major parts of the literature on institutional foun-
dations of specific skills and comparative advantages. 
The last dimension of protection, finally, is called wage 
protection and comprises any mode of coordinated wage 
bargaining that leads to a comparable wage structure in 
any company. This makes sure that, after a period of 
unemployment, a worker can expect to earn a similar 
wage in a new firm and on a new position as before so 
that individual investments in specific skills are not de-
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valued by job or employer changes. It further eliminates 
incentives for firms to free ride by poaching specifical-
ly skilled employees with higher wages, in which case 
all manufacturers would eventually cease their training 
efforts as workers cannot be kept from changing to a 
competitor, thereby eroding the supply of specific skills. 
Another benefit for firms is that coordinated bargaining 
curtails employees’ opportunities to exploit the strate-
gic advantage conferred to them by their specific skills 
to shut down production in order to exact steep wage 
hikes. Wage protection therefore serves the purpose of 
ensuring that both employers and employees can reap 
the fruits of specific skill investments. With regard to 
the importance of unemployment benefits, it follows 
that high values for the unemployment benefit indices 
are a necessary condition for any economic segment re-
lying on the prevalence of specific skills to step up em-
ployment.
Sickness Benefits: The crucial difference between un-
employment and sickness is that the latter does not en-
tail the end of an employment relationship; in fact, with 
sickness benefits in place, firms cannot easily dismiss in-
capacitated workers and, at least in most countries, have 
to continue wage payments, causing them considerable 
additional costs. In contrast to unemployment benefits, 
for the most part concerning the labour supply side, 
sick pay impacts more strongly on the demand side, 
i.e. on employers’ incentives. In a low productivity, low 
Impact on Skill  
Acquisition
Impact on  
Reservation Wage / 
Firms‘ Costs
Impact on Atypical  
Employment
Accessibility 
Unemployment Benefit
High accessibility  
encourages  
acquisition  
Of general skills
High accessibility  
can either push up or  
down reservation wages  
(unclear effect)
High accessibility  
increases incentives  
to take up atypical  
Employment
Unemployment Benefit 
For Atypical Workers
High benefits  
encourage  
acquisition  
Of general skills
High benefit  
can either push up or  
down reservation wages  
(unclear effect)
High benefits  
increase incentives  
to take up atypical  
Employment
Unemployment Benefit  
For Standard Workers
High benefits  
encourage  
acquisition  
Of specific skills
High benefit  
can either push up or  
down reservation wages  
(unclear effect)
Low benefits  
increase incentives  
to take up atypical  
Employment
Accessibility  
Of Sickness Benefit
High accessibility  
encourages  
acquisition  
Of general skills
High accessibility  
pushes up firms‘  
Costs
Low accessibility  
increases incentives  
to take up atypical  
Employment
Sickness Benefit  
For Atypical Workers
High benefits  
encourage  
acquisition  
Of general skills
High benefits  
push up firms‘  
Costs
Low benefits  
increase incentives  
to take up atypical  
Employment
Sickness Benefit  
For Standard Workers
High benefits  
encourage  
acquisition  
Of specific skills
High benefits  
push up firms‘  
Costs
High benefits  
increase incentives  
to take up atypical  
Employment
Minimum Income High benefit  
encourages  
acquisition  
Of specific skills
High benefit  
pushes up reservation  
Wages
No effect
Table 7.4: The Impact of Institutions on Sectoral Employment Growth
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skill environment with rapid turnover of staff generous 
sickness benefits mean that labour costs are driven up 
and may eventually exceed the threshold of profitabil-
ity, resulting in declining employment. On the other 
hand, they may encourage firms to concentrate on high 
skill, high productivity sectors that can more easily af-
ford the expenses and even benefit from entering into 
more long-run relationships with their highly qualified 
staff (e.g. through specific skills), directing the economy 
towards high productivity sectors. 
The rules on accessibility and benefits can also have 
a significant impact on the decision whether a company 
offers more standard or non-standard jobs. If, for in-
stance, dualism exists in that atypical workers receive 
less generous benefits than their standard counterparts, 
employers save costs if they maintain a higher share of 
atypical jobs. In this case, employers are likely to thrive 
whose business model is built upon large proportions of 
atypical contracts (such as non-dynamic services) and 
vice versa. 
For skill acquisition, sick pay serves the same pur-
pose as unemployment protection, namely to reassure 
employees that their income is safe and their qualifica-
tions are not devalued if they fall sick, thereby allowing 
for the spread of specific skills. Generous sick pay is thus 
one prerequisite for industries depending on such skills 
to grow.
Minimum Income: Although minimum incomes 
normally are less than unemployment and sickness ben-
efits, they could nonetheless be able to affect the reser-
vation wage. Especially in low productivity segments, 
basic incomes could have the effect to undermine work 
incentives; in particular, if a large fraction of jobs on 
offer is atypical and low pay. A generous minimum 
income is thus likely to reduce employment in sectors 
based on low wages and high shares of atypical jobs. 
In sectors with higher productivity, however, the min-
imum income is not expected to have any effect on 
employment since wages–both in standard and atypical 
jobs–will outstrip any public basic income by far. 
With regards to skills, minimum incomes serve as a 
supplementary part of unemployment protection, step-
ping in as a last resort if unemployment and sickness 
benefits cannot be obtained or have been exhausted. A 
higher minimum income is therefore hypothesised to fa-
cilitate specific skill acquisition among the workforce, es-
pecially when first-tier benefits are stingy, and to increase 
employment in sectors requiring such skills. An overview 
of the impact of institutions is given in table 7.4.
7.4 HYPOTHESES ON SECTORAL 
EMPLOYMENT GROWTH
As previous sections have pointed out, each sector has 
its idiosyncratic needs that must be met if the sector is 
to expand its employment share. The following para-
graphs derive concrete hypotheses about the specific 
configurations of social protection arrangements that 
may be conducive to employment growth in each of 
the four economic sectors, drawing on the theoretical 
mechanisms set out above. Additionally, further factors 
likely to play a role in the determination of job shares 
are identified and introduced as control variables.
Manufacturing: high productivity makes sure that 
unemployment benefits and minimum incomes cannot 
not subvert work incentives in this sector as wages are 
sufficiently generous. Neither are sickness benefits like-
ly to be a major concern of manufacturers. The costs 
of wage continuation for ill workers are relatively mar-
ginal compared to the profits they earn the firm. What 
is likely to affect job figures, however, is the extent of 
coordinated wage bargaining (Iversen / Soskice 2013). 
If coordination is more pronounced in that wages of 
high productivity sectors (such as manufacturing) are 
closely linked to those in low productivity sectors (such 
as non-dynamic services), wage compression will occur 
since wages in high productivity sectors will stay below 
their actual productivity and wages in low productivity 
sectors will go beyond their productivity. This bolsters 
competitiveness in the high productivity sector and 
raises its employment rate. Coordination of bargaining 
is therefore expected to increase employment shares in 
manufacturing.
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Manufacturing also shows a preponderance of 
standard work arrangements as these complement the 
distinct conditions of industrial production best. Any 
measure that makes full-time, permanent employment 
more desirable than atypical work is thus likely to re-
sult in a larger number of manufacturing jobs. This im-
plies that restrictive accessibility in combination with 
low benefits for atypical workers and high benefits for 
standard ones constitute an institutional environment 
in which industrial jobs are likely to flourish.
Most important, however, is the role of specific 
skills in creating a comparative advantage for manufac-
turing. In order to generate these skills to a sufficient 
extent, a whole range of necessary conditions has so far 
been identified by theory: a significant degree of em-
ployment protection, generous unemployment benefits, 
sickness benefits and minimum income, as well as a sys-
tem of wage bargaining located on a central level. Given 
that specific skills are most profitable when used in stan-
dard work arrangements and also given the preference 
of manufacturing for standard jobs, a social protection 
arrangement seems most favourable for employment 
expansion that, on the one hand, guarantees generous 
financial support in order to allow for specific skills and, 
on the other hand, puts a premium on standard work. 
This calls for a form of dualism concentrating social 
protection on standard workers while being restrictive 
to part-time and fixed term ones; in terms of concrete 
index scores, this is expressed in high values for the ben-
efit index for standard workers as well as high values 
for minimum income. The accessibility index and the 
benefit index for atypical workers, by contrast, should 
display markedly lower values. As for the controls, strict 
employment protection legislation and a centralised 
bargaining are assumed to help manufacturing employ-
ment.
Non-dynamic Services: low productivity and high-
ly price sensitive customers create an environment in 
which firms’ scope for wage increases is tight. A high 
unemployment benefit can therefore seriously hamper 
job growth in this sector if it pushes the reservation 
wage above the threshold of what employers are willing 
to pay. Sickness benefits lead to the same result by add-
ing to the costs employers have to bear, reducing their 
capacity to hire. For persons ineligible for either of these 
benefits, a minimum income too generous can have the 
same effect by driving up the reservation wage exces-
sively. If these hypotheses describe reality correctly, high 
employment in non-dynamic services is contingent on 
low values for all social protection indices. 
Somewhat confusing, from the same theory de-
scribed above contradicting predictions can be derived. 
Given the low wage floor, contribution based unem-
ployment benefits may also be appreciated as wage 
supplements by job seekers, raising their willingness to 
accept low wage work. Hence, more generous unem-
ployment benefits (but not minimum incomes) in com-
bination with less restricted accessibility rules may also 
hold the potential to increase employment in non-dy-
namic services by lowering the reservation wage rather 
than heightening it. This is reinforced by the fact that 
non-dynamic services are highly dependent on atypi-
cal employment which becomes more attractive if it is 
more comprehensively protected relative to standard 
work. Therefore, if it is true that, in fact, unemployment 
benefits raise incentives, we would expect the strongest 
positive effect on employment shares when accessibility 
and benefits for atypical employees are high, whereas 
those for standard ones are relatively smaller. Sickness 
benefits have only partly the same effect as they shape 
employers’ incentives more intensively than job seekers’. 
It is thus unlikely that sick pay impacts on reservation 
wages. More likely is that accessibility of sick pay and 
the generosity of hand-outs to atypical workers may 
serve to make non-standard work more attractive which 
can support employment in non-dynamic services. Spe-
cific skills and their sophisticated institutional prerequi-
sites do not play a role in this sector that is reliant on a 
broad supply of general skills.
Yet wages paid are not determined by productivity 
and social protection schemes alone; there are also more 
direct institutional interferences that can have substan-
tial impact on remuneration. One of them is the extent 
of coordinated bargaining which is able to diminish 
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wage disparities by aligning wage trends in more and 
less productive branches of the economy. While more 
centralisation of bargaining yields a more restrained pay 
level in manufacturing, it makes pay in non-dynamic 
services rise above its actual productivity and therefore 
has a potentially detrimental effect on employment 
(Blau / Kahn 2009, 1999, Freeman 2007). More decen-
tralised wage bargaining, in turn, is expected to increase 
the employment share of non-dynamic services.
In contrast to manufacturing, theories make con-
tradictory predictions as to the effect of social protec-
tion measures. Hence, there are competing hypotheses 
derived from theory that need to be subjected to empir-
ical testing in order to determine which one describes 
reality more closely. The first hypothesis holds that low 
scores for all indices, i.e. a state of low protection with-
out dualism, makes employment shares of non-dynamic 
services grow. The second hypothesis states that higher 
first-tier benefits, in particular the accessibility index 
and the benefit index for atypical workers in the realm 
of unemployment protection, in combination with low 
minimum incomes are most conducive to employment, 
constituting a social protection arrangement with a 
small degree of dualisation due to less restrictive accessi-
bility and relatively higher benefits for atypical workers, 
but with a considerable cleavage between first-tier ben-
efits and the minimum income. More centralised wage 
bargaining impedes the expansion of employment in 
non-dynamic services.
Dynamic Services: Starting with the demand side, 
with respect to high labour productivity in this sector, 
neither unemployment benefits nor minimum incomes 
are likely to undermine incentives to work or hire. Since 
dynamic services are largely based on college educated 
labour inputs with general skills, there is likewise no 
necessity for social security prerequisites to create spe-
cific skills. Considering the need for atypical employ-
ees in dynamic services, however, better accessibility as 
well as higher payments of unemployment and sickness 
benefits for atypical employees may help to ensure the 
availability of part-time and, to a smaller extent, fixed 
term workers. Thus, more generous unemployment and 
sickness benefits for atypical workers in combination 
with easy access may have a small employment enhanc-
ing effect.
On the supply side, sickness benefits may be ben-
eficial for employment growth in dynamic services as 
they reduce turn-over of staff and add to firms’ labour 
costs, giving an incentive to invest in sectors making use 
of highly skilled, highly productive personnel suited to 
recover bigger expenses on wages and fringe benefits; 
this applies to all three sickness benefit indices. 
Wren, Fodor, and Theodoropoulou (2013) argue 
that the centralisation of wage bargaining can also have 
an impact on dynamic services. Work in this sector of-
ten requires college based training; it thus can only grow 
if academic skills are sufficiently widespread among the 
workforce. Since these skills are comparatively expen-
sive investments due to tuition fees and a generally pro-
longed period outside work and in education, they will 
only be made once lucrative employment opportunities 
exist afterwards to recoup the expanses. If incomes are 
compressed by comprehensive collective agreements, 
people may refrain from costly college attendance, leav-
ing academic skills undersupplied. Governments may 
mitigate this effect by subsidising university training 
through waiving of tuition fees and financial grants 
to students, yet even in this case better wage prospects 
are likely to encourage more people to study. Less cen-
tralised wage bargaining might therefore be beneficial 
for employment shares in dynamic services.
Summed up, we generally expect only a modest ef-
fect of social protection schemes on employment. The 
minimum income index is assumed to play no role at 
all; no variety of dualism seems to be particularly help-
ful for job growth in this sector.
Welfare Services: These sectors differ from the previ-
ously described in that they are not purely governed by 
the market, but that substantial parts of them are pro-
vided by the public. The size and staffing of welfare ser-
vices is not so much contingent on supply and demand 
formed by market conditions; it is a political decision 
on how much a society is willing to spend on public 
services. The main determinant of welfare service em-
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ployment and the respective wages paid to employees is 
therefore state expenditure on welfare rather than other 
institutional or market factors. It follows that earnings 
are sufficiently above the reservation wage to preclude 
that benefits and minimum incomes can exert a detri-
mental influence on incentives to accept jobs in this seg-
ment. Because the scale of employment is more a politi-
cal than a market decision, sick pay entitlements are not 
likely to reduce aggregate employment figures in welfare 
services. Moreover, welfare services do not have specif-
ic skill requirements. The only aspect in which benefits 
could make a difference is, as with dynamic services, the 
pervasiveness of atypical work, which could be support-
ed by generous accessibility rules in combination with 
higher and longer payments for atypical workers in case 
of sickness and unemployment. By and large, the effects 
are expected to be quite small, however, with no inher-
ent dynamic towards dualisation. All hypotheses for all 
sectors are briefly summarised in tables 7.5–7.8.
Included in every estimation, whatever the depend-
ent variable, is labour productivity in manufacturing. 
Since the starting point of thinking about tertiarisation 
has always been the massive loss of employment in man-
ufacturing due to increases in productivity (for reasons 
I will not further investigate in this study), it seems to 
be important to control the productivity level of man-
ufacturing in each country and year to see clearer what 
difference labour market institutions make beyond 
productivity differentials. Another control I employ in 
every estimation is state consumption which can divert 
jobs away from the private to the public sector if the 
state decides to heavily invest in public employment as 
is the case of Scandinavian countries. State consump-
tion therefore can play a major role in shaping the pro-
cess of tertiarisation.
Many studies on this topic employ GDP per capita 
as control (e.g. Wren / Fodor / Theodoropoulou 2013), 
yet I deliberately dropped this variable because its in-
terpretation is not straightforward. It can be used as a 
yardstick for an economy’s general development status 
(e.g. in Wren / Fodor / Theodoropoulou 2013), which 
is a rather vague concept, as a measure of affluence or 
as a measure of technical advancement. The latter two 
concepts, however, could be gauged more immediately 
by other proxies such as median income or productivi-
ty, so that adding the GDP per capita as control is not 
going to improve results, especially if it is combined, 
as it often is, with other variables it may share a causal 
relationship with (such as trade openness). 
7.5 DATA
The dependent variables, i.e. the employment shares of 
the four economic sectors, are computed for each coun-
try by dividing the number of persons engaged in each 
of the sectors by the size of the total labour force.3 Data 
on total numbers of people engaged stem from the 
OECD’s STAN data base (using ISIC Rev. 3), figures 
on the labour force were obtained from the OECD’s 
ALFS summary tables. 
The independent variables being at the heart of this 
thesis, i.e. unemployment benefits, sickness benefits, 
and minimum income, are measured by the indices de-
scribed in chapter 7 and enter the estimation at face val-
ue. The transformation of the values performed during 
the cluster analysis is thus not repeated for the regres-
sion. Other data included in the regressions as controls 
were taken from various sources. Figures on productiv-
ity in manufacturing were calculated by dividing the 
value added of manufacturing (in constant 2010 prices 
and in purchasing power parities) by all persons en-
gaged in this sector in any given year.4 Data on value 
added were retrieved from OECD’s STAN data base. 
Public employment, another important control vari-
3 Total labour force includes all people employed or unemp-
loyed and seeking work.
4 It would be more accurate to compute productivity by 
using hours actually worked instead of persons engaged. Yet 
data on hours worked are not available in sufficient sectoral 
detail for many countries. Some comparative calculations 
show that, especially in non-dynamic and welfare services, 
productivity seems to be somewhat underestimated due 
to the high number of part-time workers in these sectors, 
whereas in manufacturing, where atypical work is rare, the 
deviation is rather small.
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Table 7.5: Hypotheses Manufacturing
Causal Mechanism Total Effect
Skill Acquisition Reservation Wage 
/ Firms‘ Costs
Essential Type of 
Employment
Accessibility  
Unemployment 
Benefit
Low accessibility 
discourages atypical 
employment → 
conducive to the acqui-
sition of specific skills 
→ more manufacturing 
employment
No effect  
→ wages are suffi-
ciently high (work 
incentives are not 
eroded)
Manufacturing relies 
on standard work 
→ low accessibility 
discourages atypical 
employment  
→ more manu- 
facturing employment
Low accessibi-
lity increases 
employment in 
manufacturing
Unemployment 
Benefit for Atypical 
Workers
Low benefits discou-
rages atypical 
employment → 
conducive to the acqui-
sition of specific skills 
→ more manufacturing 
employment
No effect  
→ wages are suffi-
ciently high (work 
incentives are not 
eroded)
Manufacturing relies 
on standard work → 
low benefits discourage 
atypical employment 
→ more manufactu-
ring employment
Low benefits 
increase 
employment in 
manufacturing
Unemployment 
Benefit for Standard 
Workers
High benefits serve as 
income protection  
→ encourage acquisi-
tion of specific skills  
→ more manufacturing 
employment
No effect  
→ wages are suffi-
ciently high (work 
incentives are not 
eroded)
Manufacturing relies 
on standard work → 
high benefits encourage 
standard employment 
→ more manufactu-
ring employment
High benefits 
increase 
employment in 
manufacturing
Accessibility of 
Sickness Benefit
Low accessibility 
discourages atypical 
employment → 
conducive to the acqui-
sition of specific skills 
→ more manufacturing 
employment
No effect  
→ productivity is 
sufficiently high 
(firms are able to 
bear the financial 
burden)
Manufacturing relies 
on standard work 
→ low accessibility 
discourages atypical 
employment  
→ more manufactu-
ring employment
Low accessibi-
lity increases 
employment in 
manufacturing
Sickness Benefit for 
Atypical Workers
Low benefits discou-
rages atypical 
employment → 
conducive to the acqui-
sition of specific skills 
→ more manufacturing 
employment
No effect  
→ productivity is 
sufficiently high 
(firms are able to 
bear the financial 
burden)
Manufacturing relies 
on standard work  
→ low benefits 
discourage atypical 
employment  
→ more manufactu-
ring employment
Low benefits 
increase 
employment in 
manufacturing
Sickness Benefit for 
Standard Workers
High benefits serve as 
income protection  
→ encourage acquisi-
tion of specific skills  
→ more manufacturing 
employment
No effect  
→  productivity 
is sufficiently high 
(firms are able to 
bear the financial 
burden)
Manufacturing relies 
on standard work → 
high benefits encourage 
standard employment 
→ more manufactu-
ring employment
High benefits 
increase 
employment in 
manufacturing
Minimum Income High benefits serve as 
income protection  
→ encourage acquisi-
tion of specific skills  
→ more manufacturing 
employment
No effect  
→  wages are suffi-
ciently high (work 
incentives are not 
eroded)
No effect High benefits 
increase 
employment in 
manufacturing
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Causal Mechanism Total Effect
Skill Acquisition Reservation 
Wage / Firms‘ 
Costs
Essential Type of 
Employment
Accessibility  
Unemployment 
Benefit
Non-dynamic services 
rely on general skills 
→ no social protection 
prerequisites  
→ no effect
High accessibi-
lity can either 
push up or down 
reservation wages 
(unclear effect on 
employment)
Non-dynamic services 
rely on atypical work 
→ high accessibility 
encourages atypical 
employment  
→ more non-dynamic 
service employment
Accessibility 
can increase 
or decrease 
employment 
(unclear effect)
Unemployment 
Benefit for Atypical 
Workers
Non-dynamic services 
rely on general skills 
→ no social protection 
prerequisites  
→ no effect
High benefit can 
either push up or 
down reservation 
wages (unclear 
effect on employ-
ment)
Non-dynamic services 
rely on atypical work  
→ high benefits 
encourage atypical 
employment  
→ more non-dynamic 
service employment
Benefit can 
increase or 
decrease 
employment 
(unclear effect)
Unemployment 
Benefit for Standard 
Workers
Non-dynamic services 
rely on general skills 
→ no social protection 
prerequisites  
→ no effect
High benefit can 
either push up or 
down reservation 
wages (unclear 
effect on employ-
ment)
Non-dynamic services 
rely on atypical work  
→ low benefits encourage 
atypical employment  
→ more non-dynamic 
service employment
Benefit can 
increase or 
decrease 
employment 
(unclear effect)
Accessibility of 
Sickness Benefit
Non-dynamic services 
rely on general skills 
→ no social protection 
prerequisites  
→ no effect
High accessibility 
pushes up firms‘ 
costs  
→ negative 
employment 
effect
Non-dynamic services 
rely on atypical work 
→ high accessibility 
encourages atypical 
employment  
→ more non-dynamic 
service employment
Accessibility 
can increase 
or decrease 
employment 
(unclear effect)
Sickness Benefit for 
Atypical Workers
Non-dynamic services 
rely on general skills 
→ no social protection 
prerequisites  
→ no effect
High benefits 
push up firms‘ 
costs  
→ negative 
employment 
effect
Non-dynamic services 
rely on atypical work  
→ high benefits 
encourage atypical 
employment  
→ more non-dynamic 
service employment
Benefit can 
increase or 
decrease 
employment 
(unclear effect)
Sickness Benefit for 
Standard Workers
Non-dynamic services 
rely on general skills 
→ no social protection 
prerequisites  
→ no effect
High benefits 
push up firms‘ 
costs  
→ negative 
employment 
effect
Non-dynamic services 
rely on atypical work  
→ low benefits encourage 
atypical employment  
→ more non-dynamic 
service employment
Low benefit 
increases 
employment
Minimum Income Non-dynamic services 
rely on general skills 
→ no social protection 
prerequisites → no 
effect
High benefit 
pushes up reser-
vation wages → 
negative employ-
ment effect
No effect High benefits 
decrease 
employment
Table 7.6: Hypotheses Non-dynamic Services
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Table 7.7: Hypotheses Dynamic Services
Causal Mechanisms Total Effect
Skill Acquisition Reservation Wage 
/ Firms‘ Costs
Essential Type of 
Employment
Accessibility  
Unemployment 
Benefit
Dynamic services 
rely on general skills 
→ no social protec-
tion prerequisites  
→ no effect
No effect  
→ wages are suffi-
ciently high (work 
incentives are not 
eroded)
Dynamic services rely on 
atypical work  
→ high accessibility 
encourages atypical 
employment  
→ more non-dynamic 
service employment
High accessi-
bility slightly 
increases 
employment 
in dynamic 
services
Unemployment 
Benefit for Atypical 
Workers
Dynamic services 
rely on general skills 
→ no social protec-
tion prerequisites  
→ no effect
No effect  
→ wages are suffi-
ciently high (work 
incentives are not 
eroded)
Dynamic services rely on 
atypical work  
→ high benefits encourage 
atypical employment  
→ more non-dynamic 
service employment
High benefits 
slightly increase 
employment 
in dynamic 
services
Unemployment 
Benefit for Standard 
Workers
Dynamic services 
rely on general skills 
→ no social protec-
tion prerequisites  
→ no effect
No effect  
→ wages are suffi-
ciently high (work 
incentives are not 
eroded)
Dynamic services rely on 
atypical work  
→ low benefits encourage 
atypical employment  
→ more non-dynamic 
service employment
Low benefits 
slightly increase 
employment 
in dynamic 
services
Accessibility of 
Sickness Benefit
Dynamic services 
rely on general skills 
→ no social protec-
tion prerequisites  
→ no effect
Higher accessibility  
causes firms higher 
costs  
→ firms concentrate 
on high productivity 
sectors → more 
dynamic service 
employment
Dynamic services rely on 
atypical work  
→ high accessibility 
encourages atypical 
employment  
→ more non-dynamic 
service employment
High accessi-
bility increases 
employment 
in dynamic 
services
Sickness Benefit for 
Atypical Workers
Dynamic services 
rely on general skills 
→ no social protec-
tion prerequisites  
→ no effect
Higher accessibility  
causes firms higher 
costs  
→ firms concentrate 
on high productivity 
sectors → more 
dynamic service 
employment
Dynamic services rely on 
atypical work  
→ high benefits encourage 
atypical employment  
→ more non-dynamic 
service employment
High benefits 
increase 
employment 
in dynamic 
services
Sickness Benefit for 
Standard Workers
Dynamic services 
rely on general skills 
→ no social protec-
tion prerequisites  
→ no effect
Higher accessibility  
causes firms higher 
costs →  firms 
concentrate on high 
productivity sectors 
→ more dynamic 
service employment
Dynamic services rely on 
atypical work  
→ low benefits encourage 
atypical employment  
→ more non-dynamic 
service employment
High benefits 
can increase 
or decrease 
employment 
(unclear effect)
Minimum Income Dynamic services 
rely on general skills 
→ no social protec-
tion prerequisites  
→ no effect
No effect  
→ wages are suffi-
ciently high (work 
incentives are not 
eroded)
No effect No effect
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Table 7.8: Hypotheses Welfare Services
Causal Mechanisms Total Effect
Skill Acquisition Reservation 
Wage / Firms‘ 
Costs
Essential Type of 
Employment
Accessibility  
Unemployment 
Benefit
Welfare services rely 
on general skills  
→ no social protec-
tion prerequisites  
→ no effect
Wages decoupled 
from productivity 
→ no effect
Welfare services rely on 
atypical work  
→ high accessibility 
encourages atypical 
employment  
→ more non-dynamic 
service employment
High accessi-
bility slightly 
increases 
employment in 
welfare services
Unemployment 
Benefit for Atypical 
Workers
Welfare services rely 
on general skills  
→ no social protec-
tion prerequisites  
→ no effect
Wages decoupled 
from productivity 
→ no effect
Welfare services rely on 
atypical work  
→ high benefits encourage 
atypical employment  
→ more non-dynamic 
service employment
High benefits 
slightly 
increases 
employment in 
welfare services
Unemployment 
Benefit for Standard 
Workers
Welfare services rely 
on general skills  
→ no social protec-
tion prerequisites  
→ no effect
Wages decoupled 
from productivity 
→ no effect
Welfare services rely on 
atypical work  
→ low benefits encourage 
atypical employment  
→ more non-dynamic 
service employment
Low benefits 
slightly increase 
employment in 
welfare services
Accessibility of 
Sickness Benefit
Welfare services rely 
on general skills  
→ no social protec-
tion prerequisites  
→ no effect
Employment poli-
tically determined  
→ no effect
Welfare services rely on 
atypical work  
→ high accessibility 
encourages atypical 
employment  
→ more non-dynamic 
service employment
High accessi-
bility slightly 
increases 
employment in 
welfare services
Sickness Benefit for 
Atypical Workers
Welfare services rely 
on general skills  
→ no social protec-
tion prerequisites  
→ no effect
Employment poli-
tically determined  
→ no effect
Welfare services rely on 
atypical work  
→ high benefits encourage 
atypical employment  
→ more non-dynamic 
service employment
High benefits 
slightly 
increases 
employment in 
welfare services
Sickness Benefit for 
Standard Workers
Welfare services rely 
on general skills  
→ no social protec-
tion prerequisites  
→ no effect
Employment poli-
tically determined  
→ no effect
Welfare services rely on 
atypical work  
→ low benefits encourage 
atypical employment  
→ more non-dynamic 
service employment
Low benefits 
slightly increase 
employment in 
welfare services
Minimum Income Welfare services rely 
on general skills  
→ no social protec-
tion prerequisites  
→ no effect
Wages decoupled 
from productivity 
→ no effect
No effect No effect
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able, must be measured indirectly through government 
consumption expenditure proportional to GDP (both 
obtained from World Bank’s World Development Indi-
cators data base) because exact data on the numbers of 
public jobs are not readily available for most countries 
(Tepe 2009). 
To operationalise the coordination of wage bar-
gaining, Visser (2015) proposes one specific way in his 
ICTWSS data set by conseptualising a ‹centralisation 
index› that measures on which level wage bargaining 
takes place. It takes into account, among other factors, 
the authority of union confederations towards their 
member organisations, whether or not unions are af-
fected by internal and external divisions, and the pro-
portion of members represented by single unions and 
confederations. The index ranges between zero and 
one, indicating a higher centralisation by higher scores. 
A high degree of centralisation is most likely to result 
in a more compressed wage structure, as unions do not 
bargain wages separately for single groups of employees, 
e.g. for single occupations or skill levels, but negotiate 
wages for all different types of employees within an in-
dustry. 
Dismissal protection, finally, is gauged as suggest-
ed by the OECD’s employment protection legislation 
index for regular employment (see OECD 2014 for 
details).
7.6 METHOD OF ESTIMATION
The estimations are conducted using an error correction 
model (ECM) which can be represented as follows: 
Yit=βo+β1Yit-1+β2ΔXit+β3Xit-1+ui+vt+ε
Y is a sector’s share of the total labour force, i is the 
country subscript, and t is the subscript of the time 
period. The regressors are represented by X. U is a set 
of country dummies, and v is a set of time dummies. 
Benefit indices for standard and atypical employees are 
not simultaneously part of the regressors; each enters 
the regression after the other, all other variables stay-
ing the same. This procedure becomes necessary since, 
if both were included, the number of regressors would 
be on the verge of overfitting. Moreover, both indices 
are closely correlated. The results, however, do not sub-
stantially change, no matter whether both variables are 
included separately or together.
The advantage of an ECM is that it allows us to 
capture effects occurring immediately, in the subsequent 
time period, and dispersed over several time periods. 
The former two effects are easy to access from the equa-
tion as they are represented by β1 and β2, while the ac-
cumulated total effect over multiple time periods, the so 
called the long-run multiplier (LRM), must be worked 
out using the Bewley transformation (Bewley 1979). 
The ECM is a most general model that imposes no 
prior restrictions on the variables’ lag structures, which 
seems to be the right way to proceed for the theories 
tested in this study predicting no exact time span within 
which the explanatory variables are going to influence 
the dependent variable. Unemployment benefits, for 
example, may influence educational decisions only in 
the long-run, but may have an immediate impact on 
reservation wages. Forcing a specific lag structure on the 
data a priori would therefore almost certainly result in 
spurious outcomes (Deboef / Keele 2008). The ECM, 
by contrast, tests and informs us whether an effect is 
transitory or long-term, which is additional, crucial in-
formation for the interpretation of the results. The only 
contemporaneous variables included are centralisation 
of wage bargaining and the EPL index because they do 
not have enough variability to be modelled in error cor-
rection form.
One controversy is closely tied to the inclusion of a 
lagged dependent variable (LDV) which is widely used 
to correct for serial correlation present in most time se-
ries data. While it is very successful in doing so, a com-
mon criticism is that, if the independent variables have 
a time persistent influence, the LDV absorbs too much 
of the independent variables’ power and becomes overly 
dominant in explaining the outcome, leaving no room 
for other regressors (Achen 2001, Plümper / Troeger / 
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Manow 2005). I decided to include an LDV despite 
these caveats for two reasons. First, since regressors are 
allowed to have a more persisting influence, the ECM 
weakens the LDV’s power to dominate the estimation 
and consequently reduces a possible bias (Deboef / 
Keele 2008). Second, employment shares are not ran-
domly generated anew in each time period, but strong-
ly dependent on the prior period; changes are likely to 
happen only gradually. There is thus a strong path de-
pendency that should be explicitly modelled to avoid 
overestimating the independent variables’ effects (Beck 
/ Katz 2011). In my estimations, the inclusion of an 
LDV suffices to get rid of serial correlation5 in all cas-
es, except when employment shares of welfare services 
are to be explained. Only then I additionally apply the 
Prais-Winsten procedure to eliminate auto-correlation. 
Standard errors in all estimations are panel corrected 
(Beck / Katz 1995). Full sets of country and year dum-
mies are added since F-tests concluded they belong in 
the model.
As a last point, issues of endogeneity need to be 
discussed. As research has shown, economic crises en-
tailing soaring unemployment levels can trigger reforms 
of benefit schemes (Høj et al. 2006, Duval / Elmeskov 
2006), whereas this study assumes that benefits shape 
employment structures. It follows that the analysis may 
suffer from endogeneity problems if unemployment 
directly affects employment shares of specific sectors. 
For example, in an economic downturn employment 
in non-dynamic services might contract faster than in 
other sectors as these kinds of services are considered 
luxury items, the demand for which falls disproportion-
ally relative to incomes. A decreasing fraction of total 
employment in non-dynamic services would then re-
flect growing unemployment figures which could affect 
benefit systems and cause endogeneity in the analysis. 
This concern turns out to be unjustified, however, as 
employment shares in no single sector are markedly cor-
related with unemployment:6 Correlation coefficients 
5  Breusch-Godfrey-Test
6  Data obtained from the OECD data base.
oscillate between -0.1 in manufacturing and 0.25 in 
non-dynamic services. The dependent variables are thus 
not good proxies for unemployment, so that endogene-
ity seems no severe issue here.
7.7 RESULTS
7.7.1. UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS
I begin this section with the presentation of the results 
with unemployment benefits as independent variables 
(see tables 7.9 and 7.10). The effects on employment 
shares in manufacturing are partly surprising. As ex-
pected, unemployment benefits for standard workers 
have a positive impact in the short run (yet insignif-
icant), but the long run multiplier is negative and 
significant. This runs counter to the hypothesis that 
high unemployment benefits for standard workers are 
a necessary condition for the creation of specific skills 
among the workforce and thus for a large industrial 
sector. The parameters of the accessibility variables are 
more in line with our expectations, though on a much 
smaller scale than theory had predicted. The long run 
multiplier is negative and significant as expected, but 
the parameter of the differenced accessibility variable 
is significant positive. The overall effect is small (one 
additional index point lowers the manufacturing em-
ployment share by 0.063 percentage points) and neg-
ative. The effect of minimum income is strong and 
significant in the long run and stays so even when the 
insignificant positive short-term effect is subtracted 
from it (a one percentage point increase in minimum 
income raises the manufacturing employment share by 
0.075 percentage points) which is widely in congru-
ence with expectations. The reason why the immediate 
effects of benefits, accessibility, and minimum income 
have different signs than the long-term effect may be 
that in the short run higher benefits and lower min-
imum income support are perceived as greater, albeit 
transitory, incentives to take up jobs, whereas the effect 
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of unemployment protection on skill acquisition needs 
more time to play out. 
The assumed positive impact of higher central-
isation of wage bargaining is confirmed by the data. 
Likewise, productivity and state consumption show the 
correct signs as predicted by theory both in the short 
and in the long run, although in the former they are 
significant only for state expenditure. This implies that 
the state has a more immediate capacity to influence 
employment shares while structural change happening 
through productivity growth is more incremental. EPL, 
however, was insignificant in all estimations and thus 
dropped from the regressions.
When unemployment benefits for atypical employ-
ees are inserted in the estimation instead of standard 
benefits, results hardly change, except that the negative 
long run effect of benefits is growing larger. Falling un-
employment benefits for fixed term and part-time em-
ployees therefore seem to be more conducive for manu-
facturing employment than falling support for standard 
workers.
From this we can conclude that the hypothesis 
that generous unemployment protection for standard 
workers is needed to make manufacturing thrive is not 
directly confirmed by the estimations. Rather, manufac-
turing sustains its employment share particularly when 
first-tier benefits are curtailed. Even though it is impos-
sible to tell from the regressions whether manufacturing 
employment holds up as a result of or in spite of decreas-
ing benefits, it is safe to conclude that unemployment 
protection is not only and not most crucially provided 
by unemployment benefits. Instead, rising minimum 
incomes seem to be associated with higher employment 
in manufacturing, leading us to the tentative conclu-
sion that it is primarily minimum income schemes that 
offer the financial protection needed for workers to ac-
quire specific skills. It is important to note, however, 
that trimming atypical workers’ benefits does more to 
bolster manufacturing than standard workers’. That is, 
a situation where standard workers can receive higher 
benefits than atypical ones, even when both are subject 
to a general downward trend, is conducive to manu-
facturing employment. Hence, the incentive to prefer 
standard over atypical jobs may be preserved when ben-
efits accrued from standard employment relationships 
will still be relatively greater compared to benefits from 
atypical work. The discouragement of non-standard 
employment is further amplified by restrictive accessi-
bility rules. 
Summed up, the results imply that first-tier bene-
fits are not the primary defenders against income loss 
due to unemployment, but that this task is primarily 
performed by minimum income schemes. Nonetheless, 
despite their vanishing function as financial protection 
measures, unemployment benefits still appear to serve 
the purpose of privileging standard over atypical work 
by erecting high obstacles for atypical employees to 
become eligible and by offering higher (or less sharp-
ly dropping) benefits to standard workers. In this way, 
they still put a premium on standard employment and 
discourage the take up of atypical jobs which helps the 
acquisition of specific skills. Manufacturing thus has 
the inherent tendency to produce dualisation in form 
of atypical employees being treated less favourable by 
unemployment insurance both in terms of access and, 
albeit less pronounced, benefits. The tendency towards 
dualism is only alleviated by generous minimum in-
comes. One caveat to this interpretation is that the 
time series begins in the 1990s; a period, in which most 
countries cut back on their unemployment protection 
schemes. It might be interesting to observe a longer pe-
riod, e.g. starting in the 1960s, to analyse whether there 
had been a different trend prior to 1990 and when there 
(possibly) was a turning point.
With employment in non-dynamic services as de-
pendent variable, both coefficients of short and long 
run effects of unemployment benefits for standard 
employees are significant positive. The same holds for 
accessibility, whereas minimum income has an overall 
negative impact. The hypothesis that minimum income 
schemes can hamper employment growth in non-dy-
namic services by lifting the reservation wage is thus 
confirmed by the data. As to the question whether un-
employment benefits provide further incentives for the 
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slim. The mere prospect of being integrated in social se-
curity systems seems to represent an incentive sufficient 
to rise employment in a segment that otherwise would 
be considered unattractive. At least if benefits are not 
too generous–besides higher accessibility only benefits 
for standard employees have a weak positive effect on 
employment; financial support for atypical workers, by 
contrast, has a negative net effect, implying that benefits 
should primarily reward people who work longer while 
those with shorter hours and tenures should be handed 
less. Incentives stimulating work in non-dynamic ser-
vices hence stem from an unemployment benefit system 
that is highly inclusive for atypical workers, opening up 
the perspective to become eligible to benefits quickly, 
yet with generosity being contingent on how much one 
has worked before. The minimum income should be 
low, making first-tier benefits more valuable. Just like 
manufacturing, non-dynamic services are prone to du-
alism in unemployment benefits, although the specific 
shape of dualism is exactly opposite: it manifests itself in 
a gap between benefits for standard and atypical work-
ers as well as a stingy minimum income, only mitigated 
by comprehensive accessibility (not necessarily resulting 
in generous benefits, however).
Productivity in manufacturing has a negative long 
run multiplier contradicting Baumol’s theory of cost 
disease. Since benefits are controlled for, we would have 
expected to see a positive sign of manufacturing pro-
ductivity, indicating that manufacturing workers are 
take up of jobs in this segment or whether they under-
mine them, the results clearly show that the motivation 
effect of standard benefits outweighs the adverse effect 
of a higher reservation wage once minimum income is 
controlled for. In this context, accessibility has a larger 
incentivising effect than duration and amounts of the 
benefits. 
Outcomes with benefits for atypical employees as 
independent variable further corroborate these results. 
While coefficients for accessibility and minimum in-
come barely change, benefits for fixed term and part-
time employees have a small but positive significant im-
mediate impact and a larger negative impact in the long 
run. Therefore, unlike benefits for standard workers, 
higher benefits for non-standard workers seem to erode 
work incentives in the long run by pushing up the reser-
vation wage. The same calculations were also performed 
with the centralisation of wage bargaining as a further 
control which was insignificant in all estimations and 
consequently dropped. 
Key to higher employment in non-dynamic ser-
vices is thus a low minimum income, keeping the 
reservation wage down in combination with inclusive 
accessibility rules, exerting a markedly higher influence 
on employment than amount and duration of benefits. 
Greater accessibility obviously does not discourage the 
acceptance of less well paid jobs, but rather seems to be 
the largest source of additional work incentives, even if 
the benefits atypical employees can expect to receive are 
Strict Accessibility Divergence of 
First-tier Benefits 
Between Standard and 
Atypical Workers
Divergence between 
Minimum Incomes And 
First-tier Benefits for 
Standard Workers
Manufacturing ↑ ↑ ↓
Non-dynamic Services ↓ ↑ ↑
Dynamic Services ↓ ↓ -
Welfare Services - - -
Table 7.9: Unemployment Benefits: Types of Dualisation Conducive to Sectoral Employment
Legend: 
Increasing dualisation helps sectoral employment: ↑ 
Decreasing dualisation helps sectoral employment: ↓ 
Dualisation has no discernable effect: –
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Table 7.10: Regression Results for Unemployment Benefits
Manufacturing 
Employment
Non-dynamic 
Service 
Employment
Dynamic Service 
Employment
Welfare Service 
Employment
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Lagged Dependent Variable 0.825*** 
(0.04)
0.825*** 
(0.04)
0.819*** 
(0.043)
0.812 *** 
(0.043)
0.83 *** 
(0.035)
0.83 *** 
(0.036)
0.796 *** 
(0.042)
0.799*** 
(0.041)
Δ Benefit for Standard 
Employees
0.012 
(0.046)
0.088** 
(0.039)
0.115 *** 
(0.033)
0.048 
(0.032)
Benefit for Standard 
Employeest-1
-0.022 
(0.022)
0.009 
(0.026)
-0.016 
(0.019)
0.028 
(0.024)
Benefit for Standard 
Employees LRM
-0.126*** 
(0.024)
0.047* 
(0.026)
-0.092*** 
(0.02)
0.124*** 
(0.04)
Δ Benefit for Atypical 
Employees
0.004 
(0.051)
0.082* 
(0.043)
0.085** 
(0.033)
0.067* 
(0.039)
Benefit for Atypical 
Employeest-1
-0.029 
(0.028)
-0.018 
(0.029)
-0.014 
(0.021)
-0.02 
(0.026)
Benefit for Atypical 
Employees LRM
-0.164*** 
(0.031)
-0.095*** 
(0.028)
-0.078*** 
(0.021)
0.002*** 
(0.005)
Δ Accessibility 0.113*** 
(0.042)
0.112*** 
(0.041)
0.15*** 
(0.044)
0.143*** 
(0.043)
-0.127 
(0.029)
-0.0008 
(0.03)
0.04 
(0.034)
0.032 
(0.034)
Accessibilityt-1 -0.031 
(0.032)
-0.029 
(0.032)
0.078** 
(0.036)
0.082** 
(0.036)
0.018 
(0.02)
0.017 
(0.021)
-0.018 
(0.026)
-0.02 
(0.026)
Accessibility LRM -0.176*** 
(0.035)
-0.167*** 
(0.034)
0.431*** 
(0.032)
0.437*** 
(0.031)
0.104*** 
(0.021)
0.095*** 
(0.021)
-0.001 
(0.0005)
-0.018 
(0.046)
Δ Minimum Income -0.019 
(0.011)
-0.016 
(0.011)
-0.018* 
(0.01)
-0.017* 
(0.01)
-0.002 
(0.008)
-0.003 
(0.008)
-0.009 
(0.01)
-0.094 
(0.01)
Minimum Incomet-1 0.016 
(0.008)
0.017** 
(0.008)
-0.012** 
(0.005)
-0.011** 
(0.053)
0.001 
(0.005)
0.001 
(0.005)
0.003 
(0.007)
0.002 
(0.007)
Minimum Income LRM 0.091*** 
(0.01)
0.095*** 
(0.01)
-0.659*** 
(0.006)
-0.06** 
(0.006)
0.006 
(0.005)
0.007 
(0.005)
0.015 
(0.012)
0.013 
(0.011)
Δ Productivity in  
Manufacturing
-0.00001 
(-0.000009)
-0.00001 
(0.000009)
0.00005 
(0.000007)
0.000004 
(0.000007)
0.000004 
(0.000006)
0.000003 
(0.000006)
0.000007 
(0.000008)
0.000007 
(0.000008)
Productivity in Manufac-
turingt-1
0.0000024 
(0.0000039)
-0.000002) 
(0.000004)
-0.000003 
(0.00004)
-0.000003 
(0.000004)
0.000004* 
(0.000002)
0.000004* 
(0.000002)
0.00001*** 
(0.000004)
0.00001*** 
(0.000004)
Productivity in Manufactu-
ring LRM
-0.000014*** 
(0.0000038)
-0.00001*** 
(0.000004)
-0.00001*** 
(0.000004)
-0.00004*** 
(0.000004)
0.00003*** 
(0.000003)
0.00002*** 
(0.000003)
0.00001* 
(0.000008)
0.00001 
(0.000008)
Δ State Consumption -0.165*** 
(0.039)
-0.165*** 
(0.039)
-0.071* 
(0.032)
-0.068** 
(0.032)
-0.072*** 
(0.027)
-0.071*** 
(0.027)
0.131*** 
(0.029)
0.131*** 
(0.029)
State Consumptiont-1 -0.124*** 
(0.028)
-0.124*** 
(0.028)
-0.032** 
(0.19)
-0.036* 
(0.019)
-0.032* 
(0.02)
-0.034* 
(0.02)
0.089*** 
(0.025)
0.088*** 
(0.025)
State Consumption LRM -0.709*** 
(0.03)
-0.715*** 
(0.03)
-0.179*** 
(0.02)
-0.19*** 
(0.02)
-0.2*** 
(0.02)
-0.2*** 
(0.021)
0.191*** 
(0.043)
0.191*** 
(0.043)
Centralisation of Bargaining 0.012*** 
(0.004)
0.012*** 
(0.004)
R² 0,73 0,73 0,67 0,67 0,67 0,67 0,99 0,99
N 299 299 299 299 299 299 299 299
*p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01 Standard errors in parantheses
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absorbed by services. Yet this is not reflected in the data. 
According to the estimations, rising employment in 
non-dynamic services is no necessary outcome of grow-
ing manufacturing productivity. When the impacts of 
social protection measures and state consumption are 
controlled for, non-dynamic services rather appear as a 
way towards higher employment in all such economies 
where jobs in other, more productive segments–manu-
facturing or dynamic services–are not available. It fits 
into this picture that state consumption has negative 
short and long-term effects on non-dynamic services, 
reflecting the state’s willingness to accommodate excess 
labour by public employment in social services.
We expect a much smaller influence of social pro-
tection on employment in dynamic services as these are 
not affected by the reservation wage and do not depend 
on specific skills. In fact, this is broadly reflected in the 
results of the estimations, showing a significant positive 
immediate effect of both the unemployment benefit for 
standard and atypical employees, which is cancelled out 
almost entirely by a long-run effect working in the op-
posite direction. The positive short term effect may be 
due to a transitory boost in motivation to accept jobs 
since rising benefits are perceived as a top-up to regular 
pay, but this effect is bound to fade out quickly. The 
total effect is nearly zero. Both kinds of benefits obvi-
ously are not crucial determinants of dynamic service 
employment. Accessibility has positive coefficients for 
all time periods, of which only the long-run multiplier 
is significant. This result is thus in accord with theory, 
positing that specific features of unemployment protec-
tion for atypical employees can serve to make atypical 
work more appealing relative to standard work. As we 
see here, just as we have seen with non-dynamic ser-
vices, it is primarily accessibility that makes private ser-
vice jobs–and presumptively mainly atypical jobs–more 
desirable rather than the amount and duration of po-
tential benefits. The influence of minimum incomes is 
insignificant across all time periods which is just as ex-
pected. In a first version, centralisation of wage bargain-
ing was included as additional control, but it turned out 
to be insignificant in all estimations and therefore was 
dropped. 
Rising productivity in manufacturing is significant-
ly associated with higher employment shares in dynam-
ic services in the long-run, also when social protection 
measures are controlled for. This suggests that more 
advanced industry production is also beneficial for the 
growth of dynamic services as both may complement 
each other. A surge of badly paid service jobs is hence 
not at all a necessary consequence of rising labour pro-
ductivity in the industrial sector. The results confirm 
Wren’s (2013) alternative argument that employment in 
dynamic services may turn out to be a viable high-road 
strategy out of the service transition trilemma should 
the state not be willing to compensate the losses in man-
ufacturing with public employment (the coefficients of 
state consumption are negative and significant). More-
over, jobs in dynamic services do not require the exis-
tence of welfare dualism to prosper.
Welfare services are thought to be little dependent 
on social protection given that major parts are public 
employment governed by political decisions rather than 
market forces. Both regressions with welfare services as 
dependent variable yield the results that accessibility 
and minimum income have neither short nor long term 
impacts significantly distinct from zero. Only the ben-
efit variables have a positive significant effect, slightly 
greater for atypical workers, lending tentative support 
to the hypothesis that greater benefits for atypical work-
ers make this kind of employment more appealing and 
thereby support job growth in welfare services. In gen-
eral, however, all social protection variables, regardless 
of their significance, have a positive long run effect in 
these estimations, suggesting that the significance of the 
benefit variables might be spurious, since a more mu-
nificent state may simultaneously spend more on public 
employment as well as on social support. As expected, 
the coefficient of state consumption is large, positive 
and highly significant both in the short and in the long 
term. Also the long run multiplier of productivity in 
manufacturing is significant in both estimations, con-
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One possible explanation may be that minimum in-
come protection has taken over this function. Manu-
facturing and services then fundamentally differ from 
each other in the structure of social security needed to 
expand employment: manufacturing can do without 
generous unemployment benefits and merely requires 
a well established minimum income scheme, whereas 
services (particularly those with low productivity) flour-
ish with a more restricted minimum income in combi-
nation with more accessible, but not necessarily more 
generous, unemployment benefits. Manufacturing and 
non-dynamic services then both have the inherent ten-
dency to favour specific forms of welfare dualism where-
as dynamic and welfare services may prove as segments 
allowing for more equal, yet not always more encom-
passing, social protection.
7.7.2. SICKNESS BENEFITS
The same calculations as with unemployment benefits 
have also been conducted with sickness benefits as inde-
pendent variables (see tables 7.11 and 7.12). When the 
employment share of manufacturing is the dependent 
variable, we see that sick pay for standard workers has a 
strong positive and significant influence in the long-run, 
while the coefficient of accessibility is negative and sig-
nificant across all time periods. If sick pay for non-stan-
firming the assumption that welfare services can pick up 
some of the employment that is lost in manufacturing, 
provided that sufficient funding is made available by the 
public purse.
As a conclusion, more inclusive accessibility seems 
to help employment in all kinds of services other than 
welfare (although the effect may be quite low in dynam-
ic services). Once minimum income is controlled for, 
the prospect to receive unemployment benefits turns 
out to have a motivating rather than a hampering ef-
fect on job seekers’ willingness to accept a job on offer. 
More ambiguous are the results concerning benefits. In 
non-dynamic services, a combination of greater benefits 
for standard and slimmer benefits for atypical workers 
appear to reward the take-up of work while avoiding to 
drive up the reservation wage. As implied by high pro-
ductivity, benefits in the long run are almost neutral in 
their impact on dynamic service employment. Only job 
growth in welfare services seems to be associated with 
higher benefits for standard and atypical employees.
In manufacturing, benefits for neither type of em-
ployees bolster employment, nor does greater accessi-
bility. This is partly an expected result because strict 
accessibility and low payments are a disincentive to 
atypical work. What is surprising is that, at the same 
time, benefits for standard workers were decreasing 
without significantly damaging manufacturing employ-
ment, contradicting the concept of income protection. 
Strict Accessibility Divergence of First-
tier Benefits Between 
Standard and Atypical 
Workers
Divergence between 
Minimum Incomes And 
First-tier Benefits for 
Standard Workers
Manufacturing ↑ ↑ -
Non-dynamic Services ↑ ↑ ↑
Dynamic Services ↓ - -
Welfare Services - - -
Table 7.11: Sickness Benefits: Types of Dualisation Conducive to Sectoral Employment
Legend: 
Increasing dualisation helps Sectoral employment: ↑ 
Decreasing dualisation helps Sectoral employment: ↓ 
Dualisation has no discernable effect: -
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Manufacturing 
Employment
Non-dynamic 
Service 
Employment
Dynamic Service 
Employment
Welfare Service 
Employment
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Lagged Dependent 
Variable
0.827*** 
(0.039)
0.845*** 
(0.039)
0.86*** 
(0.039)
0.848*** 
(0.04)
0.83*** 
(0.037)
0.826*** 
(0.037)
0.8*** 
(0.041)
0.8*** 
(0.039)
Δ Benefit for 
Standard Employees
0.06 
(0.08)
-0.002 
(0.089)
-0.062 
(0.075)
0.096 
(0.062)
Benefit for 
Standard 
Employeest-1
0.225*** 
(0.058)
0.095 
(0.064)
0.053 
(0.072)
0.137** 
(0.059)
Benefit for 
Standard Employees 
LRM
1.296*** 
(0.06)
0.677*** 
(0.074)
0.312*** 
(0.076)
0.086 
(0.102)
Δ Benefit for 
Atypical Employees
0.063 
(0.047)
0.065 
(0.051)
-0.007 
(0.032)
0.078** 
(0.039)
Benefit for Atypical 
Employeest-1
-0.04 
(0.034)
0.011 
(0.039)
-0.002 
(0.025)
0.02 
(0.034)
Benefit for Atypical 
Employees LRM
-0.259*** 
(0.038)
0.073* 
(0.039)
-0.014 
(0.025)
0.12** 
(0.057)
Δ Accessibility -0.145*** 
(0.069)
-0.133* 
(0.07)
-0.072 
(0.076)
-0.089 
(0.074)
-0.063 
(0.05)
-0.031 
(0.055)
0.1 
(0.062)
-0.055 
(0.057)
Accessibilityt-1 -0.133
** 
(0.037)
-0.117*** 
(0.041)
-0.01 
(0.036)
-0.011 
(0.039)
0.038 
(0.027)
0.044* 
(0.025)
0.035 
(0.031)
0.02 
(0.034)
Accessibility LRM -0.769*** 
(0.054)
-0.751*** 
(0.053)
-0.073** 
(0.035)
-0.071* 
(0.038)
0.222*** 
(0.03)
0.253*** 
(0.277)
0.021 
(0.064)
-0.06 
(0.07)
Δ Minimum Income -0.024** 
(0.011)
-0.205* 
(0.011)
-0.022** 
(0.01)
-0.021** 
(0.01)
-0.004 
(0.008)
-0.004 
(0.008)
-0.013 
(0.01)
-0.012 
(0.01)
Minimum Incomet-1 0.012 
(0.007)
0.016** 
(0.008)
-0.011** 
(0.006)
-0.01* 
(0.006)
-0.00006 
(0.005)
0.008 
(0.005)
0.001 
(0.007)
0.002 
(0.007)
Minimum Income LRM 0.068*** 
(0.009)
0.001*** 
(0.01)
-0.079*** 
(0.006)
-0.069*** 
(0.006)
-0.0003 
(0.005)
0.005 
(0.005)
0.013 
(0.012)
0.014 
(0.012)
Δ Productivity in 
Manufacturing
-0.00001 
(0.000008)
-0.00001 
(0.00001)
0.000002 
(0.000007)
0.0000009 
(0.000008)
0.000002 
(0.000006)
0.000002 
(0.0000006)
0.000007 
(0.000008)
0.000006 
(0.000007)
Productivity in 
Manufacturingt-1
0.000002 
(0.000003)
-0.000002 
(0.000004)
-0.000004 
(0.000004)
-0.000005 
(0.000004)
0.000004* 
(0.000002)
0.000003 
(0.000002)
0.00001** 
(0.000004)
0.00001*** 
(0.000004)
Productivity in 
Manufacturing LRM
0.00001*** 
(0.000004)
-0.00002*** 
(0.000004)
-0.00003*** 
(0.000004)
-0.00004*** 
(0.000004)
0.00002*** 
(0.000003)
0.00002*** 
(0.000002)
0.00001 
(0.000008)
0.00001 
(0.000008)
Δ State Consumption -0.154*** 
(0.037)
-0.155*** 
(0.038)
-0.075** 
(0.034)
-0.078** 
(0.033)
-0.076*** 
(0.026)
-0.078*** 
(0.027)
0.127*** 
(0.03)
0.124*** 
(0.029)
State Consumptiont-1 -0.112
*** 
(0.028)
-0.107*** 
(0.029)
-0.034 
(0.021)
-0.034* 
(0.021)
-0.034* 
(0.02)
-0.037* 
(0.02)
0.084*** 
(0.026)
0.087*** 
(0.025)
State Consumption 
LRM
-0.646** 
(0.268)
-0.68*** 
(0.029)
-0.239*** 
(0.023)
-0.226*** 
(0.023)
-0.203*** 
(0.02)
-0.21*** 
(0.021)
0.193*** 
(0.043)
0.196*** 
(0.042)
Centralisation of 
Bargaining
0.008* 
(0.004)
0.009** 
(0.004)
R² 0,73 0,73 0,66 0,66 0,67 0,67 0,99 0,99
N 299 299 299 299 299 299 299 299
*p < 0.1 **p < 0.05 ***p < 0.01 Standard errors in parantheses
Table 7.12: Regression Results for Sickness Benefits
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dard workers is inserted into the estimation in place of 
the benefit for standard employees, the coefficients of 
accessibility do not change, but the coefficient of the 
benefit index: the effect turns negative. This means that 
a social security scheme is favourable for manufacturing 
that is designed in such a way that it hands out generous 
financial support to standard employees while atypical 
employees are either excluded through strict qualifica-
tion criteria or, if they qualify, receive less. Theory had 
predicted this outcome. High benefits for standard 
workers serve as income protection expediting the oth-
erwise risky decision to invest in specific skills vital for 
manufacturers to maintain their competitive advantage. 
For firms, on the other hand, it becomes more lucrative 
to focus on segments requiring well trained and highly 
productive staff rather than specialising in mass produc-
tion of technically less sophisticated consumer goods. 
Atypical work is discouraged through lower benefits and 
strict accessibility, further strengthening incentives for 
individuals to seek standard employment and specific 
skills. At the same time, employers are relieved from ex-
tra costs incurred from sickness benefits for their atyp-
ical staff who constitute no integral part of their core 
workforce and can be replaced quickly. From the high-
er positive coefficient of sickness benefits for standard 
workers we can conclude however, that income protec-
tion weighs more heavily in promoting the competitive 
advantage of manufacturing than the cost-saving effect 
of less generous accessibility and benefits for atypical 
workers. The structure of dualism is similar to what we 
have already seen in unemployment benefits. Atypical 
employees get markedly worse terms than standard ones 
in first-tier schemes, but are somewhat compensated by 
a higher minimum income.
Minimum income, state consumption, and central-
isation of wage bargaining show results similar to those 
we obtained from the estimations with unemployment 
benefits. The exception is the coefficient of productivi-
ty: if the sickness benefit index for atypical workers is 
included as independent variable, it is negative and sig-
nificant as expected. Once sick pay for standard workers 
enters the calculation, the sign of productivity changes, 
but stays significant. This change survives also when all 
other controls are dropped from the equation in a step-
by-step procedure. In none of the other estimations 
such a change of signs occurs. Generally, with all oth-
er dependent variables, the coefficients of productivity 
remain insensitive to variations in the composition of 
independent variables. Nonetheless, in the case of man-
ufacturing we must interpret the change of sign as a hint 
that the relationship between productivity and employ-
ment may not be too robust. 
With non-dynamic services as dependent variable, 
minimum income, productivity, and state consumption 
are in congruence with the results from previous regres-
sions. The effect of sickness benefits deviates somewhat 
from the effect of unemployment support, however. 
Sick pay for standard workers as well as for atypical 
workers exerts a positive significant long-run influence 
on non-dynamic service employment, the standard ben-
efit more so than the non-standard benefit; the unem-
ployment benefit, by contrast, has a similar impact only 
for standard employees. This result conflicts partly with 
theory which had predicted that lower benefits for stan-
dard employees would be conducive to employment. 
Obviously, additional incentives to work on atypical 
terms do not stem from smaller benefits for standard 
workers. Accessibility has a negative significant long-run 
multiplier, but is lower than for manufacturing or when 
the same calculations were performed with unemploy-
ment benefits. We can thus conclude that amount and 
duration of sick pay have no detrimental impact on the 
number of non-dynamic service jobs despite their pos-
sibly cost-increasing effect on employers. The positive 
impact of retaining staff over longer periods even when 
they fall sick seems to exceed the higher costs arising 
from wage continuation. While in manufacturing this 
link holds only for standard workers, in non-dynamic 
services it encompasses atypical ones as well, which is 
only logical given the much higher reliance on this type 
of work. Considering that the effect is smaller for atyp-
ical workers, it must be noted, that standard workers 
seem to be more essential for a firm’s success. Yet the 
positive influence of sick pay emerges only in presence 
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of one critical limitation: accessibility is restricted (in-
dicated by a negative coefficient) so that it is available 
only to a privileged fraction of atypical employees who 
manage to meet the qualification requirements. That is, 
generous benefits are focused on those atypical employ-
ees who already have proven their value to the employer 
whereas others remain excluded, reducing the risk of 
atypical employees misusing sick pay for shirking. At 
the same time, it opens up an opportunity to employ a 
secondary group of atypical workers on less favourable 
terms, performing less crucial tasks and being easy to re-
place so that retaining them when sick has no benefit for 
the firm. In terms of dualism, this entails that a social 
protection arrangement is conducive to non-dynamic 
services once it largely excludes atypical employees from 
first-tier benefits and offers no compensation in the 
form of a higher minimum income. On the other hand, 
if atypical employees qualify nonetheless, their benefits 
are comparatively generous.
The picture looks different when employment in 
dynamic services is concerned. There are no significant 
immediate effects of any sick pay variable, but there is 
a positive significant long-run effect of accessibility and 
of benefits for standard employees. Benefits for atypical 
employees, by contrast, are negative and insignificant. 
Minimum income and controls have coefficients similar 
to those measured when unemployment benefits were 
part of the estimation. Once again, lower sickness bene-
fits for standard workers seem not to be needed in order 
to increase the appeal of atypical employment. Rather, a 
generous benefit for standard employees gives incentives 
to retain highly productive, often college-educated em-
ployees, increasing firms’ productivity. This argument 
even extends to comprise also a large proportion of 
atypical employees, as can be seen from the positive co-
efficient of accessibility. Therefore, it does not result in 
a financial disadvantage if atypical workers are covered 
by sick pay early on. It might also contribute to make 
atypical work more attractive and help to make sure that 
a sufficient number of atypical employees is available. In 
return for more inclusive accessibility, benefits paid out 
to non-standard employees might be somewhat lower 
than to standard ones, yet this relationship is not sig-
nificant. Even if the true effect is zero, it would be safe 
to conclude that it is not primarily amount and dura-
tion that make both employers retain atypical workers 
and job seekers accept non-standard job offers, but it is 
the prospect of being integrated into the scheme, even 
in spite of possibly relatively lower benefits. Dualism is 
thus no prerequisite to employment.
For welfare services the same pattern emerges as does 
when unemployment benefits are the regressors. Neither 
accessibility nor minimum income is significant in any 
of the estimations. Productivity is positive and border-
line significant in the long-run, while state consumption 
exerts a highly positive influence both immediately as 
well as across future time periods. Standard sick pay is 
positive significant only in the short-term; shrinking it 
does not improve the attractiveness of atypical work. For 
non-standard employees, benefits are also significant in 
the long-run with the same sign. As with unemployment 
benefits, social protection schemes seem to play only a 
subordinate role in creating welfare service employment; 
the more decisive impact stems from the means the state 
is able to provide. The positive impact of sick pay may 
thus be spurious if a state’s more pronounced willingness 
to social spending simultaneously leads to higher bene-
fits and more extensive public employment.
It is clearly visible that manufacturing has the high-
est propensity to unequal treatment of atypical workers 
because it is the least dependent on flexible work ar-
rangements, with atypical workers accounting for only 
a small proportion of total staff. It is reliant instead on 
a high number of standard workers covered by high 
sickness benefits, serving as income protection, whereas 
their non-standard counterparts are frequently excluded 
or receive less generous benefits. In all service sectors 
the situation looks more favourable to atypical employ-
ees: since fixed term and especially part-time work is 
pervasive and crucial for each of these segments, it is 
profitable for firms to perceive non-standard employees 
as part of their core workforce and to retain at least a 
fraction of them for longer periods. In low productivi-
ty services this seems to be achieved by higher benefits 
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targeted towards a limited group of atypical employees 
who meet tough qualification requirements. Atypical 
workers who fail to do so, however, remain excluded. 
This way, employers are able to keep some atypical em-
ployees as core workers while they can still exploit other 
atypical employees as a resource of flexible and cheap 
labour. In dynamic services with higher productivity, 
cost considerations play a smaller role so that firms can 
more easily afford to pay sickness benefits and to retain 
atypical workers. Hence, accessibility of sickness bene-
fits can be high without damaging employment growth; 
the possibility to leave a fraction of atypical workers 
without protection to cut costs is limited. In welfare 
services only amount and duration of benefits can help 
to increase the employment share. It follows that higher 
benefits for everyone in combination with greater ac-
cessibility are most conducive (or at least not harmful) 
to dynamic and welfare services. Manufacturing and 
non-dynamic services, on the other hand, require sick-
ness benefits to be more dualised.

8. CONCLUSION
The patterns of rules by which countries structure their 
social protection systems are manifold. Breaking these 
patterns down into their various, constitutive parts 
opens up a novel, more detailed perspective on the de-
sign and evolution of social security. This has become 
necessary since the economic and societal environment 
in which such schemes operate has profoundly changed 
through the growth of service jobs and the associated in-
crease in atypical employment, posing a new challenge 
to the provision of welfare and thus for research on it. 
A more traditional approach to comparative analysis of 
social policy is to focus primarily on replacement rates–
the major concern of standard workers.The quality of 
social security for atypical employees, however, hinges 
on several more factors, determining whether or not a 
scheme is beneficial for them. One of these is accessibil-
ity, deciding how much volume of work and contribu-
tions is needed for successfully filing a claim; another is 
whether benefits reach the same level of generosity for 
atypical as for standard workers. And finally, it is mini-
mum incomes, as a complement to contribution based 
benefits, which are serving as the only financial support 
many atypical employees will possibly receive. The spe-
cific combinations of these four aspects form what is 
called a social protection arrangement, the analysis of 
which tells much about a welfare system’s capacity to 
accommodate the needs of different types of employ-
ees and the perhaps unequal treatment of standard and 
atypical workers referred to as dualism.
The set-up of social protection arrangements in the 
realm of unemployment benefits follows some general 
patterns. One is that accessibility and minimum in-
comes serve as functional equivalents, i.e. if access to 
benefits is heavily restricted, it is often counterbalanced 
by more extended basic incomes and vice versa. Another 
pattern is the relative conformity of both benefits for 
standard and for atypical workers. Substantially lower 
benefits, specifically targeted to non-standard employ-
ees, are thus rather uncommon and not a major source 
of dualisation. Subtle divergences in benefit amounts 
and duration do occur, however: more restrictive quali-
fication requirements tend to result in somewhat higher 
standard benefits and slightly lower benefits for atypical 
employees, discriminating latter group twice by closing 
the path to first-tier benefits and, in the less likely case 
non-standard employees qualify nevertheless, granting 
them smaller payments. Yet this effect is only small giv-
en that benefits are generally similar. High dualisation 
through tight accessibility rules is therefore only weakly 
reinforced by divergences in benefits between standard 
and atypical workers, and mitigated by more extensive 
basic incomes. The Continental European Cluster with 
Restricted Protection (Finland, Germany, the Nether-
lands, Norway) in 2006 or the Exclusive Continental 
Cluster (Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Swe-
den) in 1991 closely match this pattern. A different log-
ic applies to the correlation of benefits for atypical em-
ployees with access conditions: they rise in tandem with 
each other. If accessibility is accommodating, benefits 
for atypical employees tend to be so as well; the main 
source of dualisation is then the marginal level of mini-
mum income support. In both 1991 and 2006, it is the 
Anglo-Saxon and Mediterranean cluster which is para-
digmatic for this kind of social protection arrangement.
Against a theoretical backdrop of Esping-Ander-
sen´s three worlds it is safe to state that significant 
shifts happened between 1991 and 2006. In 1991 the 
three regimes had been clearly discernible; 15 years lat-
er they were profoundly transformed. First, the social 
democratic cluster has ceased to exist as cuts to mini-
mum income support question universalism. The social 
democratic cluster thus has assumed more conservative 
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traits. The conservative clusters, on their part, have tak-
en on a novel shape that cannot be easily interpreted in 
terms of the three worlds typology. Their trajectory has 
been marked by retrenched accessibility and first-tier 
benefits, partly compensated for by rising minimum in-
comes. Insurance based benefits hence increasingly have 
lost their capacity to status preservation in conservative 
regimes. Given the relatively high level of basic incomes, 
they do not simply converge with the liberal model, but 
rather form something entirely new. I will later in this 
chapter give some possible political explanations as to 
why the clusters have evolved the way they have.
How social security is arranged is not a merely aca-
demic question. Rather, the shape and evolution of any 
social protection arrangement has serious repercussions 
on an economy’s employment structure and therefore 
is capable of releasing significant institutional and 
functional synergies as well as frictions. The regression 
analysis discerned several such complementarities in the 
realm of unemployment benefits. Regarding the manu-
facturing sector in the period between 1990 and 2008, 
the retrenchment of first-tier benefits, i.e. accessibility 
and benefits for both standard and atypical employees, 
did not result in job losses, even though the hypothesis 
of unemployment benefits needed as income protection 
had predicted it. Instead, a hike in minimum incomes 
turned out to prop up manufacturing employment, 
suggesting that income protection, securing workers’ 
investments in specific skills, is increasingly provided by 
basic incomes rather than first-tier benefits. In this con-
text, it turns out that most conducive to manufacturing 
is a social protection arrangement that is strongly du-
alised in terms of restrictive accessibility rules, but less 
dualised in terms of benefits, as a convergence of first 
and second-tier benefits seems to help employment in 
this sector.
If the employment share of non-dynamic services 
is observed, the key result is that, under certain circum-
stances, unemployment benefits can act as a further re-
ward for otherwise unattractive jobs. For this to happen, 
benefits need to be easy to come by, yet to be handed 
out only for a short while and in small amounts, un-
less volume and tenure of previous work grow larger. 
Minimum incomes need to be universally low. This way, 
work incentives are not undermined by overly generous 
wage replacements; rather, if stepping up working time 
is increasingly compensated for by the entitlement to 
receive larger benefits, it makes work appear more ap-
pealing. Moreover, this affects particularly atypical jobs 
which become more desirable once they are integrated 
in unemployment schemes. The specific kind of dualis-
ation promoting employment in non-dynamic services 
is thus quite different from the sort that is beneficial to 
manufacturing. It does not result from excluding atyp-
ical workers, but from granting better financial support 
to those who work more, while those who work less also 
receive less.
Services with higher labour productivity are less af-
fected by the design of social protection arrangements. 
Employment both in dynamic and welfare services is 
not hurt by increases in any part of social security con-
sidered here.
Sickness benefits take a somewhat different shape. 
The major difference is that accessibility and minimum 
incomes do not share a negative correlation, and thus 
cannot be interpreted as functional equivalents. Instead, 
they reinforce each other which renders them inherent-
ly prone to dualism, since atypical employees who, by 
strict contribution conditions, are often excluded from 
first-tier benefits cannot expect a higher minimum in-
come as compensation. A further source of dualism, as 
already seen in unemployment benefits, is the link be-
tween accessibility and benefits, with tighter access lead-
ing to slightly lower handouts to atypical workers and 
vice versa. Both types of first-tier benefits are positively 
correlated, however, limiting the scale of dualisation. In 
1991, the cluster consisting of Denmark, Finland, the 
Netherlands, and Norway is typical for this pattern in 
that it combines high accessibility with high minimum 
incomes and moderate benefits for standard workers. 
On the other side of the spectrum in 1991, it is France, 
Ireland, and Japan which are tying more generous ben-
efits for standard workers to strict access requirements, 
supplemented by a comparatively slim minimum in-
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come. In 2006, the cluster of Belgium, France, and 
Spain best fits this pattern.
Altogether, in 1991 sickness benefits can be cate-
gorised in accordance with the three worlds typology. 
There is something like a social-democratic regime with 
generally extensive benefits, but without strict accessi-
bility rules. The conservative world comes in varying 
forms: one creates dualisation by means of low mini-
mum incomes, the other one by restricted accessibili-
ty and differences between benefits for standard 
and non-standard workers. A liberal world exists as 
well, characterised by equally ungenerous first and sec-
ond-tier benefits. 15 years onwards, no fundamentally 
new type of world has emerged as changes to sickness 
benefits were smaller in scale and frequency than to 
unemployment benefits. Only Japan and New Zealand 
form a peculiar own world with surprisingly extended 
basic incomes and very reduced first-tier benefits. Liber-
al principles have been on the rise in almost all clusters 
which manifest themselves in the downward conver-
gence of first and second-tier benefits. 
Sick pay has a significant impact on sectoral em-
ployment structures, affecting incentives through the 
channel of employers’ costs. In manufacturing, it proves 
most favourable if sickness benefits are targeted on 
standard employees, with accessibility being strict and 
handouts to atypical workers small. Minimum incomes 
should be large. Through this specific social protection 
arrangement, the acquisition of specific skills is encour-
aged as well as the take up of standard work; at the same 
time, it is accepted that higher dualism through the dis-
crimination of atypical employees in first-tier schemes is 
a necessary consequence of this strategy. 
Similarly, sick pay with restricted access and gen-
erous first-tier benefits is supportive also for jobs in 
non-dynamic services. In contrast to manufacturing, 
benefits for standard workers may be high without ham-
pering employment growth, while minimum incomes 
should be low. Employers hence face incentives to retain 
both standard and a certain number of privileged atypi-
cal workers. Thanks to restrictive accessibility, however, 
large parts of the atypical, non-core workforce remain 
excluded from benefits, ensuring that employers’ per-
sonnel costs do not become excessive. Therefore, the 
specific form of dualism beneficial for this kind of low 
productivity service is based on tight access require-
ments and slim basic support, but is not founded on 
disparities in first-tier benefits. Neither dynamic nor 
welfare services exhibit a related propensity towards du-
alisation.
In summary, the intensified focus on the treatment 
of atypical workers in social security schemes, first and 
second-tier, has opened up a promising new perspective 
in comparative research. Economies combine different 
dimensions of welfare systems in distinct ways, leading 
to a large variety of outcomes. Taking these dimension, 
such as accessibility, minimum incomes etc., explicitly 
into account, gives a more nuanced view of social pro-
tection than one single aggregate figure like the decom-
modification index. While such a single index can be 
useful for a whole range of specific research questions, 
others can be better answered by various, more differen-
tiated measures. Single aspects like accessibility, for ex-
ample, may have impacts different from benefits’. Even 
more likely, the distinct combination and interaction of 
these dimensions may be crucial to the outcomes of a 
welfare scheme. This has become particularly obvious 
when the relation of access requirements to unemploy-
ment benefits and minimum incomes were examined, 
which were found to act as functional equivalents. If, 
for instance, the impact of social security on unemploy-
ment is to be analysed, this interaction must be con-
sidered: curtailing accessibility is unlikely to result in 
more employment if minimum income support is still 
significantly above the reservation wage. 
Since this study only aimed at describing the pat-
terns of change and their outcomes, it has remained 
unanswered why countries have undergone welfare 
reforms in so varying ways. I present some hypotheses 
here that might help explain the causes of distinct tra-
jectories. For reasons of clarity, I have illustrated these 
trajectories on the basis of two particularly characteris-
tic countries, namely Germany and Britain. The latter 
country is instructive for reforms in a liberal way, lead-
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ing to low manufacturing and high non-dynamic ser-
vice employment: between 1990 and 2008, accessibility 
of unemployment benefits slightly increased (from 7.2 
to 7.5), benefits for atypical workers decreased (from 1.6 
to 0.7) as well as the basic income (from 0.29 to 0.25). 
Unemployment benefits for standard workers did not 
increase as predicted, yet their further retrenchement 
in absolute terms was smaller than the retrenchment 
of atypical workers´ benefits (from 0.7 to 0.1). Similar 
was the evolution of sick pay in Britain: both kinds of 
benefits were significantly trimmed (benefits for atypi-
cal workers from 2.4 to 1.6, benefits for standard em-
ployees from 1.2 to 0.6), accessibilty remained virtually 
unchanged. At the same time, broadly in line with the 
results from the regressions, the share of non-dynam-
ic services increased from an already high number of 
28% to 29%; the share of manufacturing declined from 
18% to 10%. On the other side, there is Germany, re-
taining a manufacturing share of 27% (1991) and 18% 
(2008) which is high by international standards. It is 
also paradigmatic for the specific way of welfare enti-
tlement reforms in conservative states: over the 1990s, 
accessibility was becoming slightly more generous, but 
eventually curtailed over the course of the 2000s, taking 
it back to the level of 1991 (5.7). Benefits were dramati-
cally retrenched (non-standard benefits from 7.1 to 1.9, 
standard benefits from 8.3 to 2.1). Basic incomes, how-
ever, rose from 0.51 to 0.53. With regard to sick pay, ac-
cessibility was made tougher, falling from universal ac-
cess (10) to much more restrained access (6.8). Benefits 
went down, but only by a small margin (6.5 to 6.1 for 
atypical employees, 6.8 to 6.6 for standard ones). All in 
all, Germany and Britain, as paradigmatic examples of 
the conservative and liberal world, conducted reforms 
that would help the former to maintain a high manu-
facturing share and the latter to have a high proportion 
of non-dynamic services. The question is, why exactly 
these countries were following their respective routes.
Starting with Britain and the liberal world, it was 
Esping-Andersen who argued in 1990 that entitlements 
were too modest to create broad support to the welfare 
state among the middle classes (Esping-Andersen 1990: 
26). Therefore, in an economic environment marked 
by polarisation between well-paid, high productivity 
services and badly-paid, low productivity services, it is 
convenient to secure an electoral majority in favour of 
welfare state retrenchment because this allows to more 
easily push people off the dole and into employment in 
non-dynamic services. Coinciding with a steep decline 
in union bargaining power, the wage floor for low-qual-
ified workers becomes substantially lower. Indeed, the 
withdrawal of support for the welfare state among the 
middle-class is most conspicuously illustrated by cen-
tre-left parties catering increasingly towards the interests 
of white-collar workers and appealing less to manual 
workers (Gingrich / Häusermann 2015). As a result, 
decommodification is no longer pursued as a vital goal 
of social and labour policy, but replaced by activation. 
To this aim, benefits and terms of receipt are cut on a 
large scale. Accessibility, on the other hand, can even be 
made more accommodating to enhance the incentives 
to work in atypical jobs necessary for non-dynamic ser-
vices. Since entitlements are slim, there is no risk that 
broader accessibility may compromise work incentives 
or trigger further redistribution. Given the low general 
level of welfare entitlements, there is no room for and 
no advantage in reforms increasing dualism. The task 
to insure against risks of unemployment and illness is 
more and more taken over by privately organised insur-
ances. These developments altogether may cause what 
comes close to a vicious circle in the liberal world in 
which benefit retrenchment leads to further polarisation 
on the labour market which further promotes welfare 
cuts. The final point may be the further erosion of the 
middle-class if no far-reaching measures to promote 
productivity are taken.
In Germay, the starting position is different. Strong 
benefit entitlements safeguard the living standard of 
the middle-class and entrenched unions provide for a 
more egalitarian wage structure. In this situation, re-
searchers often referred to Germany and other conserv-
ative countries as a ‘frozen welfare landscapes’ unable 
and unwilling to profound reform. Yet this study has 
shown that change has been taking place. The reasons 
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for this are, as Clasen / Clegg (2006) and Clegg (2007) 
argue, that the welfare state hit its financial limits. With 
unemployment figures rising, generous benefits for un-
employed became unsustainable. Moreover, the welfare 
state seemed ill-prepared for the equally rising num-
ber of atypical workers whose level of social protection 
through social insurances was trailing far behind that of 
standard workers. The existing protection schemes were 
seen as creating a situation of benefit overreach and un-
dershoot, undermining work incentives for the unem-
ployed while withholding proper benefits to the really 
needy. Persisting unemployment in combination with 
reinforced financial strains and a perceived unfairness 
of the existing system then create a political evironment 
that, at least gradually, becomes amenable to reform.
The reform strategy that was pursued is called re-
calibration by Clegg (2007), i.e. streamlining first and 
second-tier benefits. In practice, insurance-based bene-
fits were curtailed and basic incomes raised. This way, 
going back to work becomes more worthwile for recipi-
ents of first-tier benefits and minimum income support 
is better able to protect those who do not qualify for 
other kinds of financial support. The main obstacle to 
more employment was less seen in overly lavish social 
assistance, but in an insurance system that-sometimes 
infinitely-protected the living standard of former well-
paid employees. A reform strategy of better matching 
first and second-tier benefits then originates from a 
logic that, on the one hand, aims to allow for more 
wage differentiation and, on the other hand, wants 
to preserve the functionality of a system encouraging 
heavy employer and employee investments in specific 
skills. What is searched for is a new balance between 
activation, sufficient social security to provide for 
firm-specific skills, and more accommodating support 
for atypical employees. The outcome, in Germany and 
elsewhere in the conservative world, is a system main-
taining a heavy dualism based on restrictive accessibil-
ity, but a mitigated dualism based on lower first-tier 
and higher second-tier benefits. It is no wonder then, 
that this sort of reform has frequently been conduct-
ed by Social-democratic parties, trying to reconcile the 
entrenched interests of the middle-class with the need 
for more employment without forgetting about atypical 
employees. It remains to be seen, however, whether or 
not the conservative model is substantially weakened by 
the cuts to status preservation; if for this reason the wel-
fare states becomes less favourable to the middle-class it 
may set in motion a process leading to further erosion 
of entitlements and a convergence of the liberal mod-
el where there are only minor differences between first 
and second-tier benefits.
Besides unemployment and sickness benefits, there 
are many more schemes that deserve to be analysed in 
a similar way. One of them is certainly pensions, be-
ing under heavy financial pressure due to demographic 
change and subject to profound reform efforts in almost 
all developed countries. Since pensions contribute a 
great deal to overall tax burdens, they are likely to have 
a major effect on employment. It thus appears highly 
promising to develop comparable composite indices 
assessing pension entitlements of standard relative to 
atypical employees and their specific forms of dualism. 
The same applies to schemes such as maternity pay, dis-
ability pensions, or paid holidays.
In context of the indices proposed in this thesis, 
there are several more aspects that need to be scrutinised 
in more detail. One of them certainly is household size. 
For reasons of simplicity and practicability, this study 
has assumed a middle-aged single worker, although a 
large proportion of workers in fact live with families. 
Further studies therefore should take into account the 
presence of a spouse and children. The consideration 
of additional years, i.e. a longer time series, is also a de-
serving subject for future studies because many welfare 
systems had already reached their climax in terms of 
coverage and generosity in the 1970s and 1980s which 
were not included in this thesis. A more prolonged time 
series would allow us to examine whether the social 
protection of atypical employees was reformed in ways 
intentionally differing from that of standard workers, 
whether the relation of both has changed over the years 
and with it the resulting forms of dualism, and whether 
there were turning points where the protection of stand-
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ence of a welfare state with universally high benefits, 
unaffected by the need to selectively exclude specific 
groups of employees. Moreover, it shows that a delib-
erate strategy of slowing down service growth in order 
to retain large manufacturing employment is not the 
best solution either, as jobs in the industry sector de-
pend on specific skills and standard work, calling for 
very exclusive welfare schemes. Increasing employment 
in dynamic services or public jobs, however, makes it 
possible to unite inclusiveness and generous benefits. 
Stepping up efforts to increase college education and 
expanding the range of social services provided by the 
state thus seems to be the most effective remedy against 
welfare dualism. 
ard and atypical workers took diverging or converging 
directions.
Finally, what can governments do to reconcile 
comprehensive social security with high employment? 
As we have seen, manufacturing and non-dynamic ser-
vices both share the drawbacks of being prone to dualis-
ation, albeit in different forms. If in times of advancing 
tertiarisation a high standard of welfare entitlements is 
to be preserved without inducing too much dualism, 
non-dynamic services are not the route to follow. In-
stead, Anne Wren’s argument has been confirmed that 
high productivity services provide a way out of the ser-
vice economy trilemma, not only by allowing for more 
evenly spread wages, but also by allowing for the exist-
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CHRISTOPHER GATZ
Social Protection 
of Atypical Employees
Atypical work, i.e. part-time and fixed term employment, has become the 
new norm in many industrialised countries. Welfare states, however, were 
traditionally designed to accommodate the needs of standard workers in 
manufacturing.
     This study examines to what extent welfare states have adapted to 
the proliferation of atypical work in the period of 1990 to 2008. Since the 
rise of atypical work is closely related to deindustrialisation and an in-
creasing role of services in developed economies, the study also deals with 
the question how the specific design of welfare schemes has incentivised 
growth or stagnation of various service sectors.
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